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Abstract 
Intellectual property protection (IPP) attained its importance in recent years because of 
the steady increase of intellectual property-endowed goods and technology in global 
trade. Technology producers, among them multilateral pharmaceutical companies 
(MPCs) felt that the Paris Convention (the Convention) was not adequate in dealing with 
trade related issues, and that an agreement was needed to integrate the subject of IPP; 
especially patent protection for pharmaceuticals, into the broader context of global trade - 
law. 
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (the TRIPS 
Agreement) concluded in the Uruguay Round in 1994 brought IPP into the global trading 
system. The patent system contained in the Agreement reflects to a large extent MPCs' 
proposal for a strengthened patent system which paves the way to ensure market access 
and equal competition opportunity in their endeavour to expand global operation. 
The objective of the global trading system is to liberalise trade, achieved by securing 
commitments of market access and equal competition opportunity through the application 
of the principles of most-favoured-nation treatment, national treatment and reciprocity, 
reinforced by domestic competition policy to ensure efficient functioning of markets. 
4 
However, in regard to patent protection for pharmaceuticals, the exercise of the exclusive 
marketing rights conferred by patent protection has trade restricting effect because 
competition is excluded during the patent term. This trade restricting effect does not 
compliment the objective of the global trading system nor promote competition. But the 
TRIPS Agreement does not cover a negotiated result on securing the recognition in 
domestic competition policy of the exclusive marketing rights conferred by patent 
protection, especially when domestic competition policy is designed to compliment 
microeconomic policy such as health care cost control. The implementation of 
international exhaustion to allow parallel importation of patented products during the 
term of patent is an example in point. It is an. issue the TRIPS Agreement does not 
address and is excluded from the World Trade Organisation (WTO) dispute settlement 
mechanism. It is a legal issue because the disparity among national competition policy- 
will cause trade distortions. It is political because the issue touches upon nations' 
regulatory autonomy in designing their competition policy to compliment other 
government policies. It also has economic implications in that countries might wish to 
rely on parallel importation as a mechanism to bring down prices of patent products. A 
complex issue as such requires- a multilateral solution enshrined in a legally binding 
agreement. In the absence of such an agreement, patent system under the TRIPS 
Agreement will be inadequate and ineffective because it will become inoperable and 
nations will incline to retrieve to unilateral actions for the resolution of grievances. 
s 
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Introduction 
The TRIPS Agreement 1 was concluded in 1994 after seven tortuous years of multilateral 
trade negotiations (MTNs) under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT). It provides the most comprehensive multilateral agreement on IPP to 
date. And for the first time in a multilateral treaty, it contains provisions specifically 
relating to patent protection for pharmaceuticals. Among the supporters of such an 
agreement, MPCs had played an influential role in bringing IPP into the global trading 
system and securing a multilateral patent regime of industrialised countries' (ICs') 
standard. They believed such an agreement was essential in laying the groundwork for 
their expansion of global trade in pharmaceuticals. 
In seeking such an agreement within the framework of the global trading system, the 
liberalisation and expansion of global trade could be achieved by securing market access 
and equal competition opportunity commitments through MTNs under the auspices of the 
GATT, with the reinforcement of domestic competition policy to ensure the efficient 
functioning of markets as the basis for the implementation of treaty obligations. These 
two inter-linked factors will serve as the benchmarks to evaluate whether the patent 
system for pharmaceuticals 2 conferred by the TRIPS Agreement provides an adequate 
' GATT, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 
Annex IC, 15 April 1994 (hereinafter the Final Act). 
2 Whether to include patent protection for pharmaceuticals within the framework of TRIPS MTNs had 
attracted more debates than other issues in the Uruguay Round across the North-South axis. See discussion 
in Zutshi, B. K., `Bringing TRIPS into the Multilateral Trading System', in Bhagwati and Hirsch (eds. ), 
The Uruguay Round and Beyond, Heidelberg: Springer, 1998, pp. 37-50, Subramanian, Arvind, `Putting 
Some Numbers on the TRIPS Pharmaceutical Debate', International Journal of Technology Management, 
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and effective patent regime for MPCs 3 which ensures the legal recognition of the 
exclusive marketing rights among nations. 
The substantive analysis of this thesis begins with the examination of economic and legal 
dimensions of patent protection for pharmaceuticals. It gives insight to ICs and 
developing countries' (DCs') different perspectives 4 as to their desired legal standard of 
a multilateral patent system, its function in the domestic and global economies, 5 why the 
10(2/3), 1990a, p. 253, and Hoekman, Bernard M. and Michel M. Kostecki, The Political Economy of the 
World Trading System - From GATT To WTO, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 151. 3 MTNs on TRIPS under the auspices of the global trading system came about as a market-driven initiative 
by multinational corporations (MNCs) from industrialised countries, who are the major producers of 
intellectual property-endowed products and technology. Among them, MPCs were at the forefront of 
advocating the inclusion of patent protection for pharmaceuticals as a part of TRIPS MTNs in the Uruguay 
Round. In their survey of British industries, Taylor and Silberston comment that the pharmaceutical 
industry stands alone in the extent of its involvement with the patent system. See Taylor, C. T. and Z. H. 
Silberston, The Economic Impact of the Patent System: A Study of British Experience, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1973, p. 231. Mansfield and Levin et al also confirm the importance of patent 
in protecting the process and product innovations of the pharmaceutical industry. See Mansfield, Edwin, 
`Patent and Innovation: An Empirical Study', Management Science, 32,1986, pp. 173-181 and Levin, 
Richard C., Alvin K. Klevorick, Richard R. Nelson, and Sidney G. Winter, Appropriating the Return from 
Industrial Research and Development, Cowles Foundation Paper no. 714, Cowles Foundation for Research 
in Economics at Yale University, 1989, p. 797. In this thesis, multinational pharmaceutical corporations 
refer to those research based pharmaceutical companies that produce original brand name products and 
operate in the global market. These companies are described as "multinational" because however large the 
companies may be and however many subsidiaries they may have scattered across the globe, most of them 
have a centralised management structure (see Mead, Richard, International Management - Cross-Cultural 
Dimensions, 2°d ed., Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998, pp. 356-357 and Lessem, Ronnie, Global 
Management Principles, Hertfordshire: Prentice Hall, 1989, pp. 12-13. ) Although some manufacturers 
from this industry also engage in the production of generic products, it is only as a strategic move to 
counter generic erosion of market shares of their patent-expired products. The original brand name 
products are ethical products, which require physicians' prescription to dispense, i. e., physicians make the 
decision as to what medicine to prescribe for their patients. The original brand name pharmaceuticals are 
not proprietary medicines commonly known as Over-the-Counter medicines (OTCs) which are considered 
to be safe for self-medication which are available without prescription. 
4 It is important to give a balanced view on patent protection for pharmaceuticals from the perspectives of 
both ICs and DCs even though the assessment of the adequacy and effectiveness of the patent system for 
pharmaceuticals under the TRIPS Agreement in this thesis is made from the stand point of MPCs. 
Going beyond economic debates, ICs viewed a strengthened IP system as necessary to provide a fair rule- 
based global trading environment that safeguards patent holders' exercise of exclusive marketing rights 
conferred by patent protection. DCs, the majority of them technology purchasers, remained defensive in 
protecting their economies from the invasion of monopolistic power derived from exclusive marketing 
rights patent holders enjoy. DCs argued that there is a divorce between patent protection in DCs and 
incentive on the R&D investment in that that granting of patent protection to MPCs had not had influence 
on their decision on where to conduct their R&D, and it was unlikely to affect MPCs' foreign investment 
decisions. Instead, it had been used as a tool to erect barriers of entry to DCs' markets. Furthermore, the 
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Convention was inadequate, how the patent system should be revised 6 and under which 
forum. 7 The inclusion of TRIPS in general, and the patent system for pharmaceuticals in 
specific, on the agenda of the Uruguay Round MTNs was only made possible by two 
major events which took place in the global political and economic scenes prior to the 
Uruguay Round. Firstly, the global economy was faced with severe recession during that 
patent regime under the Convention failed to address DCs' development needs, nor did it curtail 
monopolistic power exercised by foreign patent owners. See Vaitsos, Constantine V., `The Revision of the 
International Patent System: Legal Considerations for a Third World Position', World Development, 4(2), 
1976, pp. 85-102 and from the same author `Patent Revisited: Their Function in Developing Countries', 
Journal of Development Studies, 4(2), 1972, pp. 85-102, Lall, Sanjaya, `The Patent System and the 
Transfer of Technology to LDCs', JWTL, 10(1), 1976, pp. 1-16, and Oddi, Samuel A., `The International 
Patent System and Third World Development: Reality or Myth? ' Duke Law Journal, 1987, pp. 831-878. 
See discussion in Chapter 1.5.1. 
6A strengthened IP system was seen by ICs as essential to conduct the global trade of IP-endowed products 
and technology. But DCs sought more freedom to adopt a patent system which could reflect their domestic 
public concerns, especially when pharmaceuticals are regarded as an important component of public health 
policy. 
ICs proposed GATT as the negotiation forum because the elimination and reduction of trade distortions 
caused by non-tariff barriers was within the jurisdiction of GATT. (See David, Paul A., `Intellectual 
property Institutions and the Panda's Thumb: Patent, Copyrights, and Trade Secrets in Economic Theory 
and History', in Wallerstein, Mogee, and Schoen (eds. ), Global Dimensions of Intellectual Property Rights 
in Science and Technology, Office of International Affairs National Research Council, Washington, D. C.: 
National Academy Press, 1993, pp. 119-61, p. 20 and Primo Braga, Carlos Alberto, `The Economics of 
Intellectual Property Rights and the GATT: A View from the South', Vancd JTL, 22(2), 1989, pp. 243-264, 
p. 245, Meessen, Karl M., `Intellectual Property Rights in International Trade', JWTL, 21(l), 1987, p. 68, 
Stern, Richard H., `Intellectual Property', in Finger and Olechowski (eds. ), A Handbook for the 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Washington, D. C.: The World Bank, 1987, p. 205, and statements in the 
Basic Framework of GATT Provisions on Intellectual Property, Statement of Views of the European, 
Japanese and United States Business Communities, The Intellectual Property Committee (USA), UNICE 
(Europe), and Keidanren (Japan), June, 1988 (hereinafter the Basic Framework. ) Furthermore, ICs 
identified the difficulty of revising and strengthening the patent regime under the Convention because the 
voting system of the Convention and the political dynamic among the member states within the Convention 
were as such that ICs did not think they were in a strong bargaining position to push their revision proposal 
through. (See Remarks of Professor John H. Jackson, VandJTL, 22(2), 1989, p. 346 (hereinafter Jackson 
Remarks) and Remarks of Professor Robert Hudec, VandJTL, 22(2), 1989, p. 321 (hereinafter Hudec 
Remark), Blakeney, Michael, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Concise Guide to 
the TRIPS Agreement, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1996, p. 27, and Emmert, Frank, `Intellectual Property 
in the Uruguay Round - Negotiating Strategies of the Western Industrialized Countries', Michigan Journal 
oflnternational Law, 11(4), 1990, p. 1343. Furthermore, the World Intellectual Property Organisation 
(WIPO) was seen by the business community in ICs as being sympathetic to some anti-IP activities. See 
Kastenmeier, R. W. and David Beier, `International Trade and Intellectual Property: Promise, Risk, and 
Reality', VandJTL, 22(2), 1989, p. 293. ) But DCs chose to continue their revision endeavour under the 
Convention insisting that it had been in existence for more than one hundred years, and that the WIPO was 
the competent and appropriate forum for handling intellectual property matters. It was in June 1974, during 
the sixth session of the co-ordination Commission of WIPO, that the idea of possible revision of the 
Convention was put forward based on the proposal made by the delegates of India and the UK representing 
DCs and ICs respectively. See WIPO, PR/DC/3, June 25,1979, p. 6. See also Kunz-Hallstein, Hans Peter, 
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period of time. Protectionism flourished partly due to ICs' resentment of DCs free-riding 
on the benefits of MTNs 8 without making reciprocal trade concessions. DCs soon came 
to the realisation that their more active participation in MTNs was necessary to rid ICs of 
the resentment. And with the legitimate expectation to achieve trade-offs between topics 
important to parties in the MTNs under the GATT system, DCs consented to ICs' 
demand for the inclusion of IPP issues on the agenda for MTNs in exchange for ICs' 
agreeing to bring agriculture and other commodities important to DCs' economies into 
the fold of the global trading system. 9 Secondly, the political and economic pressure 
from ICs, in particular the US, linking IPP with their domestic trade legislation and 
imposing unilateral trade sanctions against countries with lower standard of IP system 
than theirs 10 served as a reminder to trading nations that a multilateral agreement would 
`The Revision of the International System of Patent Protection in the Interest of Developing Countries', 
IIC, 10,1979, pp. 649-670. 
8 Despite the benefit of differential and more favourable treatments conferred by GATT, many DCs' 
economies remained in tatters. Some of them initiated unilateral trade liberalisation and export expansion 
policies in the wake of the early 1980s debt crisis. Their efforts were hindered by the proliferation of 
protectionism among many ICs which could partly be attributed by the resentment toward differential and 
more favourable treatments (DMFT) DCs had enjoyed in GATT, the strongest of which came from the US 
political establishment. See Bhagwati, Jagdish, `Fair Trade, Reciprocity and harmonisation; The New 
Challenge to the Theory and Policy of Free Trade', in Deardorff and Stern (eds. ), Analytical and 
Negotiating Issues - In the Global Trading System, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994, 
pp. 547-598, Whalley, John (cord. ), The Uruguay Round and Beyond, The Final Report fr om the Ford 
Foundation Project on Developing Countries and the Global Trading System, London: The MacMillan 
Press Ltd., 1989 (hereinafter Ford Foundation Report), p. 5, and Greenway, David and Robert C. Hine, 
`Introduction: Trends in World Trade and Protection', in Greenaway, Hine, O'Brien, and Thornton (eds. ), 
Global Protectionism, Hampshire: MacMillan Academic and Professional Ltd., 1991, p. 7. 
9 Hoekman and Kostecki, note 2 above., p. 78, Jackson, John, The World Trading System - Law and Policy 
of International Economic Relations, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1992, p. 125, and Cottier, Thomas, 
`The Prospects for Intellectual Property in GATT', 28, CMLR, 1991, pp. 383-414. 
10 Since 1970s, the US administration enacted domestic trade legislation, the most well-known ones being 
Section 301 provisions, linking IPP with its trade policy as the result of domestic political pressure from the 
US Congress and lobbying efforts by high technology industries, compounded by the frustration of US 
administration in their effort to bring the IPP issue into the auspices of GATT. The perceived inadequate 
and ineffective IP system in some countries was regarded as unfair foreign trade practices with the effect of 
denying US firms market access and fair commercial opportunity. When a country was being identified as 
to have practised as such, they were targeted for unilateral trade sanctions by being denied the access to the 
US market. See Hudec, Robert E., `Thinking About the New Section 301: Beyond Good and Evil', in 
Bhagwati and Patrick (eds. ), Aggressive Unilateralism - American's 301 Trade Policy and the World 
Trading System, Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf,. 1991, p. 130, Remarks by David Beier in Vand. JTL, 
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be more desirable to defend one's trade interests than unilateral or bilateral sanctions 
based on arbitrary rules set by individual countries. it 
Since the provisional application of GATT in 1947, it had not only provided a legal 
framework for the conduct of global trade relations, shaped by national and global 
politics, 12 it had also been used by contracting parties (CPs) 13 as a forum for settling 
disputes. But ICs' endeavour to introduce TRIPS into GATT raised the question of the 
competence of GATT, in particular, the application of the Most-Favoured-Nation 
principle (MFN), 14 the principle of National Treatment (NT), 15 and Reciprocity, 16 in 
dealing with the protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs). , How the three 
22(2), 1989, p. 334 (hereinafter Beier Remark), Gadbaw, Michael R., and Timothy J. Richards, 
`Introduction', in Gadbaw and Richards (eds. ), Intellectual Property Rights - Global Consensus, Global 
Conflict? Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988a, GATT, BISD 28 Supp., 1982, p. 15 and GATT, 
L/4817,31 July, 1979. 
11 See Getlan, Myles, `TRIPS and the Future of Section 301: A Comparative Study of Trade Dispute 
Resolution', Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 34(1), 1995, pp. 173-218 and Primo Braga, Carlos 
Alberto, `Intellectual Property Rights in NAFTA: Implications for International Trade', in Riggs and Velk 
(eds. ), Beyond NAFTA: An Economic, Political and Sociological Perspective, Vancouver: The Fraser 
Institute, 1993, p. 107, Cottier, op. Cit., p. 389. 
12 The Economist, Forty Years on for GATT, October 24,1987. 
13 As GATT was applied provisionally in 1947, its members were referred to as the "contracting parties" 
(hereinafter CPs). Under Article XXV: I of GATT: "... whenever reference is made.. to the contracting 
parties acting jointly, they are designated as the CONTRACTING PARTIES ... 
". "Contracting parties" in 
the lower case represents individual contracting parties. GATT 1994 is one of the agreements reached in 
the Uruguay Round (1986-1994) which has subjected many articles of GATT to amendments. As 
distinguished from GATT 1994, GATT 1947 will be referred to as GATT, and GATT 1994 specified as 
GATT 1994. 
'a The unconditional MFN as stated in Article I of GATT requires each contracting party to grant to every 
other contracting party unconditionally the most favourable treatment which it grants to any country. It 
confers on contracting parties of GATT equal right of market access irrespective of their size and 
bargaining power. But its application was limited to trade in goods prior to the TRIPS Agreement. See 
discussion in Chapter 3.3.1. 
15 NT as stated in Article III of GATT obliges contracting parties to apply domestic law in a non- 
discriminatory manner and accord no less favourable treatment to imported products than what has been 
conferred on like products of domestic origin. It is to prevent domestic taxes and government regulations 
from being used to afford protection to domestic productions. It touches upon domestic regulatory 
autonomy and restricts what government could do to deny foreign products equal opportunities for 
competition. See discussion in Chapter 3.3.2. 
16 "Reciprocity" was not defined in the General Agreement, but it-has been applied in GATT MTNs 
through mutually accepted tariff and non-tariff concessions on the basis of an overall balance of rights and 
12 
principles have evolved over the years and worked in tandem to secure market access and 
equal competition opportunity commitments from trading nations demonstrates their 
responsiveness to the changing needs of trading nations and global business 
communities, '7 which is essential for the handling of the legal, economic, and political 
dynamics which underline MTNs. 18 
Following the conclusion of the TRIPS Agreement, the legal analysis of which illustrates 
the success of the Agreement in securing market access and equal competition 
opportunity commitments by incorporating MFN and NT applicable to natural or legal IP 
owners, with the application of reciprocity reflected in the mandatory requirement of the . 
WTO members to implement the minimum standards set out in TRIPS. And the concern 
of the ineffectiveness of the patent system under the Convention has been rectified by the 
introduction of detailed provisions for a domestic enforcement mechanism 19 and the 
incorporation into the TRIPS Agreement of the WTO dispute settlement procedures. 20 
t two areas of concern he been identified which might undermine the adequacy and 
effectiveness of the patent system for pharmaceuticals conferred by the TRIPS. 
Agreement which ensures the recognition of the exclusive marketing rights among 
nations. The first area concerns the uncertainty in relation to how governments might 
obligations. It also has been relied on to limit the scope of free riding that may arise fiom the application of 
unconditional MFN. See discussion in Chapter 3.3.3. 
'7 Jackson, John, `The Crumbling Institutions of the Liberal Trade System', JWTL, 12(2), 1978, p. 98. 
18 Especially in accommodating different domestic economic and political agendas among negotiating 
parties. Long, Olivier, Law and its Limitations in the GATT Multilateral Trade System, Dordrecht: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987, p. 22 and Low, Patrick, Trading Free - The GATT and US Trade 
Policy, NY: The Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1993. 
19 Articles 41- 61 of the TRIPS Agreement 
20 Article 64 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
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exercise their discretion in implementing the exception clause and the contractual 
licensing provision contained in the TRIPS Agreement. 21 The TRIPS Agreement does 
not prohibit governments' practices which restrict the exercise of the exclusive marketing 
rights conferred by patent protection. But at least the WTO Dispute Settlement Body 
could adjudicate the legality of government measures if disputes do arise in this area. 
What concerns MPCs most is the absence of an agreement on prohibiting the adoption of 
international exhaustion 22 and parallel importation, 23 where patented products are faced 
with competition from unauthorised import of. cheaper original products during patent 
terms. And the TRIPS Agreement specifically excludes disputes arising from the issue of 
the exhaustion of IP from its jurisdiction. 24 :. Recognising that the exclusive marketing 
rights conferred by patent protection have a restrictive effect on competition, and that 
competition policy remains with domestic jurisdiction, a multilateral solution is needed to 
address the question of to what extent domestic government policy promoting 
competition should give consideration to those exclusive rights. Or it will put into 
question the adequacy and effectiveness of the patent system for pharmaceuticals under 
the "TRIPS Agreement. 
21 Although WTO member states are under obligations to incorporate the minimum standards stipulated in 
the TRIPS Agreement into their domestic legislation, they are free to determine the appropriate methods of 
implementation so long as they are consistent with the Agreement (Article 1.1 of the TRIPS Agreement). 
See discussion in Chapter 4.4. 
22 Under the doctrine of international exhaustion, a patent holder is not entitled to any legal control over the 
subsequent commercialisation of the patented product within the territory of the state granting the 
protection following the first authorised domestic sale of the patented product. Parallel importation is thus 
allowed. See discussion in Chapter 5.3. 
23 Parallel importation of pharmaceuticals involves the importation of patented drugs, lawfully put on the 
market in the place of export, by third parties without patent holders' consent, to countries where identical 
products have been legitimately put onto markets but are selling at a higher price. See discussion in 
Chapter 5.3. 
24 Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
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Structurally, this thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter I explores why ICs and 
developing countries (DCs) both found the patent regime under the Convention 
inadequate, 25 and discusses their diverse perceptions with regard to patent protection for 
pharmaceuticals. Chapter II identifies two major factors which have contributed to the 
eventual agreement between ICs and DCs to include TRIPS on the agenda of the 
Uruguay Round MTNs which includes the issue of patent protection for pharmaceuticals. 
Chapter III is to take up the question of the competence of the legal framework of GATT, 
in particular, the three pivotal principles of MFN, NT, and Reciprocity, in dealing with 
the non-traditional subject matter of IPP for the benefit of natural and legal persons. 26 
For the purpose of assessing whether the patent system for pharmaceuticals conferred by 
the TRIPS Agreement provides an adequate and effective legal regime that ensures the 
recognition of the exclusive marketing rights among nations, Chapter IV contains the 
analysis of the legal framework of the TRIPS Agreement which underlines the 
achievement of the Agreement as far as securing market access and equal competition 
opportunity commitments from members of the WTO for the implementation of a 
strengthened IP system, in particular, a patent system for pharmaceuticals of ICs' 
standard. 27 But two areas of concerns deriving from the TRIPS Agreement are discussed 
25 The Convention was the major multilateral agreement governing patent protection prior to the conclusion 
of the TRIPS Agreement. See Bodenhausen, G. H. C., Guide to the Application of the Paris Convention for 
the Protection of Industrial Property, Paris: United International Bureau for the Protection of Intellectual 
Property (BIRPI), 1968, p. 175 and Bogsch, Arpad, `The First Hundred Years of the Paris Convention for 
the Protection of Industrial Property, Special Issue for the Commemoration of the Centenary of the Paris 
Convention', Industrial Property, Geneva: WIPO, 1983. 
26 The 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade is to secure the liberalisation and expansion of global 
trade in tangible goods only. 
27 For example, the inclusion of pharmaceutical process and product as patentable subject matters (Article 
28.1 of the TRIPS Agreement), twenty years of patent protection from the date of filing (Article 33 of the 
TRIPS Agreement), and the reversal of burden of proof now on the defendant in case of breach (Article 
34.1(a) of the TRIPS Agreement). 
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in Chapter V which raise doubts as to the adequacy and effectiveness of the patent system 
in the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement so to secure the exercise of the exclusive 
marketing rights it confers. 
16 
Chapter I 
The Pre-Uruguay Round International Patent Regime for 
Pharmaceuticals Under the Paris Convention 
This chapter looks into the economic as well as the legal dimensions of IPP and explores 
the very different underlying perceptions of ICs and DCs in regard to IPP to explain why 
and what ICs and DCs sought in the legal regime of patent protection under the 
Convention. A detailed analysis of the legal regime of the Convention provides a full 
picture, linking the perceived inadequacies of the Convention from both sides with the 
changes they sought. 
1.1 Introduction 
TRIPS was introduced, for the first time, as a subject in MTNs in the Uruguay Round. 'ý 
Among the subject areas negotiated, patent protection for pharmaceuticals had attracted 
more debate than any other issue across the North-South axis. 2 Prior to the Uruguay 
Round, the Convention administered by the World Intellectual Property Organisation 
(WIPO) had been the major multilateral agreement governing the international regime of 
patent protection. 3 Patent protection had not been treated as an issue related to trade but 
1 The Uruguay Round MTNs (1986-1994) started with the participation of 108 nations represented more 
than 90% of world trade at the time. 
2 Zutshi, B. K., `Bringing TRIPS into the Multilateral Trading System', in Bhagwati and Hirsch (eds. ), The 
Uruguay Round and Beyond, Heidelberg: Springer, 1998, pp. 37-50, Subramanian, Arvind, `Putting Some 
Numbers on the TRIPS Pharmaceutical Debate', International Journal of Technology Management, 
10(2/3), 1990a, p. 253, and Hoekman, Bernard M. and Michel M. Kostecki, The Political Economy of the 
World Trading System - From GATT To WTO, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 151. 3 Other major international agreements relating to patents are the Patent Co-operation Treaty (1970), the 
Budapest Treaty (1977), and the Strasbourg Agreement (1971). Primo Braga, Carlos A., `Trade-Related 
Intellectual Property Issues: The Uruguay Round Agreements and its Economic Implications', in Martin 
and Winters (eds. ), The Uruguay Round and the Developing Countries, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
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more of an economic one with direct relevance to industrial development policy. 4 
Furthermore, as pharmaceuticals were seen to be of direct relevance to public health, the 
patent regime for pharmaceuticals was also within the sphere of public health policy. 
It was the alleged inadequacies of the Convention expressed both by DCs and ICs which 
prompted both sides to seek changes in the international legal framework. MPCs from 
ICs were in the forefront of lobbying their respective governments to bring intellectual 
property protection as a trade issue to the negotiation table in the Uruguay Round. 5 It 
was a market-necessity driven initiative. Patent protection is important to MPCs. The 
exclusive marketing rights conferred by patent protection prevent generic versions from 
entering into markets during the patent life of the new chemical entity (NCE). It allows 
MPCs to recoup R&D costs 6 and to compensate for the high risks involved in research 
and development (R&D) and post product launch. But with generic competition 
appearing on the scene upon the expiration of patent protection, accompanied by 
government measures such as price capping of patented products and generic substitution 
Press, 1996, p. 343, Table 12.1. These three treaties are administered by WIPO. The Patent Co-operation 
Treaty (PCT) implements the concept of a single international patent application. Once such an application 
is filed, it has the effect in the members to the PCT. An applicant then has time to decide in which of the 
countries to continue with the application. PCT opens to the member states of the Paris Convention by 
virtue of Article 19 of the Paris Convention. It was concluded in 1970, and was amended in 1979 and 
1984. As to February 1997,89 of 140 states party to the Convention were party to the PCT. The Budapest 
Treaty is on the international recognition of the Deposit of micro-organisms for the purposes of patent 
procedure. And the Strasbourg Agreement concerns the international patent classification to assist anyone 
considering to apply for a patent whether the invention is new or is owned or claimed by someone else. 
4 United Nations, World Investment Report 1998: Trends and Determinants, NY: UN, 1998 (hereinafter 
World Investment Report 1998), p. 350. 
s The success of bringing patent protection into the MTNs in the Uruguay Round was described as a 
private-sector driven initiative. Remarks by David Beier in VandJTL, 22(2), 1989, p. 334 (hereinafter 
Beier Remark). 
6 Redwood, Heinz, New Horizons in India, Suffolk: Oldwicks Press, 1994, p. 89. 
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to keep health care budgets in check, 7 the erosion of MPCs' profit is considerable. 
Gaining access to unexplored markets, most of them in DCs, becomes a necessary option. 
This is why patent protection for pharmaceuticals has become an important component of 
MPCs' global competition strategy. 8 
MPCs from the United States (US), the European Union (EU), and Japan were very 
active in lobbying their respective governments to take up the issue of IPP in MTNs 
under the auspices of GATT. In these free market economies, policy consideration has 
largely shifted from welfare impacts of patent regime to the mechanics of the legal 
system. In an interdependent global economy, business practices of MNCs play an 
increasingly influential role in shaping both the domestic and global regulatory 
frameworks to ensure fair competition on both domestic and global fronts. This policy 
emphasis has been reflected in MPCs' expressed concerns over the inadequacy of the 
Convention. They felt that the Convention allowed its member states too much discretion 
in establishing their domestic patent system, resulting in disparity among national 
systems which in turn caused distortions to international trade. They were also 
dissatisfied with the lack of domestic enforcement procedures and a workable dispute ' 
settlement mechanism under the Convention to ensure compliance of treaty obligations. 
7 See Nogues, Julio, Patents and Pharmaceutical Drugs: Understanding the Pressures on Developing 
Countries, International Economic Department, Washington, D. C.: The World Bank, 1990, Grabowski, H., 
Health Reform and Pharmaceutical Innovation, Washington, D. C.: American Enterprise Institute of Public 
Research, 1994b, and Grabowski, H., and J. Vernon, `Brand Loyalty, Entry and Price Competition', 
Journal ofLaw and Economics, 35,1992, pp. 305-33 1. It could also be caused by generic substitution. 
Mansfield, E., `How Rapidly Industrial Technology Leak out, The Journal of Industrial Economics, 34(2), 
1985, pp. 217-223. . 8 Trade marks, copyrights, and trade secret legislation all form the armouries for the research-based 
pharmaceutical industry. to protect the proprietary rights of their inventions. 
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With the steady increase of their innovative products crossing national borders, 9 MPCs 
viewed lower or no patent protection in foreign countries as non-tariff barriers (NTBs) 10 
inhibiting their market access and causing economic losses. As the elimination and 
reduction of trade distortions caused by NTBs was within the jurisdiction of GATT, 
MPCs called for a negotiated rule-based multilateral legal framework under the auspices 
of GATT. " 
From DCs' viewpoint, the Convention failed to address their development needs and 
curtail monopolistic power exercised by the multinational corporations (MNCs). They 
sought revisions of the Convention and requested more freedom to adopt patent systems 
so as to reflect domestic public concerns and meet their developmental needs. They 
insisted that as the Convention has been in existence for more than one hundred years 
providing a workable patent regime administered by WIPO, that it was WIPO, and not 
GATT, which was the competent and appropriate forum for handling IP matters. 
At the time of debate for the inclusion of patent protection for pharmaceuticals on the 
agenda for the Uruguay Round MTNs , many DCs provided very little or no protection 
for pharmaceuticals. 12 While considering whether to introduce a patent -regime for 
9 Formerly dominated by primary products, international trade is now concentrated in technology-intensive 
goods. High technology goods along doubled their share of world merchandise export from 11 percent in 
1976 to 22 percent in 1996. But the share of primary products dropped to less than 25 percent from about 
45 per cent in 1976. See The World Bank, World Development Report, 1998/99, NY: Oxford University 
Press for the World Bank (hereinafter World Development Report 1998/99), p. 27. 
10 Stem, Richard H., `Intellectual Property', in Finger and Olechowski (eds. ), A Handbook for the 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Washington, D. C.: The World Bank, 1987, p. 205. 
11 See discussion in Chapter 1.5.2. 
12 Examples include Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, India, and Mexico. For full list, see GATT, 
MTN. GNG/NG I 1/W/24/Rev. 1,1988 prepared by the International Bureau of WIPO for the GATT 
Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, including Trade in 
Counterfeit Goods (Negotiating Group 11) (hereinafter WIPO Report for GATT). 
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pharmaceuticals, policy makers in DCs focused almost exclusively on economic analysis. 
This approach took place from the perspective of maximising economic efficiency and 
welfare at the level of the world or national economy as a whole. 13 It focused almost 
exclusively on the balance of costs (such as monopoly rent and social welfare losses) and 
benefits (increases in foreign technology transfer and domestic and foreign investment in 
research and development). 14 Based on the premise that patent: protection does confer 
monopoly to patent holders, it believed that the monopolistic power could cause domestic 
welfare losses to consumers and societies as a whole. In the international context, the 
static effect of patent protection could be to diminish global welfare in the short term and 
redistribute world income in foreign producers' favour, with the. dynamic, effects of 
inducing foreign technology transfer and R&D activities. 
The validity of the claim that the introduction of patent system would encourage foreign 
technology transfer and foreign R&D activities has been investigated extensively, but 
with no conclusive results. 
1 Nevertheless, it is a commonly held view that patent 
protection serves as an important groundwork in encouraging local innovative activities 
when a country wishes to establish the scientific and technological infrastructure required 
for developing the capability to select, absorb and adapt technologies available, with a 
long term view of attracting foreign investment in technology and R&D activities. The 
introduction of patent protection is necessary, although not sufficient, to ensure any 
13 Abbott, Kenneth W., `Defensive Unfairness: The Normative Structure of Section 301', in Bhagwati and 
Hudec (eds. ), Fair Trade and Harmonisation - Prerequisites for Free Trade? Vol. 2,: Legal Analysis, 
Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996, p. 419. 
14 Primo Braga, Carlos Alberto, `Intellectual Property Rights in NAFTA: Implications for International 
Trade', in Riggs and Velk (eds. ), Beyond NAFTA: An Economic, Political and Sociological Perspective, 
Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 1993, pp. 107-108. 
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possibility of attracting desirable foreign technology transfer and R&D investment in the 
short-term. 
I 
1.2 Patent defined 
Prior to the completion of TRIPS MTNs, the Paris Convention (the Convention) for the 
protection of Industrial Property as revised in 1967 was the major multilateral patent 
regime, administered by WIPO. Under the Convention, industrial property was divided 
into two areas: one covered patents, industrial designs and trade secrets, and the other for 
the protection of distinctive signs, in particular trademarks and geographical 
indications. 15 Intellectual property (IP) has been used collectively to cover both 
industrial property and copyright and rights related to copyright. 16 Following the 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round, all categories of intellectual property are covered by 
the TRIPS Agreement, 17 which is administered by the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO). 
15 WTO Website, http: //www. wto. org, February 2,1998. 
16 Copyright and rights related to copyright was traditionally under the separate jurisdiction of the Berne 
Convention. The Berne Convention came into force in 1886. The aim of this Convention was to help 
nationals of its member states obtain international protection of their right to control, and receive payment 
for, the use of their creative works such as novels, poems, musicals, paintings, and architectural works, etc. 
See WIPO, General Information, Geneva: WIPO, July 1998, p. 4. After several revisions, the most recent 
one is the Paris Act of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of July 1971. 
The Convention is administered by WIPO. 
"Article 1.2 of the TRIPS Agreement: 
"For the Purposes of this Agreement, the term "intellectual property" 
refers to all categories of intellectual property that are the subject of 
Sections 1 through 7 of Part II. " % 
These subjects are: copyright and related rights, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial designs, 
patents, layout-design (topographies) of integrated circuits, and protection of undisclosed information. 
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"Patent" was not defined in the Convention. But a description of "patent" has been given 
in an United Nations (UN) report on "The Role of Patents in the Transfer of Technology 
to Developing Countries" as 
"a statutory privilege granted by the government to inventors, and to 
other persons deriving their rights from the inventor, for a fixed period 
of years, to exclude other persons from manufacturing, using or selling a 
patented product or from utilising a patented method or process. At the 
expiration of the time for which the privilege is granted, the patented 
invention is available to the general public or, as it is sometimes put, 
falls into the `public domain'. " 18 
In a separate study by the UN, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), and WIPO in 1974 on "The Role of the Patent System in the Transfer of 
Technology to Developing Countries", a patent was described as 
"a legally enforceable right granted by virtue of a law to a person to 
exclude, for a limited time, others from certain acts in relation to a 
described invention; the privilege is granted by a government authority 
as a matter of right to the person who is entitled to apply for it and who 
fulfils the prescribed conditions. " 19 
18 UN, The Role of Patents in the Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries, UN Doc. E/3861/Rev. 
1.1964, (hereinafter UN 1964 Report). % 19 UN, UNCTAD, and WIPO, The Role of the patent system in the Transfer of Technology to Developing 
Countries, UN Doc. TDB/AC. 11/19,1974, (hereinafter UN 1974 Report), 
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In more concise terms, a patent could be defined as an exclusive property right conferred 
on an invention 20 by law 21 for a limited duration, to prevent others from making, using, 
offering for sale, selling or importing without the patent holder's consent, 
22 in exchange 
for the disclosure of the invention to the public. 
The disclosure provision is set out in Article 29 of the TRIPS. Agreement. It requires an 
applicant for patent to disclose the invention "in a manner sufficiently clear and complete 
for the invention to be carried out by a person skilled in the art ... " 23 By providing 
financial incentives in the form of market exclusivity to recover R&D cost in exchange 
for the disclosure of the innovative information to the society, it not only facilitates the 
generation and diffusion of new knowledge, 24 but also facilitates further R&D, and 
prevents duplicate effort of conducting identical research. 25 
20 Invention can take forms of a new product, a new process for making the product, or a new molecule. 
See Jackson, John H., Davey, William J., and Alan 0. Sykes, Jr., Legal Problems of International 
Economic Relations - Cases, Materials and Text, Third Edition, St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1995 
(hereinafter Jackson et al. ), p. 845. 
21 Sherwood, Robert, Intellectual Property and Economic Development, Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
Press, 1990, ch. 2. 
22 Article 28.1(a) of the TRIPS Agreement. 
23 An almost identical requirement is stipulated in Article 83 of the European Patent Convention specified 
that an application "must disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to e 
carried out by a person skilled 'in the art". 
24 Schumann, Gunda, `Economic Development and Intellectual Property Protection in Southeast Asia: 
Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Thailand', in Rushing and Brown (eds. ), Intellectual Property Rights in 
Science and Technology and Economic Performance, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990, ch. 9. 
25 See discussion in Beier, Friedrick-Karl and J. Straus, `The Patent system and Its Information Function - 
Yesterday and Today', 8,11C, 1977. 
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In order for an invention to be patentable, most of the states require an invention to be' 
novel, non-obvious, and industrially applicable. 26 An invention has to be a novel idea, 
which provides in practice the solution of a specific problem in the field of technology. 
The idea, in order to be protected by law, must be new in the sense that it has not been 
published or publicly used before the date on which the application for the grant of a 
patent was filed. The invention is non-obvious if it would not have occurred to any 
specialist in the particular industrial field had such a specialist been asked to find a 
solution to the particular problem. And the invention is industrially applicable if it can be 
27 industrially manufactured or used. 
In the context of international law, the protection conferred is upheld by both Article 
27(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 28 and Article 15(c) of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966 which 
recognise: 
"the right of everyone ... to benefit from the protection of the moral and 
material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic 
production of which he is the author". 29 
26The Patent Co-operation Treaty 1970 contains definition of novelty, non-obviousness and industrial 
applicability. 
2 WIPO Web site, http: //www. wipo. org, pp. 1& 29, April 1997. 
28 GA Res 217, UN Doc A/810,1948. For a detailed discussion of the legal status of the General Assembly 
resolutions, see Subedi, Surya P., Land and Maritime Zones of Peace in International Law, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1996, pp. 96-101. 
29 GA Res 2200,21 UN GAOR Supp (No. 16), UN Doc A/6316 (1966). 
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There is a debate of whether receiving protection is one's natural right as against the 
knowledge itself being a "common heritage of mankind". Natural right theory, which has 
its origin in French patent law emerged during the French Revolution, is predominately a 
western belief. 30 It has been suggested that the examination of the patentability precedes 
the granting of the patent which makes it difficult to reconcile the protection with the 
notion of inherent right. 31 By placing a balance on private and public interests, some 
continental countries have evolved away from a natural law basis. 
The DCs' view is that an innovation is the equivalence of information, which has a zero 
marginal cost of use, i. e. a given piece of information can be used by an infinite number 
of people simultaneously without exhausting the information itself. 32 It might be 
expensive to create but, due to its inexhaustible nature, 33 it may be used at no additional 
economic costs once created. 34 Hence, the innovative information is a public good, not 
private property. It should be made freely available to the greater general public. 
30 Meessen, Karl in., `Intellectual Property Rights in International Trade', JWTL, 21(1), 1987, p. 68 and 
Emmert, Frank, `Intellectual Property in the Uruguay Round - Negotiating Strategies of the Western 
Industrialised Countries', MJIL, , 
11(4), 1990, pp. 1317-1399. 
31 Primo Braga, Carlos, `Guidance from Economic Theory', in Siebeck, Evenson, Lesser, and Primo Braga 
(eds. ), Strengthening Protection of Intellectual Property in Developing Countries -A Survey of the 
Literature, Part III, World Bank Discussion Papers #112, Washington, D. C.: The World Bank, 1990a, p. 
18. 
32 OECD, Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Rights, Paris: OECD, 1989, p. 11. 
33 Vaitsos, Constantine V., `Patent Revisited: Their Function in Developing Countries', Journal of 
Development Studies, 4(2), 1972, p. 72. 
34 Benko, Robert, `Intellectual Property Rights and New Technologies', in Walker and Bloomfield (eds. ), 
Intellectual Property Rights and Capital Formation in the Next Decade, Lanham, MD: University Press of 
America, 1988. 
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The US Constitution provides for the exclusive right for limited times to inventors for 
their discoveries as a means to promote the progress of science and useful arts. 35 The 
official position of the US is to regard IP as a right the legislators create for the 
promotion of public policy goals, i. e., it is an artificial right. 36 Primo Braga argues that 
the debate on the justification for granting the protection has been replaced by more 
utilitarian perspectives which addresses the patent protection as a social contract between 
inventors and society in terms of inventors disclosing technology secrets in exchange for 
a privilege. 37 It is often seen as a trade-off between the objective of stimulating 
invention and the loss of social welfare associated with the life of the patent. 38 
This exclusive property right is often regarded as the equivalent of granting a statutory 
monopoly to the patent owner by governments thereby interfering with -free market 
competition. Some believe that monopolies created by patent are temporary because new 
technologies are continuously invented to replace old ones. 39 Others argue that the 
creation of exclusive legal rights does not necessarily establish right holders' ability to 
exercise market power because market power stems from the nature of demand for the 
product, and this demand depends on the availability of substitutes and the cross- 
elasticity of demand between these substitutes. 40 Sherwood further argues that although 
IP creates the right to exclude others from a discrete product or process, the classic 
monopoly is the ability to exclude others from a specific market. But rarely is a single 
35 Article 1.8.8 of the US Constitution: "To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for 
limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries". 36 Reichman, J. H., `Intellectual Property in International Trade: Opportunities and Risks of a GATT 
Connection', VandJTL, 22(2), 1989, p. 776. 
37 Primo Braga, 1990a, note 31 above. 
38 UNCTAD, Uruguay Round: Paper on Selected Issues, Trade an% d Development, NY: UN, 1989, p. 150. 
39 Tirole, Jean, The Theory of Industrial Organisation, Cambridge, The MIT Press, 1988, p. 400 
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product the equivalent of a market. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish the effect of 
monopoly from the operation of IPP. 41 Especially in the research-based pharmaceutical 
industry where competition takes the form of rivalry in innovation 42 and the profit 
margin is often being competed away by rival firms introducing substitutable versions of 
the NCE. 
1.3 The research-based pharmaceutical industry and patent 
The research-based pharmaceutical industry (the industry) is a knowledge-based 
technology-intensive industry 43 in constant search for therapeutically innovative 
products in order to stay ahead of the competition. 44 Therefore, patent protection for 
.. pharmaceutical product and process 
has direct relevance to the competitiveness and . 
profitability of the industry. As Taylor and Silberston point out in their surveys of British 
industries, the industry "stands alone in the extent of its involvement with the patent 
system". 45 Various US industry surveys also confirm the importance of patent in 
protecting the process and product innovations of the drug industry and its function of 
appropriating return from investment on innovation. 46 
40 OECD, 1989, note 38 above, pp. 16,20, and 25. 
41 Sherwood, 1990, note 21 above, p. 51. 
42 Parker, John E. S., `Pharmaceuticals and Third World Concerns: The Lall Report and the Otago Study', in 
Helms (ed. ), The International Supply of medicines, Washington D. C.: American Enterprise Institute for 
Public Policy Research, 1980, p. 136. 
43 Pharmaceutical industry is regarded as a high technology industry because it draws on most recent 
scientific advances in their R&D activities and it high ratio of R&D expenditures to sales. See Krugman, 
Paul, `Technology-Intensive Goods', in Finger and Olechowski (eds. ), The Uruguay Round-A Handbook 
for the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Washington, D. C., The World Bank, 1987, p. 191. 
44 Parker, note 42 above, p. 138. 
45 Taylor, C. T. and Z. H. Silberston, The Economic Impact of the Patent System: A Study of British 
Experience, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973, p. 231. 
46 For example, Mansfield, Edwin, `Patent and Innovation: An Empirical Study', Management Science, 32, 
1986, pp. 173-181 and Levin, Richard C., Alvin K. Klevorick, Richard R. Nelson, and Sidney G. Winter, 
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The market exclusivity conferred by patent protection is taken as allowing the industry 
pricing freedom for NCEs to compensate for R&D costs and high risks associated with 
the investment. And the exclusive property right makes illegal generic versions of 
patented products during the term of patent protection. But the effective patent life has 
been shortened as the result of more stringent domestic regulatory requirements for 
gaining marketing approval. And the. effectiveness of patent protection has been eroded 
in recent years as the consequence of government policies such as price capping or health 
budget control. These four inter-related strands explain why patent protection is 
important for the research-based industry. They are elaborated further as follows: 
Pricing freedom - The industry is an investment intensive industry. 
47 Patents offer the 
industry an opportunity to recoup their investments in R&D 48 and receive reasonable 
profit to reinvest for future R&D. The pharmaceutical industry is the most R&D 
intensive in the industrial sector as illustrated by the International R&D Scoreboard of 
1997 whereby the pharmaceutical industry spent on average 12.8% of their sales on 
R&D, the highest among the industries. 49 According to DiMasi et. al.: 50 the actual 
average R&D costs per NCE was US$54 million i 0197 Hansen using the same model 
Appropriating the Return from Industrial Research and Development, Cowles Foundation Paper no. 714, 
Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics at Yale University, 1989 (hereinafter Levin et al), p. 797. 
47 OECD, Sector Case Study of Globalisation in the Pharmaceutical Industry, Paris: OECD, 1994. 
48 R&D costs are divisible. According to Redwood, research costs represent about one-third of the total 
R&D costs and development costs two-third of the total R&D costs. Redwood, 1994, note 6 above, p. 89. 
49 Published by the Department of Trade and Industry. FT, "The R&D Scoreboard", Tuesday, June 25, 
1998. 
so DiMasi, J, R. Hansen, H. Grabowski and L. Lasagna, `The Cost of Innovation in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry', Journal of Health Economics, 10,1991, pp. 107-142. 
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predicted that the average R&D costs for 1987 would be US$100.7 million. 
51 But the 
actual figure for the average R&D costs per NCE discovered and developed by the US 
firms for 93 drugs in 1987 was estimated at $231 million. One of the factors contributing 
to the continuous increase of the cost, according to Grabowski, is the shift in research 
focus toward therapeutics to treat chronic clinical conditions, such as cancer. The result 
is higher development costs caused by drugs for chronic disease requiring. more long- 
term testing and greater overall investment prior to commercial introduction. 52 
The risks associated with pharmaceutical R&D are high and unique -- Statistically, only 
one in five thousand of patented new chemical entities succeed in passing stringent safety 
and efficacy tests during development and regulatory approval stages. 53 According to a 
Financial Times Survey, for a NCE whose development started in 1995, the average total 
cost of bringing a NCE to market is estimated at US$600million, of which US$170 
million is the cost of the NCE. The remainder is spent on other compounds that failed 
during the R&D process. 54 The industry has to pin their hope on the one successful NCE 
to finance the R&D costs of the other five thousand NCEs. In addition, there is a unique 
life time risk associated with the product after its eventual launch in the market. As 
explained by Blee, the chemical agents obtained from research are in almost all cases, 
also by definition, potentially dangerous to the human body. Because each person is 
51 Hansen, R, `The Pharmaceutical Development process: Estimates of Current Development Costs and 
Times and the Effects of Regulatory Changes', in Chien (ed. ), Issues in Pharmaceutical Economics, 
Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1979, pp. 151-187. 
52 Grabowski, Henry, `Price and Profit Control, New Competitive Dynamics and the Economics of 
Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry', in Towse (ed. ), Industrial Policy and the Pharmaceutical 
Industry, London: Office of Health Economics, 1994a, p. 81. Enough reserves are necessary to deal with 
negative cash flows over the pre-clinical and clinical R&D period. Negative cash flows continue on in the 
market launch stage due to costs involved from initial heavy promotional activities. 
33 Redwood, 1994, note 6 above., p. 13. 
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unique, the danger of side effects can arise in any stage of the research and development 
processes and post-marketing phase. When ingested by humans, the development of a 
serious side effect can virtually destroy the commercial value of the product and the 
economic value of the research conducted over many years. 55 Furthermore, 
compensations payable as the result of litigation could lead to a significant financial 
burden. An adequate level of profitability is necessary in order to undertake these risks. 56 
Imitation of patented product made illegal -- The exclusion of others from interfering 
with the right of the patent holder is of great importance to pharmaceutical companies 
because pharmaceutical products are easy to imitate by reverse engineering. 57 The 
pharmaceutical research in recent years has focused more on discovering drugs that treat 
diseases for which no drugs as yet exist and have large potential market instead of 
investing in "me-too" drug discovery which replicate the therapeutic properties of drugs 
already on the market. 58 Drugs with a large potential market often attract imitators in 
countries with no product or process patent protection. To demonstrate the ease of 
imitation, Mansfield reported from a survey of 100 US firms in 1985 that information 
54 FT, FT Survey - Pharmaceuticals, March 15,1999. 55 Blee, Francis J., `Commentary', in Helms (ed. ), The International Supply of medicines, Washington, 
D. C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1980, pp. 126-132, p. 126. 
56 Gerefft, Gary, The Pharmaceutical Industry and Dependency in the Third World, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1983, p. 190. The fact that most of the R&D activities in the industry are self-financed 
could be seen as another reason to justify the high profitability of the industry. Apart from putting in place 
the patent system, government involvement in supporting the industry's R&D effort is minimal. For 
example, the industry receives less than two percent of direct R&D supports from governments in most of 
the OECD Countries. See Holmes, Jeremy and John Dunning, `Factors Influencing the Location of 
Multinational Investment in the pharmaceutical Industry', in Towse (ed. ), Industrial Policy and the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, London: Office of Health Economics, 1994, pp. 92-105, p. 103. 
57Reverse engineering is a process of studying and analysing technological information endowed in a 
particular product. And the process itself does not violate patent protection but what ensues might 
Sherwood, 1990, note 21 above, p. 59. 
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concerning the detailed nature and operation of a new product generally leaked out within 
about a year. With regard to processes, it generally becomes available in less than fifteen 
months. 59 For pharmaceuticals, it means that generic versions of a new product could 
be available in the market less than twelve months from the market launch of a patented 
product with direct impacts on sales and profit margins for the patent owner. 60 
Effective patent life - In the early 1990s, the average time spent on R&D for a NCE has 
remained at ten to twelve years. 61 With a twenty-year patent protection period, a NCE 
could enjoy an effective patent life of approximately eight years during which it enjoys 
the market exclusivity. Statman explains. this asfollows: 62 
"a drug is invented when a chemical compound is found to have some 
therapeutic utility. As a practical matter, a drug firm must apply for a 
patent at this point, since a delay may result in a loss of the rights for a 
patent if a competitor is the first to file... The invention of a drug, 
however, is only one step in the process that may eventually lead to 
58 Brada, Josef C., `Government Policy and the Transfer of Pharmaceutical Technology Among Developed 
Countries', in Helms (ed. ), The International Supply of Medicines, Washington, D. C., American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research, 1980, pp. 37-70, p. 48. 
59 Mansfield, 1985, note 7 above, pp. 217-223. 
60 It might also have implications on the original manufacturer's liability if, for example, a patient is injured 
as a result of taking the medicine manufactured by the original company but was smuggled in without 
authorisation. It only makes sense for the patient to bring a suit against the original manufacturer who has 
resources to pay for damages. In all probabilities, the smuggler would have disappeared from the scene. 
This is a common occurrence in many DCs when drugs are mainly supplied by importation. 
61 FT, March 15,1999, op. cit. It was calculated that a mean total R&D time is almost twelve years for US 
new drugs. To obtain a mean total R&D time of almost twelve years, the clinical investigation phase 
averages over five years, regulatory review phase about two and a-half years, and the pre-clinical phase two 
to four years. Grabowski, 1994a, note 52 above, p. 78. 
62 Statman, M., `The Effect of Patent Expiration on the Market Po3ition of Drugs', in Helms (ed. ), Drugs 
and Health: Economic Issues and Policy Objectives, Washington, D. C.: American Enterprise for Public 
Policy Research, 1981, p. 141. 
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commercial marketing of a drug. A chemical entity must undergo a 
lengthy development process and be approved by the relevant regulatory 
agency before it can appear on the market and enjoy the protection 
provided by the patent for the duration of effective patent life. " 
In recent years, effective patent life has been shortened as a result of lengthier clinical 
trial and domestic regulatory approval delay, which postpones the market launch of new 
products. For example, it takes on average two years to conduct country-specific local 
clinical trials to satisfy local product registration requirements. Countries such as Japan 
have requested MPCs to do so, insisting that genetic and metabolic differences mean that 
evidence of a drug's safety and efficacy data gathered in the west has only limited validity 
in Japan. 63 
Effectiveness of patent protection -- Price capping of new drugs by governments to 
control public health budgets is common. 64 It affects the effectiveness of patent 
protection by taking away the pricing freedom patent protection confers. Patent as a 
major factor in sustaining drug prices 65 no longer holds true. 
The industry's profit margin is further eroded by competition from two quarters: one 
being existing substitutable alternatives of a NCE, and the other generic versions of a 
63 FT, March 4,1999, p. 4. 
64 Governments from countries such as Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan and the UK exercise 
pharmaceutical price control. The extent of the impact can be demonstrated by the example of Japan where 
a clampdown on drug prices by the Japanese government in 1998 resulted in reducing the cost of 1,588 
prescription drugs by an average of 9.7 per cent. See FT, September 24,1998 and November 24,1998, p. 
10. 
6$ Nogues, note 7 above. 
33 
NCE following the expiration of patent. Both forms of competition pose an imminent 
threat to the market share of the product involved during its patent life. Grabowski gave 
an illustration for the first form of competition from the cholesterol-reducing therapeutic 
group. The blockbuster drug 
66 was introduced in 1987. The second and third entrants 
were introduced in the following year and priced below the first entrant. A 1994 
competitive entrant in the same class was priced at a discount of 50% below the first 
entrant. This competitive experience also applies to other therapeutic groups. 67 To 
explain the second form of competition, Grabowski and Vernon examined 18 
economically signif ant band- e products whose generic competition occurred during 
1984 and 1987. They discovered that, on average, a product was =subject to twenty 
generic competitors and lost approximately half its market share within two years. 68 In 
1994, with patent expiration, fifty percent of the overall revenue from a particular product 
was lost in the first month of facing generic competition. 69 The sense of crisis deepens 
with governments' encouragement of generic substitution in their reimbursement policy. 
In February 1999, a WTO dispute settlement panel was established to investigate the 
ECs' claim that Canada is in breach of its obligation under the TRIPS Agreement by 
allowing third parties (generic manufacturers), without the consent of the patent holder, 
to carry out clinical trials for the purpose of applying for marketing approval, and the 
manufacturing and stockpiling of patented products before the expiry of the patents 
66 To be a blockbuster drug, the qualifying level of annual sales is reckoned to be in the region of USS 750 
million in 1990. Nine drugs achieved sales in excess of US$ 1 billion. A further five reached a level 
between US$ 750 to US$ 1 billion. See Barclays de Zoete Wedd Research, Pharmaceutical Industry 
Perspectives - The World's 50 Best Selling Drugs, London: Barclays de Zoete Wedd Research, 1991. 67 Grabowski, 1994b, note 7 above. 
69 Grabowski and Vernon, note 7 above, pp. 331-305. 
69 Scrip, Effect of US generic Price Cuts, April 12,1994, p. 19. 
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concerned. 70 This case highlights both the intensity of competition in the pharmaceutical 
market and increased government involvement in public health care policy. 
It is deeply felt within the industry that, regardless of the stage of development, 
government policy has considerable influence on the future level and sources of drug 
innovation. 71 The decision to adopt an innovative strategy, instead of an imitative one, 
rests firmly in the hand of public policy makers. , From the investors and technology 
sellers' perspective, the introduction of patent protection in DCs is an important 
prerequisite to ensure success in attracting desirable foreign technology transfer and 
foreign R&D investment in the future. 
1.4 Developing countries and economic issues relating-to patent protection 
In DCs' effort to seek institutional changes for global management of world resources 
and to assert the right of access of every nation to "the universal heritage" of technology, 
they paid considerable attention to the revision of the patent system under the 
Convention. 72 DCs were concerned that the majority of patents granted by them are to 
the foreign nationals, most of them MNCs. 73 This phenomenon is perceived as a threat to 
70 WTO, Focus, January-February 1999, p. 5 and FT, November 13,1998. See further discussion in 
Chapter 5.2. 
" Especially in areas such as the regulatory regime for marketing approval and reimbursement scheme for 
new drugs. See Grabowski, 1994a, note 52 above, p. 87. 
7z It was in June 1974, during the sixth Session of the Co-ordination Committee of WIPO, that the idea of 
possible revision of the Convention was put forward based on the proposals made by the delegates of India 
and the UK representing DCs and ICs respectively. See WIPO, PR/DC/3, June 25,1979, p. 6. 73 84% of the patents issued are owned by nationals of the US, Germany, France, Switzerland, and the 
United Kingdom. UNCTAD, The Role of the Patent System in the Transfer of Technology to Developing 
Countries, UN Doc. no. TDB/AC. 11/19,1974 (hereinafter UNCTAD 1974 Report), p. 92. 
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national economic independence and development. 74 Granting patent protection to 
foreigners is based on the assumption that it will encourage them to introduce new 
technologies or products into the patent granting country so that DCs will benefit from 
the actual use of the invention within their countries. 75 But many patents granted in DCs 
are never worked in those countries. 76 And the lowest exploitation rates are found 
among the most technology-intensive industries such as pharmaceuticals. 77 
DCs have also expressed concerns that the patent protection granted by. DCs has hardly 
had any influence over the locations where MPCs conduct their R tD, 78 nor did not 
affect foreign direct investment decisions of MPCs. Instead, the. requirement of the 
working of the patent was often met by importation of the patented innovation and the 
foreign patents became an import monopoly. 79 It was unacceptable to DCs that patent 
protection granted to MNCs was used as a tool to erect barriers of entry to their markets 
in order to protect patent owners' competitive advantages. And monopolistic effects of 
74 Bifani, Paolo, Intellectual Property Rights and International Trade, Uruguay Round - Papers on Selected 
Issues, UNCTAD, NY: UN, 1989. Different opinions have been expressed on this point. For example, 
Kunz-Hallstein cited studies that have shown that the dominance of foreign patent in the Third World does 
not produce harmful effect and that there is a positive correlation between the GNPs of these countries and 
both the number of foreign patent applications and the level of patented products they import, see Kunz- 
Hallstein, Hans Peter, `The Revision of the International System of Patent Protection in the Interest of 
Developing Countries', IIC, 10,1979, p. 665. 
75 Bifani, note 74 above. 
76 It is a phenomenon also occurs in some ICs whereby more than 90% of the patent granted were accorded 
to foreigners and a large part of them not worked. See GATT, MTN. GNG/NG11/14,12 September 1989, 
31. 
77Adikibi uses Nigeria as an example: in a sample of 590 patents, only 40 are being worked effectively in 
the country. It represents 6.8% of the sample total with a national estimate of 5% exploitation rate. See 
Adikibi, Owen T., `The Multinational Corporation and Monopoly of Patents in Nigeria', World 
Development, 16(4), 1988, pp. 511-526, p. 517. 
78 Vaitsos, Constantine V., `The Revision of the International Patent System: Legal Considerations for a 
Third World Position', World Development, 4(2), 1976, pp. 85-102. He claimed that there is a divorce 
between patent protection in DCs and incentive on the R&D investment. 
79 Oddi, Samuel A., `The International Patent System and Third World Development: Reality or Myth? ' 
Duke Law Journal, 1987. He also commented that technological know-how could be strategically withheld 
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patent protection could lead to price increases and welfare loss to the DCs with welfare 
gain accruing to innovative MNCs. 
80 But the proponents of IP system advocate that the 
South should introduce patent protection so as to encourage potential long-term dynamic 
benefits of inducing domestic and foreign innovations. 
81 DCs were assured that by 
introducing patent protection, it will encourage foreign direct investment (FDI) by 
MNCs. And along with FDI, there will be transferred technology that supports DCs' 
economic development, and investments in R&D activities that are essential in building 
up their scientific and technological infrastructure. 
82 
depriving DCs of control over the technology at the end of royalty period whether supported by patent or 
not. 
80 Vaitsos, 1976, note 78 above. 
81 Maskus and Konan believe that IPP along cannot guarantee success in economic development, other 
factors such as technical capability and market size are relevant. They are not alone in stating as such, 
more discussion will ensue in Chapters 1.4.1 and 1.4.2. Maskus Keith. E. and Denise Eby Konan, `Trade 
Related Intellectual Property Rights: Issues and Exploratory Results', in Deardorff and Stem (eds. ), 
Analytical and Negotiating Issues in the Global Trading System, Ann Arbor: The Michigan University 
Press, 1994, ch. 10, p. 411. 
82 See, for example, Basic Framework of GATT Provisions on Intellectual Property, Statement of Views of 
the European, Japanese and United States Business Communities. The Intellectual Property Committee 
(USA), UNICE(Europe), and Keidanren (Japan) (hereinafter Basic Framework). Also Suggestion by the 
United States for Achieving the Negotiating Objective - Revision, GATT, MTN. GNG/NGI 1/W/14 Rev. 1, 
17 October 1988. Although these economic incentives were the subject of many surveys and empirical 
research, Cottier comments that they are still largely one of political debate rather than in-depth analysis 
and field studies. The absence of comparable data on the impacts of patent protection in DCs leads to 
inconclusive and fragmented results. See Cottier, Thomas, `The Prospects for Intellectual Property in 
GATT', CMLE, 28,1991. and Maskus and Konan, note 81 above, p. 438. Evenson also commented that the 
costs and benefits of protection for DCs are difficult to establish due to fragmented empirical data 
available, see Evenson, Robert E., `Survey of Empirical Study', in Siebeck, Evenson, Lesser, and Primo 
Braga (eds. ), Strengthening Protection of Intellectual Property in Developing Countries -A Survey of the 
Literature, Part IV, World Bank Discussion Papers #112, Washii gton, D. C.: The World Bank, 1990a. 
Also Mansfield, 1986, note 46 above: the "before and after" analysis of how economic activities and 
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1.4.1 Monopolistic effects 
With the premise that patent protection does grant monopoly to patent holders, 83 the 
economic impact of introducing patent protection is often expressed as social welfare loss 
to patent granting countries. 84 Welfare is defined as the sum of benefits to consumers, 
often addressed as consumer surplus. 85 Economic theory has it that under perfect 
competition, monopoly rent (monopoly profit) created by a patent is non-existent. With 
the introduction of patent protection, the best-known monopoly distortion is its pricing 
behaviour. As the result of monopoly rent, there will be welfare losses accruing to 
consumers and the society as a whole partly because of the relatively weak bargaining 
power of developing countries in negotiating prices with monopoly suppliers. 86 The 
magnitude of welfare losses may affect government' policy in patent protection 
especially when the country is poor. Furthermore, if patented products are supplied 
through importation, monopoly rent would mostly be repatriated to the country of 
manufacturing, depleting the host country's foreign exchange reserves and possibly 
technology development may have changed in response to IP regime change is a suggested area for future 
research. 
83 Sherwood does not think patent protection grants monopoly to the patent holder. Maskus and Konan 
point out that even though patent grants a monopoly, the monopoly is rarely introduced into a market that 
previously had been perfectly competitive. The patent-seeking foreign firm is likely to enjoy limited 
market power while it faces competition from substitute products or imports from other countries of the 
identical product. Sherwood, 1990, note 21 above, p. 51 and Maskus and Konan, note $1 above, p. 411. 
" Other economic costs include loss in employment and tax receipts because of a reduction of domestic 
output and employment from firms that have been producing counterfeit and pirated goods. Whether these 
short term costs will generate long term economic benefits or costs depends on the specific circumstances 
of a country. Potential economic benefits might come from gains in other sectors of employment and tax 
revenue from reallocated labour out of counterfeited or pirated activities. See UNCTAD, The TRIPS 
Agreement and Developing Countries, NT: UN, 1996, pp. 16-18. 
$S Subramarian, 1990a, note 2 above, p. 254. 
86 World Development Report 1998/99, note 9 above, p. 35. 
38 
adding to its debt burden. 87 These are the reasons based upon which DCs argued against 
the introduction of patent protection in their countries and why the critics of patent 
monopoly have been severe toward the industry. 88 
In an international context, many hold the view that strengthening of patent protection 
will have a distributive effect on world welfare and cause an international welfare 
transfer. 89 Subramanian estimates that the full economic impact of welfare losses and 
gains would not be felt until 10 or 20 years after the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement to . 
grant patent protection to pharmaceuticals. 90 In his comparative study of the impact of 
higher level of patent protection for pharmaceuticals. on . -DCs of 
different market 
.. 
structure, 91 he found that, for those small DCs with perfect competitive markets but 
which became monopolies after the introduction of patent protection, foreign producers 
always gained less than losses accruing to those DCs. Patent protection diminishes 
global welfare 92 in the short term at least, and serves to redistribute world income in 
foreign producers' favour, and the greater the gains to foreign producers the greater the 
welfare losses to individual DCs. But apart from looking into the static effect of 
monopoly rent for foreign producers thus causing international rent transfer, many 
87 Hurlbut, David, `Fixing the Biodiversity Convention: Toward a Special Protocol for Related Intellectual 
Property', National Resources Journal, 34,1994, p. 379. 
88 Taylor and Silberston, note 45 above, p. 231. 
89 Sherwood, 1990, note 21 above, and Subramanian, 1990a, note 2 above. See Dani Rodrik's comment in 
Deardroff and Stem (eds. ), Analytical and Negotiating Issues in the Global Trading System, Ann Arbor: 
The Michigan University Press, 1994, for a detailed analysis on the distributive effects of enhanced IP 
system. 
90 Subramanian, 1990a, note 2 above, p. 263. According to UNCTAD, price increases from stronger 
pharmaceutical patents are relatively modest in large DCs such as India, Brazil, Argentina and Mexico. 
Much depends on the competitive reaction of foreign rights holders and the technology capacity of local 
fines. See UNCTAD, 1996, note 84 above, Annex 1. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Feinberg R. M. and D. J. Rousslang, `The Economic Effects of Intellectual Property Rights 
Infringements', Journal of Business, 63,1990, pp. 79-90. 
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caution the need to look into the dynamic benefits of patent system to induce R&D 
activities and technology transfer 93 that DCs will gain if these dynamic effects out- 
weight consumer losses from monopoly pricing. 
1.4.2 Foreign technology transfer 9S 
The introduction of patent protection into domestic legislation has been seen as strongly 
correlated with the economic development of a country since the Middle Ages, and was 
affirmed in the Inventors Act of Venice of 1474, the first European patent statute. 95 
Although ICs and DCs both recognise the contribution of IP to a nation's economic 
development, DCs believe that the absence or low level of patent protection could reduce 
the costs of production and secure lower prices for consumers as the result of free market 
competition. 96 In the area of pharmaceuticals, DCs' public health policy often places 
priority on affordability and self-sufficiency. And they view a low level of patent 
protection as a means to reduce the costs of acquiring technology and to decrease foreign 
93 See, for example, Subramanian, Arvind, `TRIPS and the Paradigm of the GATT: A Tropical 
Temperature View', The World Economy, 4, December 1990b, p. 514 and Yarrow, George, `CEC and EC 
Member State Industrial Policy and the Pharmaceutical Industry', in Towse (ed. ), Industrial Policy and the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, London: Office of Health Economics, 1994, pp. 1-12, p. 3. 
94 Transfer of technology" is defined by UNCTAD as "the transfer of systematic knowledge for the 
manufacturer of a product, for the application of a process or for the rendering of a service and does not 
extend to the transactions involving the mere sale or mere lease of goods". It also includes the provision of 
know-how and technical expertise in the form of instruction. UNCTAD, Code of Conduct for the 
International Transfer of Technology, UN Doc. TD/CODE TOT/41,1983, ch. 2.1, p. 2. 
95 Blakeney, Michael, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Concise Guide to the TRIPS 
Agreement, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1996 and Appendix I and Maskus and Konan, note 81 above, p. 
429. 
96 One major reason why DCs take this stance is because DCs are technology purchasers. DCs as the major 
technology purchasers can be demonstrated by a 1974 UNCTAD report which concludes that: The 
nationals of developing countries hold in their own countries no more than I per cent of the world stock of 
patents, and in other countries, no more than about two thirds of 1 per cent of foreign-owned patents. 
These countries have plainly been on the periphery of the patented system. See UNCTAD 1974 Report, 
note 19 above, p. 92. 
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exchange outflows in the form of royalties, fees and profits. 97 Some DCs therefore 
adopted a policy of reducing or revoking the national patent protection as a means of 
achieving their development goals 98 despite some studies advise against such an 
approach. 99 
MNCs are the major players in the global technology market as both transferors and 
sellers. 100 Technology transfer is another aspect of their cross-border activities, as 
distinguished from direct cross-border trade in. goods. The major modes of transfer 101 
for patented technology include foreign direct investment 102 and arm's length technology 
purchasing arrangements 103. such as licensing agreements. 
97 Costs of technology to DCs are estimated to be about 37% of their public debt service payments. 
Licence fees and royalties account for around 56% of the annual flow of direct private foreign investments. 
UNCTAD, Major Issues Arising From the Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries, UN Doc. 
TDB/AC. 11/10/Rev. 2,1975, para. 98. In the same report, it was estimated that the annual rate of growth 
of the direct cost of technology to DCs was about 20%, para. 101. 
98 Example of Turkey revoking patent protection conferred on pharmaceuticals in 1961. Kirim, Arman S., 
`Reconsidering patents and Economic Development: A Case Study of the Turkish Pharmaceutical 
Industry', World Development, 13(2), 1985, pp. 219-236. 
99 For example, a study conducted in 1976 by the Kiel Institute for Economic Policy recommended against 
reducing patent protection as a development strategy device even in the critical sector of pharmaceuticals. 
Kunz-Hallstein, 1979, note 74 above, pp. 649-670, p 665. Even Lall, a staunch critic of introducing patent 
protection in DCs, warns against overestimating the shortcomings of the patent system in regard to the 
policies promoting technical development in and transferring technology to DCs. See Lall, Sanjaya, `The 
Patent System and the Transfer of Technology to LDCs', JWTL, 10(1), pp. 1-16. In a more recent study 
conducted by Evenson, he comments that by weakening the scope of patent coverage to discourage foreign 
patenting, DCs have discouraged domestic invention as the unintended result. See Evenson, Robert, 
`International invention: Implication for Technology Market Analysis', in Griliches (ed. ), R&D, Patents, 
and Productivity, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984. 
10° World Investment Report 1998, note 3 above, ch. 1. 
101 Buckley has identified ten forms of technology transfer: wholly-owned foreign affiliates, joint ventures, 
foreign minority holdings, "fading-out" agreements, licensing, franchising, management contracts, turnkey 
ventures, contractual joint ventures, and international subcontracting. See Buckley, P. J., `New forms of 
International Industrial Co-operations', in Buckley and Casson (eds. ), The Economic Theory of the 
Multinational Enterprise, London: Macmillan, 1985, pp. 38-59. 
102 The most widely used definition of FDI is that of the IMF for balance-of-payment statistics: 
" foreign direct investment (FDI) refers to an investment that is 
made to acquire a lasting interest in an enterprise operating in an 
economy other than that of the investor; the investor's purpose 
being to have an effective voice in the management of enterprise. " 
See IMF, Balance ofPayment Manual, 5`h ed., Washington, D. C.: IMF, 1993. The OECD has also 
established a definition of FDI, and recommends that an enterprise in which a single foreign investor 
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A licensing agreement is the common mode of arm's length technology transfer for the 
pharmaceutical industry. It could protect IPRs while providing licensees access to the 
latest technology. This mode of transfer is particularly important as an alternative in 
countries with no IPP, 104 or when the foreign market is too small to warrant direct 
investment. 105 Nevertheless, it is a common knowledge that if IPRs are not adequately 
protected in a particular country, foreign firms tend to avoid selling a licence or investing 
there. 106 An OECD survey result shows that inadequate IPP is the greatest disincentive 
controls more than -10% of the ordinary share or voting power of the enterprise is to be considered a FDI. 
When the equity participation is less than 10%, it will be considered a FDI provided that the investor has an 
effective voice in the management of the enterprise. See OECD, Detailed Benchmark Definition of 
Foreign Direct Investment, 2d ed., Paris: OECD, 1992. Technology could be transfer through intra-firm or 
inter-firm arrangements. Intra-firm technology transfer involves foreign direct investment, mostly by 
MNCs, it takes the forms of wholly-owned foreign affiliates, joint ventures, or foreign minority holdings. 
Wholly-owned foreign affiliate is the conventional form of foreign direct investment for intra-firm 
technology transfer. Wholly-owned foreign affiliate transfer takes place when product quality standard is a 
matter of concern or when the technology involved is sophisticated and the transferee lacks the know-how 
to assimilate it. See Mansfield, Edwin, `Unauthorised use of Intellectual Property: Effects on Investment, 
Technology Transfer, and Innovation', in Wallerstein, Mogee, and Schoen (eds. ), Global Dimensions of 
Intellectual property Rights in Science and Technology, Office of International Affairs National Research 
Council, Washington, D. C.: National Academy Press, 1993, pp. 107-145, p. 116. 
103 Inter-firm transfer takes place mostly by means of arm's length purchase. The 1990s saw an upsurge of 
inter-firm technology agreements from a yearly average of less than 300 in the 1980s to over 600 in the 
mid-1990s. (World Investment Report 1998, note 3 above, pp. 23-25. ) Receipts and payment of royalties 
and license fees are a measure of the value of technology flow by MNCs. This value is increasing at 
double-digit rates predominantly from inter-firm transaction. The increase in R&D expenditure and the 
speed and risk involved of new product development and introduction in the last two decades underlie the 
need for MNCs to seek to increase their flexibility and leverage their R&D investments through inter-firm 
transfer. UNCTAD had identified two types of inter-firm agreements with the two way agreement on a 
rising trend in 1990s: 1) one-way technology agreement in which the flow of technology is from licensor to 
licensee or from one joint-venture partner to the other; 2) two way agreement involving joint research 
and/or development agreements and the creation of joint R&D ventures with specific research programmes. 
See UN, World Investment Report 1997 - Transnational Corporations, Market Structure and competition 
Policy, Geneva and NY: UN, 1997, p. 14 and Holmes and Dunning, note 56 above, p. 92. 
1°4 Rozek, Richard P., `Protection of Intellectual Property Through Licensing: Efficiency Considerations', 
JWL, 22(5), 1988, pp. 27-34. 
105 Mansfield, 1993, note 102 above, p. 119. 
106 OECD, 1989, note 32 above, p. 11. Also Primo Braga, Carlso, `The Developing Country Case for and 
Against Intellectual Property Protection', in Siebeck, Evenson, Lesser, and Primo Braga (eds. ), 
Strengthening Protection of Intellectual Property in Developing Countries -A Survey of the Literature, 
Part VII, World Bank Discussion Papers #112, Washington, D. C.: The World Bank, 1990b, p. 83. 
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when the pharmaceutical industry considers technology licensing, 
107 which might 
explain why DCs only have minor involvement in the increasing number of inter-firm 
technology agreements despite the finding that highly knowledge-intensive industries 
such as pharmaceuticals have the largest number of such inter-firm agreements, 
108 but 
mostly with both partnering firms from ICs. 
109 
Another means of acquiring knowledge is to free-ride on the technological information 
available. in the international market. 
110 The impressive speed and magnitude of . 
development among the Newly Industrialised Economies (NIES) with no domestic patent 
protection installed but. by free-riding on western technologies is an example in point. ý. 
Sherwood comments that free riding is easy in pharmaceutical technology, but it only 
involves a taking of a product, not an appropriation of technology. He warns that those 
who copy would learn very little about developing medicine because skills gained from 
copying are typically not useful in the transfer to the process of innovation. 111 
Apart from considering the mode of technology transfer, DCs are faced with the choice 
of technology that will benefit them most. Even though the modern technology market is 
saturated with choices, many latest technologies might not be appropriate for the 
107 OECD, International Technology Licensing: Survey Result, 1987, Table 40. Two other disincentives 
identified by the survey are imposition of foreign exchange control and burdensome government approval 
regulations. 
108 World Investment Report 1998, note 3 above, p. 25. 
109 Ibid., p. 29. Less than 6% of inter-firm technology agreements involve a DC firm. It might partly due to 
a shift in MPCs' approach toward a more co-operative stance in their emphasis of investment founded on 
the upgrading of the competitiveness of indigenous assets such as know-how. 
110 Maskus and Konan, note 81 above, p. 415 
11' Sherwood, Robert M., `Why a Uniform Intellectual Property system Makes Sense for the World', in 
Wallerstein, Mogee, and Schoen (eds. ), Global Dimensions of Intellectual property Rights in Science and 
Technology, Office of International Affairs National Research Council, Washington, D. C.: National 
Academy Press, 1993, p. 76. 
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production and consumption needs of DCs. Jennings comments that there is a 
tremendous attraction to high technology in less developed countries (LDCs) which 
sometimes distorts the pattern of their investment in pharmaceuticals and health care 
supply 112 ignoring their economic capability, difference in disease pattern, and the 
specific medicines most needed by their respective population. Some argue that it is not 
4 
the most advanced technology that will benefit DCs most, but the appropriate one 113 ý 
which matches the capacity of the recipient countryto absorb and successfully exploit the 
technology. 114 The inappropriateness could be substantially lessened 115 when DCs 
develop the competence and build up technological capacity to search, select, absorb and 
adapt so to take advantage of the vast stock of global knowledge. 116 
A study conducted by Diwan and Rodrik shows that an increase in patent protection has 
indeed led to a greater fit between the available technologies and the preferences of 
patenting countries. 117 According to UNCTAD, closer co-operation on technology 
matters appear to have increased world wide due to the growing cost of developing new 
technology, the difficulty in its appropriation, and the increased complexity of its 
transfer. 118 From the perspective of the pharmaceutical industry, the readiness to invest 
and transfer technological know-how would increase if a country strengthened its patent 
112 Jennings, John, `Commentary'. In Helms (ed. ), The International Supply of Medicines, Washington, 
D. C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1980, p. 152. 
113 Stewart, Frances, `Technology Transfer for Development, in Science and Technology - Lessons for 
Development Policy', in Evenson and Ranis (eds. ), Economic Development: An International Comparative 
Study, in Science and Technology - Lessons from Development Policy, Colorado: Wesiview Press, 1990, p. 
308. 
114 UNCTAD, Further Consultations on a Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of 
Technology - Report by the Secretary General of UNCTAD, TD/CODE TOT/56,1990a, p. 6. "s Stewart, note 113 above, p. 315. 
116 World Development Report, 1998/99, note 9 above, p. 36 and. Stewart, note 113 above, p. 315. 
U7 Diwan, Ishac and Dani Rodrik, Patents, Appropriate Technology, and North-South Trade, International 
Economic Department, WPS #251, Washington, D C: The World Bank, August 1989, p. 29. 
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standard. 119 The strength and weakness of a country's IPP system seems to have a 
substantial effect not only on the mode of transfer 120 but also on the kind of technology 
transferred. 121 
As IP is strongly correlated with economic development, 122 DCs have been advised to 
assume a more liberal attitude with regard to patentees and to direct the national law 
toward offering real incentives for technology transfer. 123 As modem technology is 
mostly in the hands of private enterprises in ICs, their co-operation is essential, and it can 
only be obtained by incentives. 124 More importantly, conscious government efforts are 
118 UNCTAD, 1990a, note 114, p. 6. 
119 Stamm, Otto A., `Intellectual Property Rights and Competitive Strategy: A Multinational 
Pharmaceutical Firm', in Wallerstein, Mogee, and Schoen (eds. ), Global Dimensions of Intellectual 
property Rights in Science and Technology, Office of International Affairs National Research Council, 
Washington, D. C.: National Academy Press, 1993, pp. 221-228, p. 226. 
120 According to Chen, while transnational corporations as the major actors in international technology 
transfer, their choice of mode of transfer is often between foreign direct investment (intra-firm) and 
licensing (arm's length). Chen, Edward K. Y., Transnational Corporations and Technology Transfer to 
Developing Countries, Transnational Corporations and World Development, published by Routledge on 
behalf of the UNCTAD Division on Transnational Corporation and Investment, London: International 
Thomson Business Press, 1996. When making choices, foreign direct investment is preferred when 
technologies involved are more advanced and the transferor is more R&D intensive, see Davidson, W. H. 
and D. G. McFetridge, `Key Characteristics in the Choice of International Technology Transfer Mode', 
Journal of international Business Studies, 1985, pp. 5-21. 
121 Primo Braga, 1990b, note 106 above, p. 30. 
'22 Maskus and Konan, note 81 above, p. 429. 
123 Penrose, E., `International Patenting and the Less-developed Countries', Economic Journal, 83,1973, p. 
784. 
124 Kunz-Hallstein, 1979, note 74 above, p. 666. Incentives are defined as 
"any measurable economic advantage afforded to specific enterprises, 
or categories of enterprises by a government, in order to encourage 
them to behave in a certain manner. They include measures either to 
increase the rate of return of a particular FDI undertaking, or to 
reduce its costs or risk. " 
Incentives are a relatively minor factor in the locational decisions of MNCs relative to other locational 
advantages such as market size, adequate infrastructure, economic"stability, and the quality of the general 
regulatory framework. See UNCTAD, World Investment Report 1996 - Investment, Trade and 
International Policy Arrangements, NY: UN, 1996. 
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also needed to establish the education system and basic R&D facilities so as to build up 
local technological capacity to ensure efficient transfer of technology. 125 
lu See Stewart, 1990, note 113 above, pp. 315-322 and UN 1964 Reports, note 18 above, pp. 48-49. The 
report states that: 
"the question of patents must be seen and dealt with in the broader context of 
facilitating the transfer of patent and non-patented technology to the DCs, and 
enhancing the ability to adopt and use such foreign technology in the implementation 
of their development programmes. " 
This report was conducted as the result of a General Assembly resolution (1713 (XVI), December 1961) 
calling for a survey of patent legislation and the effect of patents on developing countries. This report is 
the most extensive official study of the patent systems in developing countries and remains widely quoted. 
See discussion in, for example, Penrose, 1973, note 123 above, pp. 768-786 and Oddi, 1987, note 79 above, 
pp. 831-878. 
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1.4.3 R&D Activities 
Dependency on foreign technology is viewed by some as perpetuating the inequitable 
distribution of income and only fulfilling the consumption demands of the elite. 126 It is 
expected that by fostering local R&D through strengthening IPP, it would lessen DCs' 
dependency on technology imports and tailor domestic R&D activities to' meet the: 
specific needs of a country so as to benefit the majority of the population. But Primo 
Braga cautions that in a world of growing inter-dependence, it is futile to equate 
technological independence with strict self-reliance. 127 
According to Redwood, the major reason why the medicines for tropical disease which (/L' 
Ddemand are not available is because it is unlikely to prove profitable fTPCs, 128 
partly because many governments in DCs have imposed price control over 
pharmaceuticals essential to their preventive or primary health care. Furthermore, TPCs' 
126 Lall, note 99 above, pp. 1-16. Stewart further explains that: 
"countries that adopt the more capital intensive of the technologies 
produced by developed countries, without modifications, face a 
dualistic pattern of development with a small high-income sector - 
absorbing almost all the countries investable resources, its 
infrastructure and skills, generating demand among a small elite for 
the modem products produced in the sector, while the remainder of 
the economy, encompassing the majority of the population, remains 
deprived of investment resources, modern technology or appropriate 
products, in conditions of extreme poverty. " 
See Stewart, 1990, note 113 above, p. 306. 
127 Primo Braga also cautions that inadequate IPP in DCs may dampen MPCs desire to invest in R&D in 
areas such as tropical diseases, which is of specific interest to DCs. Primo Braga, 1990a, note 31 above, p. 
28, and Siebeck, Wolfgang E., `Conclusions and Recommendations', in Siebeck, Evenson, Lesser, Primo 
Braga (eds. ), Strengthening Protection of Intellectual Property in Developing Countries -A Survey of the 
Literature, Part VIII, World Bank Discussion Papers #112, Washington, D. C.: The World Bank, 1990, p. 
91. Also Sherwood, 1990, note 21 above and Yusuf, Abdulqawi A., `Developing Countries and Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual property Rights', in UNCTAD, Uruguay Round - Paper on Selected Issues, 
NY: UN, 1989. 
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failure to provide adequate production for essential drugs is because the research 
e oriented toward the major maladies of the industrialised societies, priorities oP 
4S 
such as cancer, HIV, or life-quality enhancing products. 129 
FDI in R&D operations is attracted to locations that feature particular kinds of 
intellectual resources. 130 According to Mansfield's survey, the strength or weakness of a 
country's IPP seems to have a substantial. effect on the pharmaceutical industry's 
investment decision in R&D facilities. 131 , `MPCs will not make any substantial 
investments in countries with weak IPP as their products and processes are relatively easy 
to imitate. 132 : And when MPCs do consider R&D investment targeting a specific 
location, the existence of a patent system forms one of the considerations, but inadequate 
patent protection is a total turn-off. 133 
128 Redwood, 1994, note 6 above. 
129 Gerefi, note 56 above, p. 201. A point of caution to this statement: patient population for many 
incurable diseases such as cancer and HIV are spreading all over the world, they are not the privilege of 
people living in western atmosphere. The difference is that the major markets for new cancer or HIV drugs 
will be where patients or health care system can afford to pay. 
130 World Investment Report 1998, note 3 above, p. 1 16. The result of the research conducted by 
Economists Advisory Group in 1988 shows that three factors have been identified which influence MNCs' 
decision in choosing locations for R&D investment. Host country's R&D track record. is the most 
important consideration. The availability of suitable personnel such as trained scientist and medical 
professions comes second, and government incentives rank the third. This research result was mentioned in 
Holmes and Dunning, note 56 above, p. 97. The EAG report is an unpublished report prepared for the 
American Pharmaceutical Group on American pharmaceutical companies in Britain and Europe. 
131 Mansfield, Edwin, Intellectual Property Protection, Foreign Direct Investment, and Technology 
Transfer, International Financial Corporation, Discussion Paper #19, Washington, D. C.: The World Bank, 
1994. Mansfield conducts a survey of 94 US firms operating in six countries, mostly NIEs or major DCs. 
He observes that IPP seems to influence the composition and extent of US direct investment, although the 
effect differs among industries. There are five kinds of direct investment decision involved in the survey: 
R&D facilities, facilities to manufacture complete products, facilities to manufacture components, 
rudimentary production and assembly facilities, and sales and distribution outlets. The chemical industry 
(includes pharmaceuticals) regards IPP as important for the first three types of investment. 
132 Mansfield, Edwin, Intellectual Property Protection, Direct Investment, and Technology Transfer - 
Germany, Japan, and the United States, International Finance Corporation, Discussion Paper #27, 
Washington, D. C.: The World Bank, 1995 
133 Redwood, 1994, note 6 above, p. 87. 
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MIPCs have been cautious in moving research facilities abroad for the first stage of drug 
discovery. They feel that there are few countries which have sufficiently developed 
scientific support to provide the large scale facility needed. And it could not be expected 
to make any significant breakthrough in the first eight to ten years 134 because drug 
innovation is a step-by-step cumulative process which comes about through the 
accumulation of a large number of minor changes. ' 135 The second and third stages of 
drug discovery involve pre-clinical and clinical researches. Clinical trial is one area of 
development activities which have been conducted away from one single location. 136 
One of the reasons being that there is a growing regulatory requirement among countries 
to include results from different ethnic groups. And it would need to draw scientists, 
medical and pharmaceutical professions of similar calibre from the countries participating 
in the trial. So far, most of R&D operations take place in ICs. 137 There is an intensive 
competition among them to attract these R&D activities with required infrastructure and 
technology policies to support the contention. 138 
If DCs wish to participate more fully in pharmaceutical innovative activities and compete 
with ICs for R&D investments, the immediate effort must focus on establishing the 
134 Brada, note 58 above, p. 47. 
135 Parker, note 42 above, p. 138, Sherwood, 1990, note 21 above, p. 171, and Magee, Stephen P., 
`Commentary', in Helms (ed. ), The International Supply of Medicines, Washington, D. C.: American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1980, p. 148. 
136 World Investment Report 1998, note 3 above, p. 116. Also Dunning, John H., `Location and the 
Multinational Enterprise: A Neglected Factor? ', Journal of International Business Studies, 29(1), 1998, pp. 
45-66. 
137 Ibid. According to World Investment Report 1998, some 90% of research conducted by US MNCs' 
foreign affiliates took place in ICs in 1994. 
138 Inter-governmental relations, particularly among the Triad, have become more competitive because the 
structure of their economies have converged and assets and intermediate products have become 
internationally more mobile. See Dunning, John H., Multinational Enterprise and the Global Economy, 
Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co, 1993, p. 588 and Holmes and Dunning, note 56 above, p. 
100. 
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domestic scientific and technological infrastructure conducive to domestic R&D 
activities. 139 As evidenced by Redwood's cross-analysis of his database of products, the 
maintenance of a patent system constitutes an important motivating factor to encourage 
and support local R&D activities. 
140 
In regard to ICs' proposal for an international agreement to harmonise domestic -patent 
systems, many caution the approach of applying an identical set of standard to both ICs 
and DCs regardless of the stage of development a country is in. 141 As Maskus suggests, 
"a reasonable approach would be based on gradual enhancement. of 
international protective regimes as the circumstances in various countries 
change to warrant increasing protection... -- .A gradual and flexible': - -: 
approach that can accommodate both changing technical requirements 
for protection... and evolving national interests seems advisable. " 142 
139 The endorsement of government public policy is necessary to support the effort. See Redwood, 1994, 
note 6 above, p. 82 and Stewart, 1990, note 113 above, p. 320. 
140 According to Redwood's study, only eight of the 265 major global drugs originated in countries without 
patent protection. See Redwood, 1994, note 6 above, Lall, note 99 above, p. 11, and Evenson, 1990a, note 
82 above. 
141 Evenson, 1990a, note 82 above, Maskus and Konan, note 81 above, and Subramanian, 1990a, note 2 
above. 
142 See Maskus, K. E., `Normative Concerns in the International Protection of Intellectual Property Rights', 
The World Economy, 13, p. 408 and Evenson, Robert E., `Intellectual Property Rights, R&D, Inventions, 
Technology Purchase, and Piracy', in Evenson and Ranis (eds. ), Economic Development: An International 
Comparative Study, in Science and Technology - Lessons from Development Policy, Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1990b, p. 354. According to the survey conducted by Evenson, he observed that, among 
NIEs, initial effort was put in to nurture the capacity to reverse engineer which leads to high piracy 
activities. What followed was an increase in technology purchase but low technology export and 
productive domestic R&D activities. It then led to a rapid rise in the ratio of patents per scientist and 
engineer. He suggests that NIEs have a comparative advantage in adaptive invention, i. e. assimilating and 
modifying the invention of ICs. They should strengthen IPP to facilitate access to foreign invention and 
stimulate domestic adaptive and imitative invention. 
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DCs argued that IP is a function of a country's domestic situation that reflects the 
national social, development and technological policy objectives. 143 They feel that the 
degree of liberty allowed under the Convention is important to allow them to adopt 
appropriate measures consistent with its needs and social, economic and development 
policy. 144 They consider the approach under the Convention desirable whereby a gradual 
elevation of minimum standards built on a process of consensus enables all participants 
to determine the desired balance between monopoly and competition for themselves. 145 
1.5 The legal framework of patent protection under the Paris Convention 
The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property as revised in 1967 (the 
Convention) is the major multilateral Industrial Property treaty designed for the 
protection of patents, utility models, industrial designs, trademarks, service marks, trade 
names, indication of source or appellations of origin, and the repression of unfair 
competition. 146 The Convention was established in 1883 147 and is now administered by 
143 Abbott, Frederick M., `Protecting First World Assets in the Third World: Intellectual Property 
Negotiations in the GATT Multilateral Framework', VandJTL, 22(4), 1989. 
144 WIPO, PR/DC/3, June 25,1979, p. 8. 
ias Reichman, note 36 above, p. 867. 
'46 Article 1, paragraph (2) of the Convention. Service marks was added on in the Revision Conference of 
1958 while patents, utility models, industrial designs, trademarks, trade names, indication of source, and 
the repression of unfair competition were already mentioned in the 1911 Act. Neither "industrial property" 
nor the objects is defined in the Convention with the exception of unfair competition, Bogsch, Arpad, The 
First Hundred Years of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Paris: United 
International Bureau for the Protection of Intellectual Property (BIRPI), 1968, p. 191. 
147 The agreement to establish the Paris Convention was adopted in a diplomatic conference held in Paris in 
1880 and 1883 and was signed in March 1883. Since then, there have been six conferences of revision held 
in Brussels (1887 and 1900), Washington (1911), The Hague (1925), London (1934), Lisbon (1958), and 
Stockholm (1967). The seventh (also the last) revision was held in Geneva, Nairobi, and Geneva again 
during 1980-1985 ended in no agreement. 
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WIPO. 148 WIPO was established in 1967 149 with the International Bureau of Intellectual 
Property as the Secretariat of the Union. 150 In 1974, WIPO became a specialised agency 
in the UN system of organisation. 151 
The Convention recognises the principle of state sovereignty, 152 a general principle of 
international law. 153 It permits its members to legislate and enforce measures of 
protection for industrial property within their own borders and to define the extent and 
the subject matters (or technical fields) of the protection. For example, according to 
148 Other industrial property agreements administered by the WIPO include: the Madrid Agreement (1891) 
for indications of source, the Madrid Agreement (1891) for marks, the Hague Agreement (1925) for. 
industrial designs, the Nice Agreement (1957) for trademarks, the Lisbon Agreement (1958) for 
appellations of origin, the International Convention for the Protection of New Variety of Plants (1961), the 
Locarno Agreement (1968) for industrial designs, the PCT for patent, the International Patent Classification 
Agreement (1971) for patent, the Budapest Treaty (1977) for micro-organisms, and the Treaty on the 
Protection of Layout-designs (Topographies) of Microchips (1989) for microchips. The major international 
industrial property agreement not administered by WIPO is the European Patent Convention (1973) which 
is regional in character. 
149 WIPO was established by the "Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organisation" 
signed in Stockholm in 1967 and entered into force on April 1970. 
150 Union" first appeared in Article 1 of original 1883 text of the Convention to mean that a permanent link 
among countries is being created. In 1967 Act, Article 1, paragraph (1) states that "the countries to which 
this Convention applies constitute a Union for the protection of industrial Property. " The original 
Convention of 1883 had established an International Bureau of the Union for the Protection of Industrial 
property, which was entrusted with the administration of the Union. This Bureau was later merged with the 
Bureau of the Union for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works and became the BIRPI. Later on in 
the Revision Conference of Stockholm in 1967, International Bureau of intellectual Property was created 
and became the Secretariat of WIPO by virtue of Article 15(1)(a) of the Convention as revised at 
Stockholm. See Bodenhausen, G. H. C., Guide to the Application of the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property, Special Issue for the Commemoration of the Centenary of the Paris 
Convention, Industrial Property, Geneva: WIPO, 1983, p. 175. 
151 WIPO became a specialised agency in the United Nations system of organisation under General 
Assembly Resolution (GA Res) 3346,29(1) UN GAOR Supp. (no. 31), UN Doc A/9631 (1974). 
152 Fikentscher, Wolfgang, GATT Principles and Intellectual Property Protection, in Beier & Schricker 
(eds), GATT or WIPO? New Ways in the International Protection of Intellectual Property, Munich: Max 
Planck Institute, 1989, pp. 101-126. 
153 According to Brownlie, state sovereignty is a legal shorthand for legal personality of statehood. It entails 
the legal competence of a state with rights of government, administration, and disposition recognised and 
delineated by international law. Sovereignty is also used to describe the legal competence which states 
have in general jurisdiction, including legislative competence over national territory. Under general 
international law, matters within the competence of states are said to be within the domestic jurisdiction or 
reserved domain of states. See Brownlie, Ian, Principles of Public. International Law, 4`h ed., NY: Oxford 
University Press, 1990, pp. 108,289, and 291. See also Qureshi, Asif H., International Economic Law, 
London: Sweet & Maxwell, ch. 2 for discussion in economic sovereignty. 
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Article 27(2) of the Convention, member states are bound only by the "Act" they ratified 
at the time of accession. 154 Member states also have the freedom of choice not to be 
bound by certain provisions contained in the Act they subscribe to in their instrument of 
ratification or accession, I55 such as the provisions relating to dispute settlement, the 
substantive provisions of Articles 1 to 12, and the administrative clauses contained in 
Articles 13 to 17. 
The Convention is designed to protect legal and natural persons. 156 A set of substantive 
rules is articulated in the Convention with self-executing character designed to protect 
nationals of the member states of the Union. 157 The self-executing character of the rules 
is important in an international legal instrument when persons, legal or natural, are the 
parties the treaty is designed to protect. These provisions of. self-executing character are 
worded in such a way to be capable of direct application. But whether private parties 
could rely on it in front of domestic administrative or judicial. authorities is a matter for 
the national law. 158 In some countries, the constitutional system permits administrative 
and judicial authorities to apply directly to private parties the provisions of the 
154 An "act" is the incorporation of the original text of the 1883 Convention with the modified text agreed 
upon by the member states in each of the conference of revision. As the result of different legal 
requirements among the seven acts, rights and obligations of member states vary. 
155 Article 20.1 (b) of the Convention 
156 This was unanimously agreed by the Revision Conference at Brussels in 1900, see Bodenhausen, op. 
cit., p. 27. 
157 They include Article 4 (Right of priority), Article 4 bis (Independence of Patents), Article 5quarter 
(Right of the patentee of a process of manufacturer), and Article 5, Section A(l) (Importation of patented 
articles), Article 5, Section A(3) (Forfeiture of a patent), and Article 5, Section A(4) (Compulsory license). 
These articles will be discussed in detail in the text. This list itself is not exhaustive. See Bodenhausen, 
note 150 above, pp. 14 and 68. 
158 Ibid., p. 14 and Fikentscher, Wolfgang, `GATT Principles and Intellectual Property Protection', in Beier 
and Schricker (eds. ), GATT or WIPO? New Ways in the International Protection of Intellectual property, 
Munich: Max Planck Institute, 1989, pp. 109-111. 
53 
Convention while in some others, the provisions could be applied only after being 
incorporated into domestic legislation. 
The Convention embodies two fundamental principles applicable to all objects covered: 
the principle of National Treatment (NT), 159 and the right of priority for when patent 
application is filed in more than one member states of the Union. 
160 NT is the cardinal 
principle of the Convention. It obliges the member states to apply domestic law in a non- 
discriminatory manner and accord the same treatment to nationals of any country of the 
Union 161 as stated in Article 2; paragraph (1): 
"nationals of any country of the Union shall, as regards the protection of 
industrial property, enjoy in all the other countries of the Union the 
advantages that their respective laws now grant, or may hereafter grant, to 
nationals; all without prejudice to the rights specially provided for by this 
convention. Consequently, they shall have the same protection as the 
latter, and the same legal remedy against any infringement of their rights, 
provided that the conditions and formalities imposed upon nationals are 
complied with". 
'59 Article 2, paragraph (1) of the Convention. 
160 Article 4 of the Convention. 
161 For nationals from countries of the Union to enjoy IPP, there is no requirement for domicile or 
establishment in the country where protection is claimed. But foci nationals from countries outside the 
Union to apply for protection, domicile or real and effective industrial or commercial establishment is 
required. See Articles 2,. paragraph (2) and 3 of the Convention. 
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NT under the Convention is interpreted as providing protection up to the national 
standard without being allowed to require reciprocity. 
162 and causing offence to nations' 
sovereign rights. 163 Bogsch, the former Director General of WIPO, comments that 
although reciprocity is an alternative to NT in term of ensuring equal treatment among 
nationals of different states, reciprocity runs a greater risk of bringing downward the 
standard of protection. He believed that the provision of a minimum. standard in the-. -. 
Convention is designed to combat the possible risk of substandard protection resulting 
from the application of equal treatment. 164. ý. But Bodenhausen holds a. different view 
stating that reciprocity is sufficiently assured in the Convention, not - by requiring 
reciprocal treatment of nationals from different member states, but by the obligation of 
adhering to the Convention. 165 
Article 4, Section A(1) confers on an applicant the right of priority to prevent a world 
wide loss of novelty 166 when several applications for the same invention are to be filed in 
different countries within the Union. Provided that the first application is filed in one of 
the member states, the subsequent applications will be treated as if they had been filed on 
the same day as the first application within twelve months of the first application. These 
applications will have priority over other applications filed during the twelve months 
period by other persons for the same invention. 
162 Bodenhausen, note 150 above, p. 12. 
163 Evans, Gail E, `The Principle of National Treatment and the International Protection of Industrial 
Property', EIPR, 3,1996, p. 150. 
'64 Bogsch, note 146 above, p. 197. 
165 According to Bodenhausen, the original Article 17 of the Convention, later on became Article 25 after 
some amendments, qualifies the obligations under the Convention as the "reciprocal engagements 
contained in the Convention". Bodenhausen, note 150 above, pp., 12 and 108. Bodenhausen was Mr. 
Bogsch's predecessor. 
166 Kunz-Hallstein, 1979, note 74 above, p. 655. 
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Under Article 4 b'S, the member states within the Union are obliged to considered a patent 
application independently irrespective of whether the patent application has been filed 
inside or outside the Union 167 during the period of priority or not. 168 Each member state 
is obliged to evaluate the patent application according to its own law independent of what 
might be the fate of other applications for the same invention in other countries. 
In the area of patent protection; the Convention does not expressly require the member 
states to establish domestic a- patent system. 169 Regardless of the stipulation of 
substantive patent protection rules in' the l Convention, it is up to the member states to 
legislate according to their policy orientation and objectives. As Bodenhausen pointed 
out: 
"the Convention leaves the member states entirely free to establish the 
criteria for patentability, to decide whether patent applications should or 
should not be examined in order to determine, before a patent is granted, 
whether these criteria have been met, whether the patent should be 
167 Article 4bis( 1) of the Convention. 
168 Article 4b15 (2) of the Convention. 
169 Bodenhausen stated that: 
Protection of several subjects of industrial property has been 
expressly prescribed in the Convention, namely, industrial designs 
(Article 591mgw`s), service marks (Article 6"x"'), collective marks 
(Article 7b15), trade names (Articles 8,9, and 10"), indications of 
source (Articles 10 and 10"); and protection against unfair 
competition (Articles job" and 10") is also mandatory, as well as the 
temporary protection of certain subjects exhibited at international 
exhibitions (Article 11). " 
Bodenhausen, note 150 above, pp. 24-25.. He was the first Director-General of WIPO (1970-1973). 
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granted to the first inventor or to the first applicant for a patent, 170 or 
whether patents should be granted for products only, for process only, or 
for both, and in which fields of industry and for what term. " 171 
Articles 5, Section A and 54°a`e` are the substantive rules of the patent system under the 
Convention. Article 5, Section A concerns the importation of patented products, 
compulsory (non-voluntary) licences, and forfeiture of patent. Article 5 9"ße` relates to the 
importation of products manufactured by a process patented in the importing country. 
Article 5, Section A(l) states that importation by the patent holder of patented products 
manufactured in any of the countries of the Union shall not entail forfeiture of the patent. 
But it does not answer the question of whether importation itself constitutes a "working" 
of the patent. The concept of working is not defined in the Convention. It is generally 
understood, in the case of product patents, as the manufacturing of products comprising 
the invention, and in case of process patents, that the process comprising the invention is 
used in manufacturing. 172 Failure to work a patent 173 might constitute an abuse by the 
170 When the "first-to-file" rule applies, it requires novelty and non-obviousness to exist on the date the 
patent application is filed. This rule enables the first person to file the patent application the right to the 
patent after proving the patentability of the innovation. The "first-to-invent" rule is an alternative system 
the US, and the Philippines followed whereby a patent for an invention is awarded to the first person who 
actually makes the invention. See Wineberg, Arthur, `The Japanese Patent system: A Non-Tariff Barrier 
to Foreign Businesses? ', JWT, 22(1), 1988, p. 14-16 and WIPO Report for GATT, p. 227. See also Roberts, 
Tim, `Paper, Scissors, Stone', EIPR, 20(3), pp. 89-91. Roberts commented that first to file is cheaper, 
simpler, and is used everywhere in the world. Although popular belief is that first-to-invent is a fairer 
system, but it is debatable whether the extra expense is justified for the extra fairness. 
171 Bodenhausen, note 150 above, p. 15. 
172 WIPO, PR/DC/3. June 25,1979, p. 41. 
173 What constitutes "failure to work" is for the member states to define. Common sense dictates that 
surrounding circumstances have to be taken into consideration to decide whether failure to work constitutes 
an abuse. 
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patent holder which could lead to the grant of compulsory license. 174 It is based on the 
belief that patented inventions should be worked in the country where patent is granted so 
to fully justify the exclusive rights the patent holder enjoys. 175 
The Convention allows the member states to take legislative measures for the granting of 
compulsory licences on the ground of failure to work or insufficient working when the 
patentee does not have legitimate reasons to justify the inaction. 176 "Compulsory 
licence" is not defined in the Convention. But it is understood as a license to work a 
patented invention without the authorisation or consent of the patent owner, or when the 
national law obliges the patent owner to give such a license.. 177 .: 
The time constraint 
imposed for the application of a compulsory licence is after the expiration of a period of 
four years from the date of filing of the patent application, or three years from the date of 
the grant of the patent, whichever period expires last. 178 Such a licence has to be non- 
transferable and non-exclusive. 179 Non-exclusivity is not defined in the Convention but 
is construed by Bogsch to mean that exploitation of the patented invention will be 
legitimate by both the beneficiary of the compulsory license and the patent owner or any 
person authorised by the patent owner. 180 
174 Article 5, Section A(2) of the Convention. 
175 Bodenhausen, note 150 above, p. 70. 
176 Article 5, Section A(4) of the Convention. Most of the member states to the Convention has compulsory 
licensing provisions for non-working, with the exception of the US. Compulsory licences could also be 
granted on grounds of public health, national defence, economic development, or the violation of anti-trust 
law. See WIPO Report for GATT. 
"' WIPO, PR/PIC/I1/13, July 22,1977, Annex II. 
178 Ibid. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Bogsch, note 146 above, p. 202 
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The Convention further provides the forfeiture of patent as a remedy when the grant of 
compulsory licence is not sufficient to prevent the said abuse. In order to do so, two 
preconditions have to be met: 181 1) when the grant of compulsory license would not 
have been sufficient to prevent the said abuse, and 2) the proceeding for forfeiture of a 
patent may be instigated two years after the grant of the first compulsory licence. In 
other words, the provision for compulsory license has to be provided for in a country's 
legislation before the forfeiture proceeding could become possible. 
According to Article 5 quate if there exists a process patent in an importing country, the 
process patent holder's' right : extends to the. imported product which has been 
manufactured with this particular process in another country. The process patent holder 
in the importing country has all the rights, with regard to the imported products, that are 
accorded to him by the legislation of the country of importation. In case of litigation, the 
burden of proof is often on the plaintiff but the reversal of the burden of proof is provided 
for in some countries. 
182 
The Convention is. silent on domestic enforcement procedures. It is a matter for domestic 
jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the member states are obliged to abide by NT and avail the 
same legal remedies for infringement to nationals of member states as those it grants to 
its own nationals. 
181 Article 5, Section A(3) of the Convention. 
182 WIPO Report for. GATT, note. 12 above, Item 8iii.. 
a 
59 
The jurisdictional clause contained in Article 28(l) of the Convention 183 deals with the 
settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention. It 
provides that: 
"Any dispute between two or more countries of the Union concerning the 
interpretation or application of this [the Paris] Convention, not settled by 
negotiation, may, by any one of the countries concerned, be brought 
before the International Court of Justice by application in conformity with 
the Statute of the Court, 184 unless the countries concerned agree on some 
other method of settlement... ". 
A country may declare not to be bound by the jurisdictional clause by making a 
reservation 185 by virtue of Article 28(2) of the Convention. 186 Under such a 
circumstance, the general rules and principles under international law will apply with 
regard to the enforcement of treaty obligations. 187 
183 This clause was added to the Convention at the Revision Conference of Stockholm in 1967. 
1" The International Court of Justice, established at the Hague (Netherlands) is competent to deal with all 
cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in treaties and conventions in force 
(Article 36, paragraphl of the Statue of the Court). Only States may be parties in cases before the Court 
(Article 34, paragraph 1, of the Statue of the Court). 
iss Article 21.1(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 provides the legal effect of 
reservation "which is to modify for the reserving state in its relations with that other party the provisions of 
the treaty to which the reservation relates to the extent of the reservation". It also modifies those provisions 
to the same extent for that other party in its relations with the reserving state (Article 21.1(b)). 
186 It can be done at the time when the member state signs the 1967 Stockholm Act or deposit its instrument 
on rectification or accession. 
18' According to Kunz-Hallstein: if a country is bound by the Convention but fails to carry out its treaty 
obligations, it commits an international wrongful'act. The state affected by such delict may, as a matter of 
principle, take appropriate counter-measures. The affected state may resort to retorsion and limit its 
sanctions to merely unfriendly acts, or it may resort to reprisals and retort against the breach with acts 
which would otherwise be illegal. Retorsions are unfriendly acts, they do not affect the rights of the states 
against which they are directed. Reprisals respond to a violation of international law by an act which 
otherwise would be illegal. International law provides limits with respect to reprisals. For example, they 
have tobe proportionate to the damage accured as the result of the illegal acts and they have to be taken in 
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1.5.1 DCs' criticism of the Convention 
From DCs' point of view, the Convention fails to address their development needs and 
the concern for public interest. 188 It also fails to curtail monopolistic power exercised by 
MNCs. 189 By the late 1970s, the view was widespread that the patent system of the 
Convention must be revised to address these concerns... 190 In the most. recent revision 
conference under the auspices of the Convention held during 1980-1982, DCs 
191 
requested the revision of Article 5, Section A, 192 which concerns the importation of 
patented products, compulsory licences and forfeiture of patents; and the deletion of 
Article 5a"' necessary to redress the problem of non-working of patent. 193 
In relation to Article 5, Section A, DCs proposed that patent granting countries should be 
permitted to require the invention to be worked locally; and when the patented invention 
due course; and the UN Charter prohibits reprisals by force or by non-peaceful means (Article 33, UN 
Charter). In practice, there was no example of a measure of reprisal having been applied during the 
hundred years the Convention has been in force. See discussion in Kunz-Hallstein, Hans Peter, `The 
United States Proposal for a GATT Agreement on Intellectual Property and the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property', VandJTL, 22(2), 1989, pp. 278-282. 
188 Ibid. 
189 IPR might serve as an instrument for market allocation treading the domain of antitrust law, as noted by 
Meessen, note 30 above, pp. 67-74. 
190 Lall, note 99 above, p. 1. 
191 In the context of WIPO member states' participation in the revision conference, "developing countries" 
are not defined, but 
"they should be understood to mean the countries which, according to 
the practice of the United Nations, are regarded as being developing 
countries. At the present time (1979), these are the countries of Africa 
(except South Africa), Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia(except 
Japan), Oceania (except Australia and New Zealand) and, in Europe 
Romania and Yugoslavia. " 
WIPO, PR/DC/3, June 25,1979, p. 83. 
192 Kunz-Hallstein, 1989, note 187 above, p. 267. 
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is not worked or is not sufficiently worked, DCs should have the right to grant non- 
voluntary licenses within two years from the grant of the patent. 194 And only DCs could 
forfeit or revoke the patent before the expiration of three years from the grant of the 
patent, provided that the national law of the country provided for a system of non- 
voluntary licenses. 195 DCs further proposed that governments should be permitted to 
grant exclusive non-voluntary licenses. 196 to third parties for six years without 
competition for reasons of national security, nutrition, health, or the development of vital 
sectors of national economy. 
197 
Article 5 q° ' deals with the importation of products manufactured by a process patent in 
the importing country. It will constitute an infringement if it is done without the 
authorisation of the process patent holder. Vaitsos explains that this situation leads to a 
complete monopoly for the patentee in countries where legislation grants not only 
production but also sale and use privileges to products manufactured by a patented 
process. Since most of the patents granted in DCs are not worked, Article 5qua1e` entails 
the acceptance of the import monopoly if sale and use privileges are present in their 
national legislation. DCs proposed either to delete Article 5a°a, e, or be allowed not to 
193 It was argued that it is an outmoded idea to impose compulsory licensing for non-working. Modern 
technology rendered the contemplation of working of a patent in every country a practice economically 
undesirable. See GATT, MTN. GNG/NGI 1/14,12 September 1989, p. 39. 
194 WIPO, PR/DC/3, p. 40. 
195 Ibid., pp. 56-61. 
196 A non-voluntary license is considered exclusive when no one other than the non-voluntary licensee may 
work the patented invention on the territory of the country whose authorities have granted the patent and 
the non-voluntary license throughout the period of time during which the license is in force. WIPO, 
PR/DC/3, p. 53. 
197 WIPO, PRIDC/3, pp. 48-53 and Kunz-Hallstein, 1979, note 74 above.. 
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apply it 198 so that they are free to import products covered by a local process patent if the 
patent is not worked locally. 
In regard to Article 4 b'S, DCs proposed to include a provision enabling them to make use 
of the experience of patent offices in other countries by requiring an applicant for patent 
or patentee to furnish relevant information concerning the same invention published : in .- 
other countries. 199 DCs also submitted a proposal- requesting the incorporation of .. 
differential and more favourable treatments to nationals of DCs by deviating from the ,. 
general rules of the Convention in respect of fees and the term of priority. 200 
From the DCs' standpoint, these efforts were aimed at correcting the economic and 
technical imbalance between DCs and ICs as reflected in their relatively insignificant 
participation in the international system of patent protection. 201 But no agreement was 
reached at the end of the Revision Conference to adopt the DCs' proposals. Oddi 
attributed the failure of DCs' efforts to the consensus voting rules and the power and 
intransigence of ICs on these matters. 202 
198 WIPO, PR/DC/3. June 25,1979, pp. 64-65. 
199 WIPO, PR/PIC/II/13, pp. 12-15 and Annex V. 
200 WIPO, PR/DC/3, pp. 66-75. DCs proposed their nationals to pay one-half of the fees in respect of the 
application for the grant or registration of a patent, inventor's certificate, other title for the protection of an 
invention or innovation, etc.. And the priority period shall be extended by one-half of the applicable 
priority period; so that in case of patents, the priority period be extended to become 18 months. 
0'Kunz-Hallstein, 1979, note 74 above, p. 662. 
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1.5.2 ICs' concerns over the Convention 
As discussed in Chapteir2.5, 
" Convention left much discretion to its member states to 
establish their domestic patent systems. And the implementation of the minimum 
standard as set out in the Convention is not mandatory. ICs claim that it therefore results 
in trade distortions 203 and economic loss caused by infringement and other 
misappropriation of IP because of inadequate. and- ineffective : IP standards in some 
countries. 204 Ina joint paper prepared by business communities from the US, EU and 
Japan endorsed by their respective governments,, comments were made that the IP regime 
under the Convention was never intended to address trade related issues such as 
distortions caused by inadequate and ineffective IPP. 205 : As the result of the inability of 
the Convention to deal with trade distortions, countries resorted to bilateral and unilateral 
actions, 206 which damaged the trade relationship among nations and undermined the 
multilateral disciplines established under the world trading system. 
One of the ICs' major concerns was the inadequacy- of substantive norms on IPP seen in 
many member states of the Convention. Pharmaceuticals top the list of those products 
202 Oddi, 1987, note 79 above, p. 866. 
203 This point was contested by DCs. The representative from India pointed out that it was the restrictive 
and anti-competitive practices of IP owners that created trade distortions. See GATT, 
MTN. GNG/NG 11/14,12 September 1989, pp. 4 and 29. 
204 See, for example, GATT, MTN. GNG/NGI I/W/14 Rev. 1,17 October 1988, Suggestion by the US for 
Achieving the Negotiating Objective - Revision and GATT, MTN. GNG/NG11/W/26,7 July 1988, 
Guidelines and Objectives Proposed by the EC for the Negotiations on Trade Related Aspects of 
Substantive Standards of IPRs (hereinafter EC Guidelines). 
205 Basic Framework, note 82 above, pp. 5-6. See also discussions among the delegates participating in the 
TRIPS MTNs on the competence of WIPO and GATT to deal with IPP and trade matters, GATT, 
PREP. COM(86)SRJ3,11 April 1986. 
206 Ibid. 
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most commonly excluded from patent. 207 The exclusion of both pharmaceutical process 
and product for patent protection was considered to be unacceptable. Furthermore, the 
duration of protection varies considerably among the member states ranging from five to 
twenty years depending on the way it is computed. 208 And that the right to grant 
compulsory licenses has been abused which resulted in patent inventions being used by 
or for the, state without consultation or agreement of the patent holders.. . 
Another concern related to the inadequacy or ineffectiveness of domestic enforcement 
provisions to resolve disputes-as the Convention did not establish standards of national - 
enforcement. Domestic enforcement mechanism-is in place to ensure that the measures 
adopted in the domestic law will not be used as disguised restrictions on legitimate trade 
or as a means of discrimination. It is to ensure the compliance of international treaty 
obligations by invoking domestic legislation in a speedy manner in case of infringement. 
And it is utilised to settle disputes between private parties under national law. One area 
that draws particular criticism from the pharmaceutical industry is the prevailing system 
of the right holder bearing the burden of proof in process patent infringement 
proceedings. Because there are so many ways of producing a chemical compound with 
minor modification of the formula, it is difficult, if not impossible, to gather evidence to. 
substantiate the claim. Reversal of burden of proof is seen as more equitable. 
207 According to the study prepared by WIPO in 1988: among 98 members of WIPO at that time, 49 
member states provided no pharmaceutical product patent protection and 10 member states did not provide 
patent protection for pharmaceutical processes. See WIPO Report for GATT, note 12 above, a study 
prepared by WIPO in 1988 for the GATT Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights, including Trade in Counterfeit Goods 
t 
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Dispute settlement mechanism is in place to resolve disputes between governments over 
their legal obligations under the international agreement. ICs are dissatisfied with the 
absence of consultation mechanisms and meaningful dispute settlement provisions under 
the Convention. Although the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the competent 
LS Sý 
authority to deal with disputes under the Convention, no case has been brought in front of 
it. One possible reason is the requirement 209 that a judgement by the ICJ can only be .. 
enforced by voluntary co-operation or by referral to the Security Council. But it is 
questionable whether the Security Council would act to enforce a judgement on patent ",. 
protection. The other possibly is the perceived lacking of expertise of ICJ in intellectual 
property matters. 210 Among existing international agreements, GATT possesses a. 
comparatively workable dispute settlement mechanism, 211 which in part explains the ICs 
choice of GATT as the forum to negotiate an agreement on IPP. 
2011 Ibid. The duration of patent could be computed from the filing date of the application, the date from the 
filing date, the publication date of the examined application, the publication date of the unexamined 
application, or the date of the grant of the patent. And the duration could range from five to twenty years. 
22 Article 94 of the Charter of the UN. 
210 Emmert, note 30 above, p. 1343. 
21"See De Lacharriere, Guy Ladreit, `The Legal Framework for International Trade', in Trade Policies for a 
Better Future - The "Leutwiler Report", The GATT and the Uruguay Round, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff 
publishers, 1987, p. 103. Also Remarks of Professor John H. Jackson, VandJTL, 22(2), 1989, p. 346 
(hereinafter Jackson Remark). In comparison with other international dispute settlement systems such as 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), GATT dispute settlement procedures work better. See Hudec, Robert, 
Enforcing International Trade Law - The Evolution of the Modern GATT Legal System, New Hampshire: 
Butterworth Legal Publishers, 1993, op. cit., p. 353, Jackson, John, Restructuring the GATT system, 
London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1990, p. 59, Cottier, note 82 above, p. 393, and 
Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich, `The Dispute Settlement System of the World Trade Organisation and the 
Evolution of the GATT Dispute Settlement System since 1948', CMLR, 31,1994, pp. 1,194 and 1195. The 
proof for such a claim can also be found in a 1985 US Review of the Effectiveness of Trade Dispute 
Settlement under the GATT and Tokyo Round Agreement. For example, tariffs and quotas have been the 
most frequent subject of complaints and these cases have generally been resolved satisfactorily under the 
existing dispute settlement procedures; panel report adoption rarely has been delayed for long periods 
averaging 10 months from when the Article XXIII: 2 complaints was filed to the date of report adoption; 
and implementation has been fairly prompt in the cases, averaging two years between the date of the 
Article XXIII: 2 complaints and the date of implementation of panel recommendations. See USITC, Report 
to the Committee on Finance, US Senate, USITC Publication 1793, December 1985, pp. IX, XI, 58 and 64. 
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While setting out to rectify their concerns, ICs found it difficult, if not impossible, to 
revise and strengthen the standard of patent protection under the existing system of the 
Convention. One major stumbling block was the voting system under the Convention. 
The WIPO had adopted the United Nation style of voting by groups whereby four groups 
are represented: Group A consists of the DCs of the Afro-Asian region and Yugoslavia, 
and Group C represents countries from Latin America. These two groups meet together 
as the Group of 77.212 -The socialist countries 
förm. Group D. And Group B includes 
mostly western ICs. 213 The rule of procedure under the Convention to adopt a revision 
required consensus or, if consensus was unattainable, the voting of a majority of two- 
third of the member states, . provided 
that the number of states voting against its approval 
did not exceed twelve. 214 It was unlikely that more stringent patent protection proposals 
could meet approval within the framework of the Convention. 215 ICs recognised that 
they did not have enough bargaining chips in WIPO, 216 and that an alternative forum had 
to be found where they could exert more influence to push forward their case. 
With the intention of seeking a multilateral trade agreement to deal with IPP, the 
substantive norms and standards suggested by ICs contained a higher level of protection 
with wider coverage of subject matters than what was contained in the Convention. In 
order to persuade DCs to adopt a more advanced domestic IP system than is required for 
212 Group of 77 was established at UNCTAD I in 1964. It represents the DCs as a group in the UN system 
and serves as the principal organ of the Third World for articulating and promoting its collective interest so 
to gain stronger bargaining power. The membership of the group has increased since its establishment but 
the numerical designation remains. 
213 Group B also includes countries such as Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. Blakeney, note 95 above, 
F, 
127. 
See also Emmert, note 30 above, p. 1343. 
4 Bosgch, note 146 above, p. 237. 
215 See Jackson Remark, note 211 above. 
216 Remarks of Professor Robert Hudec, Van JTL, 22(2), 1989 (hereinafter Hudec Remark), p. 321. 
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their economic and technological development, assistance must be provided to deal with 
the costs of dislocation derived from, for example, not being able to acquire foreign 
technology or import products from alternative and cheaper sources, and the incursion of 
financial burdens in establishing and maintaining the judicial and administrative 
structures. 217 A mechanism to facilitate the transfer of technology with the aim to 
establish the scientific and technological infrastructure in DCs for long-term growth also 
needs to be addressed in the MTNs, or it would be unlikely for DCs to benefit from 
profit-oriented foreign investment decisions by MNCs. 
217 Yusuf, note 127 above, pp. 191-194, Sherwood, 1990, note 21 above, ch. 8, and Blakeney, note 95 
above, p. 155. 
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Chapter II 
How Did Intellectual Property Protection come to be brought under the 
Auspices of GATT 
Relevant events on the global political and economic scenes prior to the Uruguay Round 
are set out in a chronological order to elaborate why DCs' more active participation in the 
global trading system and the political pressure from ICs, especially. the US, are the two 
major contributory factors to the eventual - inclusion of the subject of TRIPS on the ` 
negotiation agenda of the Uruguay Round.. . 
2.1 Introduction 
The inclusion of the subject of TRIPS on the agenda for the Uruguay Round MTNs 1 
was held as a breakthrough, which was made possible by the conducive international 
economic and political climate of the early 1980s. 
Following a period of strong economic growth in the 1960s, 2 and the significant 
reduction of tariffs after the end of the Kennedy Round, the value of international tr ade 
soared. 3 Protectionism concurrently flourished among trading nations as the result of 
1 See GATT, MIN. DEC, 20 September 1986. The Punta del Este Declaration sets out the negotiation 
agenda for the Uruguay Round MTNs. It was adopted by the Ministers of contracting parties of GATT in 
September 1986. As GATT was applied provisionally in 1947, its members were referred to as the 
"contracting parties" (hereinafter CPs). Under Article XXV: I of GATT: "... whenever reference is made.. 
to the contracting parties acting jointly, they are designated as the CONTRACTING PARTIES.. ". 
"Contracting parties" in the lower case represents individual contracting parties. 
2 The average annual GDP growth rate during the 1960s was 5.1% for all OECD countries. See OECD, 
Economic Outlook Historical Statistics 1960-1989, Paris: OECD, 1991, p. 48, Table 3.1. 
3 The average level of tariffs among ICs has been reduced from around 40% in the 1930s to under 10% 
after the end of the Kennedy Round in 1967. See GATT, International Trade 1984/85, Geneva: GATT, 
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intensified competition from an increasing interdependent global economy. The 
economic recession caused by the two oil shocks in the 1970s 4 further fuelled the 
protectionist sentiment. The Uruguay Round was launched against this background of a 
world trading system under great strain. Doubts existed among trading nations over the 
relevance and binding power of the GATT rules and disciplines. -' 
C%Cý1r 
ICs were especially concerned with GATT's ability to response to the. development in the 
global trading environment, in particular the growing global trade brought about. by 
technological advancements. - 
As Low observed, there existed a conspiracy of non- 
compliance of rules and principles of GATT as political. wrangling and 'manipulation led 
to compliance of the GATT rules giving way to the domestic political pressure, as 
demonstrated in the US. 5 
Since the 1970s, political support for GATT in the US Congress has started to deteriorate. 
The massive current account deficits seen in the mid-1980s were viewed not only as an 
indication of the US losing competitiveness in the global market, but also the failure of 
1985, p. 201, Table A-I. According to the statistics, the value of trade stood at US$129 billion in 1960, 
USS258 billion in 1968, US$575 billion in 1973, and US$1,635 billion in 1979. 
4 In 1973, the world suffered its first oil shock and caused a surge in inflation and a period of severe 
recession in 1974 and 1975. Although economic growth surged back to 4% after 1975, came the second oil 
shock in 1979 when prices of crude oil rose sharply and governments reacted to the increased inflation with 
tight money policy. In its wake, 1980-1982 was a period of economic stagnation, with high interest rates 
reaching historical levels. See Ahari, M. E., OPEC, The Failing Giant, Lexington: University Press of 
Kentucky, 1986, pp. 150-151, Table 29 and OECD, 1991, note 2 above. 
S Low, Patrick, Trading Free - The GATT and US Trade Policy, NY: The Twentieth Century Fund Press, 
1993. The 1982 Ministerial Declaration describes the multilateral trading system seriously endangered, 
that: 
"In the current crisis of the world economy, to which the lack of convergence in 
national economic policies has contributed, protectionist pressures on governments 
have multiplied, disregard of GATT disciplines has increased and certain shortcomings 
in the functioning of the GATT system have been accentuated. " 
See GATT, L/5424,29 November 1982 
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GATT to provide substantive IP protection for high-technology products in which the US 
had comparative advantages. In response to congressional pressure, the US 
administration adopted a dual approach of continuing its multilateral approach within the 
GATT system, 6 while at the same time introduced domestic trade legislation to allow the 
administration to take unilateral measures against perceived unfair foreign practices such 
as inadequate or ineffective IPP. The latter approach was generally regarded as GATT- 
inconsistent. By accepting the inclusion of TRIPS on the Uruguay Round agenda, DCs 
saw it as a way of keeping such unilateral actions in check. 
Following the debt crisis of early 1980s, many DCs started the process of unilateral trade 
liberalisation. 7 They found that differential and more favourable treatments (DMFT) 
conferred by the GATT system did not benefit them 8 and that they remained on the 
periphery of the world trading system. 9 With the adoption of export-oriented trade 
6 The US's continued active participant within the GATT system reflected the US administration's 
purposeful drive toward modernising the system. Primo Braga, Carlos Alberto, `The Economics of 
Intellectual Property Rights and the GATT: A View from the South', VandJTL, 1989, p. 245. 
7 Bhagwati, Jagdish, `Fair Trade, Reciprocity and Harmonisation: The New Challenge to the Theory and 
Policy of Free Trade', in Deardorff and Stem (eds. ), Analytical and Negotiating Issues - In the Global 
Trading System, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994, p. 575. It was the shift from 
preoccupation with protectionism, and the successful example provided by export-promoting newly 
industrialised economies (NIES) which influenced DCs policy changes. Other reasons mentioned by 
Bhagwati as contributing to the trade liberalisation of DCs include economic writings and research into the 
negative impact and high costs of import substitution and the benefits of export promotion, and 
conditionality imposed on the lending by the World Bank and IMF based on these ideas and finding. 
Conditionality imposed by the World Bank and IMF is a substantive issue on its own, and will not be 
covered in this thesis. 
8 Despite DMFT, DCs' economies remained weak because they became dependent on tariff preferences, 
exporting at higher costs ignoring appropriate exchange rate adjustment and import liberalisation. See 
Trade Policies for a Better Future, The 'Leutwiler Report, the GATT and the Uruguay Round, Dordrecht: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987 (hereinafter the Leutwiler Report), p. 51. The Leutwiler Report was 
prepared by 7 members appointed in 1983 by then Director General of GATT Arthur Dunkel on the 
problems facing the international trading system. 
For example, despite being the beneficiaries of the Generalised System of Preference (GSP), DCs' 
preferential access to ICs' markets remained restricted. With changing economic environment and 
intensified competition in the global market, many donor countries of the GSP erected non-tariff barriers 
(NTBs) and imposed import restrictions in areas such as agriculture, textiles and clothing that DCs have 
comparative advantages for the protection of domestic industries vulnerable to import competition. 
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policies, DCs saw the benefits of participating more fully in the world trading system. 10 
The political connotation of DCs' participation in GATT MTNs 11 is that it provides a 
political counterweight needed for governments to confront domestic opposition to newly 
adopted export-oriented trade policies. And as GATT allows concessions to be swapped 
across different sectors, 12 joining in MTNs offers the opportunity of trade-offs between 
the sectors important to parties to the negotiation. - By agreeing to negotiate on-. the 
subjects important to ICs, such as TRIPS, it increases the possibility of bringing primary 
commodities important to DCs' economy into the GATT multilateral framework. ", 
2.2 DCs' participation in multilateral trade negotiations 
In the early 1980s, many DCs were faced with a severe debt crisis. 13 It triggered them to 
reconsider their economic policy direction in order to regain the capacity to service their 
debts and allow their economies to expand. 14 The debt crisis demonstrated to them that 
their earlier economic policies had failed completely, and different and more favourable 
treatments (DMFT) they enjoyed under the GATT system did not contribute positively to 
10 DCs indeed became more active in the world trading system participated in the meetings and submitted 
proposals in preparation for the Uruguay Round. See Whalley, John (cord. ), The Uruguay Round and 
Beyond, The Final Report from the Ford Foundation Project on Developing Countries and the Global 
Trading System, London: The MacMillan Press Ltd. (hereinafter Ford Foundation Report), p. 5. 
11 Hoekman, Bernard and Michael Kostecki, The Political Economy of the World Trading System from 
GATT to WTO, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 57. 
'2 Jackson, John, The World Trading System - Law and Policy of International Economic Relations, 
Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1992, p. 125. 
13 It was caused by a multitude of problems: The first oil shock of 1973 made private lending of recycled 
OPEC surplus easily available to DCs. Many of them borrowed excessively anticipating export earnings to 
service the debt. But the anticipated export earning did not materialise because of the decreased demand 
for their imports in the world market and the growing protectionism restricting DCs' exports in the wake of 
economic recessions. See Hudec, Robert, Enforcing International Trade Law - The Evolution of the 
Modern GATT Legal System, New Hampshire: Butterworth Legal Publishers, 1993, p. 22. 
Ia Ibid, p. 115. With the exception of India, countries such as Mexico, Thailand, Kenya, Brazil, and 
Argentina had all adopted market-oriented policies. 
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their economic growth. As the Leutwiler Report published in 1983 found, the DMFT 
DCs enjoyed under the GATT system was of limited value to them. 15 Under the rules of 
DMFT, DCs were not required to give reciprocal concession when negotiating with ICs 
that "would be inconsistent with their industrial development, financial and trade needs. " 
In effect, it discouraged both sides from reducing trade barriers 16 and accelerated the 
trend toward protectionism 17 by alternative means, such as the utilisation of NTBs. With 
the implementation of Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), for example, the 
advantage DCs received is very limited - because the seven rounds of MTNs have 
achieved significant reduction of tariffs.. The benefits of GSP is further out-weighed by 
the adverse effects of discriminatory restrictions imposed by ICs on DCs' exports of 
manufacturing goods, such as textiles and clothing, which DCs are the lowest-cost 
producers. 18 Over the years, DCs allowed themselves to be distracted by the idea of 
preferences and became dependent on them. This dependence not only led to 
mismanagement of economies, but also incurred high costs as the result of overlooking 
their fundamental interests in a non-discriminatory trading system. 19 
DCs' endeavour in seeking DMFT can be traced back to 1946 when DCs tabled 
amendments to the draft Havana Charter requesting to be free from the application of the 
basic principles of MFN, NT, and Reciprocity, 20 but no agreement was reached at that 
15 The Leutwiler Report, note 8 above, p. 51. 
16 Ibid., p. 27. 
"Ibid., p. 28. 
's Ibid., p. 27. 
19 Hoekman and Kostecki, note 11 above, p. 51. 
20 Article I of the Havana Charter for the establishment of the defunct International Trade Organisation did 
expressly call for preferential treatment for DCs. The Leutwiler Deport described the proposed amendment 
as reflecting the inward-oriented development strategies of those newly independent ex-colonial countries 
in the 1940s, see the Leutwiler Report, note 8 above, p. 197. 
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time. 21 Khan attributes this result to the false assumption of economic equality of states 
which presumes equal bargaining powers among all parties entering into tariff 
negotiations. 
22 
In 1964, Part IV of GATT entitled "Trade and Development" was incorporated into the 
General Agreement in 1964 as a result of the Kennedy Round. It amended the. basic 
principle of reciprocity in MTNs for tariff concessions and introduced the concept of 
non-reciprocity into the GATT system. 23 It was a disappointing outcome for. DCs 
because although Part IV contained agreed statements of principle giving DCs DMFT, 
the commitment set out was not legally binding. 24 
DCs continued to seek legal recognition of DMFT in the form of amendments to GATT 
during the Tokyo Round. 25 An "enabling clause" was adopted as a part of the outcome 
of the Round, which gave the GSP a legal base for the implementation in the GATT 
system. It is a scheme which authorised ICs to derogate from unconditional MFN by 
granting tariff preferences to DCs on a unilateral and temporary basis. 26 However, 
unconditional MFN was further eroded by the introduction of code-conditionality 
21 An infant industry provision (Article XVIII of the General Agreement) was incorporated into the General 
Agreement instead to allow gövernmental assistance to economic development. It was not until 1954 that 
Article XVIII: b was included to allow quantitative restrictions to be used for balance-of-payment purposes 
necessary to assist economic development. See Hoekman and Kostecki, note 11 above, ch. 7. 
22 Ibid. Also Khan, K. R., `International Law of Development and the Law of the GATT', in Snyder and 
Slinn (eds. ), International Law of Development; Comparative Perspective, Abingdon: Professional Books, 
1987, pp. 181-182. Khan further adds that the raison d'etre of international law of development is the 
positive and co-operative actions by governments and organisations. But GATT is essentially non- 
interventionist in character. 
23 Part IV will be discussed in Chapter 3.3.3. 
24 Hudec, Developing Countries in the GATT Legal System, London: Trade Policy Research Centre, 1987, 
57-58. % DCs s insisted on a variety of DMFT concessions under the threat of a walk out. See Hudec, ote 13 above, 
p. 26. 
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applicable to the agreements reached in the Tokyo Round which dealt with NTBs. It was 
introduced by ICs for the purpose of preventing countries that contributed very little or 
nothing but free rode on the concessions others made under conditional MFN. 
Prior to the Tokyo Round, ICs accepted DCs' demands for DMFT, partly because DCs' 
import substitution policies and selective tariff preferences they enjoyed did not impose 
substantial economic or political costs on ICs. 27 But ICs' negotiation stance changed in 
the Tokyo Round because economic and political costs associated with tariff preferences 
for DCs became too high. 28 ICs also introduced the concept of graduation advocating 
that DCs should graduate from. DMFT and participate more fully in the- world trading 
system. 29 According to ICs, it was in the interest of DCs to reciprocate and have their 
trade policy re-evaluated through negotiations. It would then make it. easier to ICs to 
convince domestic legislators to enact more favourable trade policies if DCs were seen to 
be bargaining in good faith. 30 
26 See discussion in Chapter 3.3.1. 
27 Greenaway, David and Robert C. Hine, `Introduction: Trends in World Trade and Protection', in 
Greenway, Hine, O'Brien and Thornton (eds. ), Global Protectionism, Hampshire: MacMillan Academic 
and Professional Ltd., 1991, p. 7. 
28 Because economic and political costs associated with tariff preferences for DCs became too high, 
especially in the absence of market access to DCs. Milner, Chris, `Graduation and Reciprocity', in 
Greenaway, Hine, O'Brien and Thornton (eds. ), Global Protectionism, Hampshire: MacMillan Academic 
an Professional Ltd., 1991, p. 197. 
29 e graduation of NIES from the GSP was particularly called for. According to a Ford Foundation 
crt, one major reasons why ICs called for NIEs to graduate from the GSP was that they saw the 
potential benefits from improved access to the growing markets in NIES. Followed the economic 
prosperity in NIEs, brought with it not only disease patterns similar to those in the ICs, but also more 
affluent population who demands better health care with corresponding ability to pay. NIEs proved to be 
potentially lucrative markets for MPCs. Therefore, lobbying government to negotiate with these economies 
on the long-term trade rules assumed increased economic significance. Ford Foundation Report, note 10 
above, pp. 3-5. 
30 Ibid., p. 27. 
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Throughout the history of GATT, DCs' seeking DMFT has been a source of tension 
between DCs and ICs. ICs had repeatedly voiced their dissatisfaction with DCs' 
reluctance to accept the disciplines of GATT. 31 This dissatisfaction found its expression 
in the deployment of NTBs in the 1970s, a phenomenon described as "the new 
protectionism". 32 Since the early 1970s, the growing volume of international trade had 
intensified competition in the global market place., 33 NTBs were deployed for the 
protection of the domestic industries susceptible to-import competition. 34 According to 
Ray and Marvel, 35 there is evidence to suggest that the initial increase of NTBs was 
linked to economic recession in ICs 36 in the wake of the two oil shocks in the 1970s. 
The characteristics of these NTBs are, that they are non-transparent, and they are 
discriminatory directly against DCs, especially NIEs and it is the discriminatory nature of 
these instruments that had direct impact on the credibility of the GATT system. 37 Tariffs 
were used to protect labour-intensive low technology industries such as agriculture and 
textiles and clothing industries that the US was at a comparative disadvantage in world 
trade. 38 Because GATT prevents contracting parties from introducing new tariffs to 
protect declining industries, governments then turned to NTBs, such as voluntary export 
31 Hoek man and Kostecki, note 11 above., p. 237. 
32 Greenaway and Hine, note 27 above. 
33 Hudec, 1993, note 13 above, p. 23. 
34 Hine, Robert C., `Protection in the European Community Before and After 1992', in Greenaway, Hine, 
O'Brien, and Thornton (eds. ), Global Protectionism, Hampshire: MacMillan Academic and Professional 
Ltd., 1991, p. 78. 
35 Ray E. J. and H. P. Marvel, `The Pattern of Protection in the Industrialised World', Review of Economics 
and Statistics, 1984, pp. 456-458. 
36 Ibid. The US, Japan, Canada, and the EC were given as the examples. 
" Greenaway and Hine, note 27 above, p. 7. 
38 See Ray, E. J., `The Determinants of Tariff and Non-tariff Trade Restrictions in the United States', 
Journal of Political Economy, 89(1), 1981, pp. 105-121, and Deardorff, A. V. and R. M. Stern, American 
Labour's Stake in International Trade, in Tariffs, Quotas and Trade: The Politics of Protectionism, San 
Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1979, pp. 125-148. - 
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restraints (VERs), 39 to protect the industries vulnerable to foreign competition. which 
had lost their competitive edge relating to imports from DCs. 40 
Agricultural was an example of an industry which has been subjected to protective 
government measures because of the absence of clear and fair global trading rules. 41 
Primary commodities, in particular agriculture products., have been virtually excluded.:. 
from the framework of GATT. 42 The exclusion of agriculture produce from the.. 
multilateral trade discipline disadvantages DCs economically and financially because of : .. _. 
their reliance on primary products as their major source of export earnings. 43 It 
discouraged DCs from participating in the global trading system as they felt that they. 
39 VERs are defined as quantitative restrictions imposed by an importing country but administered by the 
exporting country or countries. These restrictions have been referred to as `grey-area measures'. Despite 
the general prohibition of quantitative restrictions in the GATT system, VERs were popular forms of 
quantitative restriction, which are often negotiated under the threat of anti-dumping actions. They are 
bilateral in nature which constitutes an erosion of MFN. According to Jackson, when countries have 
proved successful in their exports of a particular product, the product becomes the target of importing 
country governments' pressure to adopt export restraints of one form or the other. 
See Deardorff, A. and R. Stern, Methods ofMeasurement ofNon-Tar (Barriers, Geneva: UNCTAD, 1985, 
Hoekman and Kostecki, note 11 above, pp. 97-98, and Jackson, 1992, note 12 above, p. 140. One well- 
known example is the Multi-fibre Agreement introduced in 1974 during the Tokyo Round relating to 
textiles and clothing. 
40 Ray, Edward J., ' Protection of Manufacturers in the US Protectionism', in Greenaway, Hine, O'Brien 
and Thornton (eds. ), Global Protectionism, Hampshire: MacMillan Academic and Professional Ltd., 1991, 
p. 14. There is a welfare dimension of the US protection in manufacturing sector. By protecting declining 
industries, it provide a welfare safety-net and reduce structural unemployment for industries that are not 
competitive and has no prospect of being able to compete in the future. See discussion in Baldwin, R. E., 
`The Changing Nature of U. S. Trade Policy Since World War II', in Baldwin and Krueger (eds. ), The 
Structure and Evolution of Recent U. S. Trade Policy, Baldwin, Chicago: National Bureau of Economic 
Research, 1984, pp. 5-27. 
41 Ibid., p. 43. 
42 It was largely brought about by Article XI: 2(c) of GATT which allows "import restrictions on any 
agricultural or fisheries products... necessary to the enforcement of governmental measures". The waiver 
secured by the US in 1955 and the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Community are the two 
well-known examples. 
43 According to Barry Jones, the vulnerability of LDCs is a result of the continuation of over-concentration 
and over-dependence on a narrow range of commodity export and a limited number of major foreign 
market, many of them ex-colonial masters. Barry Jones, R. J., Globalisation and Interdependence in the 
International Political Economy, London: Pinter Publishers, 1995, pp. 135-142. 
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were left with little to bargain with in MTNs. 
44 It was also seen as an evidence of ICs' 
unwillingness to liberalise trade so as to protect their commodity producers from 
adjustment difficulties when faced with competition from exports. 
45 
The concept of graduation involves both DCs and ICs calling each other to adhere to the 
traditional GATT disciplines. The earlier discussion touched upon ICs' demand that DCs 
should graduate from DMFT and participate more fully in the world trading system. For 
DCs, they urged ICs also to graduate from protectionist measures and special treatments 
for industries such as agriculture and textiles and clothing. 46 As non-discrimination is the 
core of the multilateral trading system, DCs urged ICs to bring these trade policies into 
the open with clear and accepted multilateral rules. 47 
In the end, it was the DCs' who took unilateral liberalisation in the wake of the debt 
crisis, with a growing appreciation of the importance of maintaining an open trading 
system in favour of more outward-oriented development strategies focusing on import 
liberalisation and export promoting measures. 48 The success of the export-oriented 
44 Khan, note 22 above, p. 192. 
as Ford Foundation Report, note 10 above; p. 22. 
46 Milner C., note 28 above, p. 196. Textiles and clothing are subject to Multifibre Agreement introduced 
in 1974 during the Tokyo Round. It is a voluntary agreement that perpetuates a quota system for 
international trade in textiles and clothing. It is recognised as inconsistent with GATT. See Jackson, 1992, 
note 12 above, p. 181. 
47 The Leutwiler Report, note 8 above, p. 41. 
4" Whalley, John, `Recent Trade Liberalisation in the Developing World: What is Behind It and Where is It 
Headed? ' In Greenaway, Hine, O'Brien, and Thornton (eds. ), Global Protectionism, Hampshire: 
MacMillan Academic and Professional Ltd., 1991, p. 226. According to the Ford Foundation Report: 
during the period of 1941 up to the time of debt crisis, many DCs considered it to be desirable to use high 
tariffs and quota to restrain imports, to maintain fixed exchange rates, and to use foreign exchange 
rationing as a trade restricting device. They accepted the theory advocated by Prebisch that reciprocity 
should not be expected from them in trading negotiation that the onus was on ICs unilaterally to implement 
trade policies to speed up the development process. They also believed that protection of domestic market 
allowed them to achieve more rapid industrialisation. Many countries followed import substitution 
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strategy implemented by NIEs 49 encouraged DCs to re-evaluate the merits of import- 
substitution strategies they had implemented since the 1960s. The newly adopted export- 
oriented development strategy brought the need for DCs to participate more fully in the 
world trading system. They recognised that participating in GATT would enable them to 
add the weight of international obligations into their open-door policies. It would also 
provide the political counterweight governments needed to confront the opposition from 
the interest groups representing those industries which would be disadvantaged from the 
change of policies. Participating in : the new round of MTNs therefore provided an 
opportunity to cement domestic support for their new market oriented policies. so 
In the Punta del Este Declaration, CPs of. GATT 51 agreed to the principles of DMFT 
embodied in Part IV, and reiterated that ICs do not expect reciprocity for commitments 
made in the negotiation, and DCs were not expected to make contributions which were 
inconsistent with their individual development, fmancial and trade needs. 52 This 
declaration has to be seen as a compromise outcome to accommodate diverse interest 
strategies argued that they should be free from internationally negotiated disciplines limiting their freedom 
in adopting appropriate trade policy actions. The Ford Foundation Report, note 10 above, p. 17, and 
Prebisch, R., `The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems', Economic 
Bulletin for Latin America, 7,1962, pp. 1-22. 
49 During the period of economic stagnation in the 1980s, many DCs' economic growth was brought to a 
virtual standstill. But NIEs' rapid and sustained growth continued unabated averaging 5.5 percent annual 
per capita real income growth since 1960. Their superior manufactured export performance demonstrated 
by their rising share of world export was largely credited to their economic growth. They used exports as a 
yardstick to evaluate their economic efficiency as export markets are likely to be more competitive. NIEs 
include Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, China, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. 
Their share in world exports was 8 percent in 1965,13 percent in 1980, and 18 percent in 1990. 
See World Bank, The East Asian Miracle - Economic Growth and Public Policy, A World Bank Policy 
Research Report, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, (hereinafter World Bank Report 1993), pp. 28,37 
and 98. 
so Hudec, 1993, note 13 above, p. 116. 
51 See note 1 above. 
52 Ibid. 
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between and within ICs and DCs. 53 Engaging in reciprocal exchange of concession 
remained a prominent feature in the Uruguay Round. 54 Reciprocity was seen by ICs, in 
particular the US, as an instrument to minimise free riding 55 and to ensure equal market 
access. 56 For DCs, it provided an opportunity to ensure progress on MTNs were made 
on sectors important to them if they were to be persuaded to concede anything on IPP. 57 
The Punta del Este Declaration included the subjects of trade-related IPRs, agriculture, 
textiles and clothing for MTNs. The advantage of dealing with such a broad range of 
subjects is that it tends to increase the scope for co-operative behaviour 58 and offer the 
possibility of trade-offs between sectors on the negotiation agenda, which:. if addressed in 
isolation could prove to be too difficult to reach any agreement. 59 Trade-off itself 
endorses the application of reciprocity, 60 and as Cottier pointed out, it is. this legitimate 
expectation to achieve trade-offs that has made progress possible during the MTNs on 
TRIPs and the sectors such as agriculture and textiles and clothing. 61 And with the 
linkage of agriculture and IPP in the Uruguay Round, if ICs, especially the US and the 
53 Hoekman and Kostecki, note 11 above, p. 241 and Milner C., note 28 above, p. 215. 
54 Winters, Alan L., `Reciprocity', in Finger and Olechowski (eds. ), The Uruguay Round -A Handbook for 
the Multilateral Trade negotiations, Washington, D. C.: The World Bank, 1987, p. 49. - 
55 Hoekman & Kostecki, note 11 above, p. 27. NIES recognised that there is little to expect from GATT 
MTNs on trade liberalisation while they enjoy DMFT, and graduation from GSP was a necessary step to 
avoid unilateral retaliation such as the US Section 301 actions linking sanction to the enforcement of IPP. 
For LDCs, they would not be asked to graduate, and the graduation of NIEs was welcomed by then because 
of the prospect of being able to enjoy increased market access to both ICs and NIEs under the principle of 
MFN. See the Leutwiler Report, note 8 above, p. 205. 
56 Committee for Economic Development, Breaking New Ground in US Trade Policy, Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1991, p. 53. 
S' Winters, note 54 above. _ 58 Hoekman and Kostecki, note 11 above, p. 78. 
59 Subramanian, Arvind, `TRIPS and the Paradigm of the GATT: A Tropical, Temperate View', The World 
Economy, 13(4), 1990b, pp. 509-521. 
60 Winters, note 54 above. 
61 Cottier, Thomas, `The Prospects for Intellectual Property in GATT', CMLR, 28,1991, pp. 383-414. 
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EU could indeed be persuaded to do something on agriculture, the benefits to DCs would 
be significant. 62 
C, ', 
2.3 Political pressure from the US 
The legitimacy of bringing the subject of trade-related IPP into GATT is based on the 
claim that non-tariff barriers in the form of inadequate and. ineffective IPP caused trade 
distortions, 63 the elimination and reduction of which : lies within the jurisdiction of 
GATT. By bringing the trade dimension into IP issues, the choice of a multilateral 
negotiation forum for a trade-related IPP agreement must be GATT, the only multilateral 
trade agreement to lay down a legal framework for the conduct of global trade. 
Politically, GATT provides a framework of. self-imposed constraints that enables 
contracting parties to regulate conflicts of interests among states, and defend against 
protectionist lobbies from competing importers and interest groups within one's own 
country. 64 
\ 
The US MNCs were at the forefront of lobbying their government for the inclusion of 
trade-related IPP on the agenda of the Uruguay Round MTNs. 65 Some of them 
encouraged the US government to tackle the subject multilaterally for fear of being 
62 Remarks of Professor John H. Jackson, VandJTL, 22(2), 1989, p. 346 (hereinafter Jackson Remark). 
63 National IP laws act like NTBs where there is disharmony in the law of nations. See Stern, Richard H., 
`Intellectual Property', in Finger and Olechowski (eds. ), A Handbook for the Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, Washington D. C.: The World Bank, 1987, p. 205. 
6' Roessler, Frieder, `The Scope, Limits, and Function of the GATT Legal System', in Trade Policies for a 
Better Future, The `Leutwiler Report, the GATT and the Uruguay Round, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1987. "ý 
65 Remarks by David Beier in VandJTL, 22(2), 1989, p. 334 (hereinafter Beier Remark), p. 334. 
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singled out for retaliation by host countries. 66 Others who regarded foreign markets as 
critical to their survival, such as high technology firms, seemed to prefer to rely on the 
US Section 301 legislation. 67 For US firms which hold the competitive edge in 
producing innovative products, such as the pharmaceutical industry, the susceptibility to 
free-riding led them to regard extensive IPP as indispensable in their pursuit of global 
expansion strategies. Their effort was supported by the belief that it was the 
responsibility of the state to act in the event of unauthorised appropriation by foreign 
nationals of private property protected by US legislation. 68 The act of pirating and 
counterfeiting technology or technology-related products protected by US IP legislation 
constitutes an unauthorised-, appropriation. They - claimed that the inadequate and 
ineffective IPP in foreign countries hinders their market access, hence affecting their 
competitiveness in the global market. They suffered significant economic loss as their 
sale of IP protected goods was replaced by pirated and counterfeited products. 69 
66 Ibid. 
' Ibid. 
istorically, FDI was made in the form of long term concession and was between a host state and a 
oreign national. Hence, the agreement was outside the international legal system as classical international 
law largely dealt with inter-state relations. However, the capital-exporting states developed the concept of 
state responsibility and evolved the assumption that an injury to a foreign national was an injury to the 
home state. Therefore, for example, taking of a foreign property independent of the concession agreement 
became a matter of international law. Despite the fact that these norms and rules were increasingly being 
challenged in recent years, ICs have persistently attempted to devise methods to internationalise the 
contractual regimes of FDI. (See, for example, Qureshi, Asif H., International Economic Law, London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, ch. 16). Section 301 of the US Trade and Tariff Act of 1974 as amended by the 
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 is a recent example of the adoption of specific rules and 
principles in relation to FDI by one 
of the major capital exporting countries. It was directed at foreign 
restrictions on US trade and was used to enforce trade rights as conferred by GATT and bilateral treaties, if 
necessary, through retaliation against those judged to have violated these right, with authority to undertake 
such actions conferred on the US Trade Representatives by the US Congress. 
69 According to US International Trade Commission (ITC), 193 US firms estimated their aggregate world- 
wide losses due to inadequate intellectual property protection in 1986 at $23.8 billion or 2.7% of sales 
affected by intellectual property. The ITC further estimated that world-wide losses to all of US industry in 
1986 from inadequate foreign protection of intellectual property ranged from $43 billion to $61 billion. 
See Basic Framework of GATT Provisions on Intellectual Property, Statement of Views of the European, 
Japanese and United States Business Communities, The Intellectual Property Committee (USA), UNICE 
(Europe), and Keidanren (Japan), 1988 and USITC, `Econom? c Effects of Intellectual Property Right 
Infringement (Investigation No. 332-245)', JYVT, 22(4), pp. 101-114. 
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The US government also recognised that technological development is where its new- 
found comparative advantage lies, 70 and exports in IP related products are increasingly 
important sources of national revenue. 71 The US government took up the MNCs' call for 
actions and concentrated on the legal reform within GATT to rectify the defects of the 
absence of a legal regime for the protection of IP in the global trading system. 72 It 
started its effort at the final stage of the Tokyo Round with the submission of a draft 
Anti-Counterfeiting Code, 73 but no agreement was reached to include it as part of the.. 
final result of the Tokyo Round. Its failure to attain an agreement for a new round of 
MTNs during the 1982 Ministerial Meeting was a: further blow to its effort-to, negotiate.. ,; 
multilaterally. 74 
70 The US's comparative advantage was reflected in its high percentage of export containing domestically 
generated technology more so than any other countries, see Davis, L, `Technology Intensity of US, Canada, 
and Japanese Manufacturers' Output and Exports', in Niosi (ed. ), Technology and National 
Competitiveness, Montreal: McGill-Queens, 1991. 
71 The relative percentage of the US exports with IP content more than double from 9.9 per cent in 1947 to 
27.4 per cent in 1986 amounting to more than 25 per cent of all its export. See Gadbaw, Michael and 
Timothy J. Richard, `Introduction', in Gadbaw and Richards (eds. ), Intellectual Property Rights - Global 
Consensus, Global Conflict? Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988a, p. 4, chart I. I. 
n Hudec, Robert, `Thinking About the New Section 301: Beyond Good and Evil', in Bhagwati and Patrick 
(eds. ), Aggressive Unilateralism -America's 301 Trade Policy and the World Trading System, 
Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991, p. 130. And there was no major effort made by the US to 
renegotiate the Convention within the auspices of WIPO in the 1980s. See David, Paul A., `Intellectual 
Property Institutions and the Panda's Thumb: Patent, copyrights, and Trade Secrets in Economic Theory 
and History' in Wallerstein, Mogee, and Schoen (eds. ), Global Dimensions of Intellectual property Rights 
in Science and Technology, Office of International Affairs National Research Council, Washington, D. C.: 
National Academy Press, 1993, p. 20 and Raghavan, Chakravarthi, Recolonisation - GATT, the Uruguay, 
Round & the Third World, London: Zed Books Ltd. and Third World Network in Malaysia, 1990, p. 120. 
The draft Code concerns border measures to combat counterfeited goods protected by trademarks. It was 
a joint submission by the US and the EU. GATT, L/4817,31July 1979, Agreement on measures to 
Discourage the Importation of Counterfeit Goods. See discussion in Bradley, Jane A., `Intellectual 
Property Rights, Investment and Trade in Services in the Uruguay Round: Laying the Foundations', 
Standford Journal of International Law, 23,1987, pp. 57-98. 
74 1982 Ministerial meeting was convened in November 1982 to assess the results of the Tokyo Round and 
to deal with outstanding issues, see Discussion to Convene the 38`h Session at Ministerial level in GATT, 
BISD 28th Supp., 1982, p. 15. During the meeting, the ministers did not consider the working text of the 
Commercial Anti-Counterfeiting Code submitted by the US delegation, but they did agree to establish a 
work program for trade in counterfeiting goods to "clarify the legal and institutional aspects involved. " 
See Ministerial Declaration, GATT, BISD 29`s Supp., 1983, pp. 9,19, and 22. No specific deadline was set 
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Between 1980 and 1985, the Reagan Administration's priority was to fight domestic 
inflation. It neglected exchange rate and trade policies, and left the US Dollar perversely 
over-valued. 75 The US thus saw its exports decline by a third as its export products 
virtually priced out of world markets 76 and its imports rose even faster. 77 By the mid 
1980s, the US deficit in merchandise trade grew significantly causing a decline in the US 
current account balance from a zero balance in 1982 to a $147 billion deficit by 1987.78 
This massive current account deficit was seen as an indication. of the US losing 
comparative advantage -in global markets. 
79 Congressional pressure grew for the 
executive branch to take action to reduce the trade deficit. , It. 
became more involved in 
the US trade policy and threatened to take drastic action to counter perceived unfair 
foreign trade practices which had contributed to. the. trade deficit.. It started the debate on 
for the conclusion of the work in Counterfeiting goods although other work programs were all given one. 
Furthermore, India and Brazil had challenged the legal competence of the CPs to deal with commercial 
counterfeiting arguing that the WIPO has exclusive jurisdiction over IPP matters. See detailed discussion 
of the events leading up to the Uruguay Round in Chapter 4.2. 
75 As Hudec explained: normally, when trade deficit increases, the value of national currency declines 
because of the increase in the supply of the country's money on world markets. But in this case, the value 
of US dollar had risen by 1985 to almost 145% of its 1980 value. It was until the end of 1985 that the value 
of the dollar started to come down as leading governments agreed to intervene in world capital markets to 
lower the value of US dollar in the Plaza Agreement. See Hudec, 1993, note 13 above, p. 105. 
76 The US deficit in merchandise trade grew from $36.4 billion in 1982 to $160 billion in 1987. Lawrence, 
Robert Z., `Commentary', in Bhagwati and Patrick (eds. ), Aggressive Unilateralism - America's 301 Trade 
Policy and the World Trading System, Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991, p. 108. 
77 Milner, Helen, Resisting Protectionism, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988, p. 300. 
'$ Hufbauer, G., `Background Paper', in The Free Trade Debate: Report of the Twentieth Century Fund 
Task Force on the Future ofAmerican Trade Policy, New York: Priority Press, 1989, pp. 164-67. Although 
the international trade performance was largely blamed for causing the current account deficits, Patterson 
and Patterson argued that the main reason was the combination of huge domestic budgetary deficits, high 
rate of domestic consumption, and consumer preferences for imported goods. See Patterson, Gardner and 
Eliza Patterson, `Objectives of the Uruguay Round', in Finger and Olechowski (eds. ), The Uruguay Round: 
A Handbook for the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Washington D. C.: The World Bank, 1987, p. 12. 
79 Committee for Economic Development, note 56 above, p. 55 and Gadbaw and Richards, 1988a, note 71 
above, p. 6. 
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the revision of Section 301 to rectify the perceived unwillingness of the president to use 
the statute 80 to counter foreign trade barriers restricting US trade. 81 
The Reagan Administration in response announced its "New Trade Policy" in September 
1985 by declaring that it would make active use of Section 301 procedures 82 and work 
with Congress in drafting a new trade policy that would deal specifically with unfair 
foreign trade practices. 83 The result is the revised and expanded Section 301 provisions 
contained in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. The 1988 Act applies 
the principle of reciprocity in market access commitments and used the access to its vast 
domestic market as a bargaining tool to open markets abroad. 84 In the context of IPP, 
the thrust of the demand for market access on a reciprocal basis is that US f =s should 
be given equivalent access to or commercial opportunities in a foreign market as firms 
80 Cline, William, `Reciprocity: A New Approach to World Trade Policy', in Cline (ed. ), Trade Policy in 
the 1980s, Washington, D. C.: Institute for International Economics, 1983, p. 136. 
81 18 petitions for Section 301 were filed during 1975 and 1979. The president did not take any retaliatory 
action. After minor revision of the 1974 Act in 1979,35 petitions were filed between 1980-1985, but no 
removal of foreign trade barriers or retaliation took place. See Milner, Helen, `The Political Economy of 
U. S. Trade Policy: A Study of the Super 301 Provision', in Bhagwati and Patrick (eds. ), Aggressive 
Unilateralism - America's 301 Trade Policy and the World Trading System, Hertfordshire: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1991, p. 165. 
82 Kuroda, Makoto, `Super 301 and Japan', in Bhagwati and Patrick (eds. ), Aggressive Unilateralism - 
America's 301 Trade Policy and the World Trading System, Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991, p. 
220. 
83 Palmeter, David, `Commentary', in Bhagwati and Patrick (eds. ), Aggressive Unilateralism - America's 
301 Trade Policy and the World Trading System, Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991, p. 167. Most 
importantly, the administration announced an export expanding strategy to address the issue of trade deficit 
by aiming to remove unfair foreign trade practices and to ensure reciprocal market access to US industries. 
Under the assumption that countries with trade surplus practice trade unfairly, the administration also set 
out to persuade major trade surplus countries to remove import barriers and encourage domestic demand 
for US goods. See Feketekuty, Geza, `U. S. Policy on 301 and Super 301', in Bhagwati and Patrick (eds. ), 
Aggressive Unilateralism - America's 301 Trade Policy and the World Trading System, Hertfordshire: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991, pp. 91 and 94. 
" Gadbaw, Michael R., and Rosemary E. Gwynn, `Intellectual Property Rights in the New GATT Round', 
in Gadbaw and Richards (eds. ), Intellectual Property Rights - Global Consensus, Global Conflict? 
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988, ch. 2, p. 50. See detailed discussion in Chapter 3.3.3. 
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from that particular foreign country has been offered in the US. 85 The US's earlier 
pursuit of multilateralism and free trade policy thus assumed lower priority. Fair trade 
and market opening were given prominence, 86 with the goal of ultimately harmonising 
other countries' IP law and practices to those of the US standard. 87 
2.3.1 Section 301 provisions 
The enactment of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 provides a: 
mechanism to deal with trade issues that were not yet covered by GATT at the time of the 
enactment, 88 and is the exemplification of the US's determination to take up the: IPP 
v/ 
issue unilaterally. It provides a procedure under which US citizens may petition the US 
governments to investigate and act against potential violation of international trade 
agreement. 89 It also authorises the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to 
investigate at its own initiative 90 and to retaliate against any unreasonable, unjustifiable, 
or discriminatory foreign practices that burden or restrict US commerce. 91 
85 Abbott, Kenneth W., `Defensive Unfairness: The Normative Structure of Section 301', in Bhagwati and 
Hudec (eds. ), Fair Trade and Harmonisation - Prerequisites for Free Trade? Vol. 2: Legal Analysis, 
Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996, op. Cit., p. 449. 
86 Abbot, Frederick M., `Protecting First World Assets in the Third World: Intellectual Property 
Negotiations in the GATT Multilateral Framework', VandJTL, 22(4), 1989, pp. 689-745. 87 Hart, Michael M., `The WTO and the Political Economy of Globalisation', JWT, 31(5), 1997, pp. 37-6 1. 
88 Feketekuty, note 83 above, p. 91. 
89 Section 302(a)(2), 19 U. S. C. § 2412(a)(2). 
90 Section 302(b), 19 U. S. C. § 2412(b). The USTR is a cabinet level official serving at the pleasure of the 
US president. Its office is located within the Executive Office of the president. See Section 19 U. S. C. § 
2171(a), (b)(1)(1998). 
91 19 U. S. C. § 2411(a) 1988. The statutory definition of "unjustifiable", "discriminatory" and 
"unreasonable" were given in the 1984 Trade and Tariff Act. An "unjustifiable" foreign practice is an act, 
policy, or practice that is in violation of or inconsistent with the international legal rights of the US. 
"Discriminatory" is defined to include an act, policy, or practice that denies MFN or NT to US goods, 
services, or investment. The term "unreasonable" is defined to include an act, policy, or practice that might 
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The 1988 Act contains three Section 301 provisions. They are known as Regular 301, 
Special 301, and Super 301. Regular 301 was first enacted in the Trade Act of 1974 92 
and had been revised in the Trade Agreement Act of 1979,93 the Trade and Tariff Act of 
1984,94 the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,95 and the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act of 1994.96 Special 301 and Super 301 97 were newly introduced in the 
1988 Act. Special 301 deals specifically with intellectual property issues. It is designed 
to improve foreign IPP through bilateral negotiations with the threat of retaliation in the 
form of restriction on access to the, US,. market. Under Special 301, the USTR must 
prepare an annual report entitled National Trade Estimate 98 and identify and analyse the 
acts, policies, or practices of each country which constitute significant market access 
barriers to or distortions of US exports of goods or services. 99 No later than thirty days 
after the submission of National Trade Estimate to Congress, the USTR must identify 
those foreign countries that "deny adequate and effective protection of intellectual 
property rights or deny fair and equitable market access to US persons that rely upon 
not be in violation or inconsistent with the international legal rights of the US but is deemed unfair or 
inequitable. See The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, §304,98 Stat. 2948,3002 (1984). 
92 The Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, §§ 301-302,88 Stat. 1978 (1975). The first appearance of 
Section 301 was in the Trade Act of 1974. One of the stated legislative purposes was to harmonise, reduce, 
or eliminate trade barriers so to assure "substantially equivalent commercial opportunities" for US 
commerce. It was introduced to enforce legal rights conferred by GATT and bilateral treaties. And it was 
directed at foreign government trade barriers restricting US trade. Its complaint procedures were GATT - 
consistent in principle as it is expected to first invoke GATT dispute settlement mechanism Bhagwati, 
Jagdish, `An Overview', in Bhagwati and Patrick (eds. ), Aggressive Unilateralism - America's 301 Trade 
Policy and the World Trading System, London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991, p. 4. 
93 The Trade Agreement Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, title IX, 93 Stat. 144,295 (1979). 
94 The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, §304,98 Stat. 2948,3002 (1984). 
95 The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§ 1301-1302,102 Stat. 
1107,1164-79 (1988). 
96 The Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 314(f), 108 Stat. 4809 (1994). 
97 Super 301 is the most controversial provision which requires the USTR to prepare an inventory list of 
foreign trade barriers, establish a priority list of countries and their unreasonable practices, and set a 
deadline for their removal. Failure to comply with the US demand will be met by retaliations. A specific 
sector will be targeted and its access to the US market denied. 
9S 19 U. S. C. §2241(6) (1988). 
99 19 U. S. C. §2241(a)(1)(A)(i) (1988). 
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intellectual property protection. " 100 Unless they have entered into good faith 
negotiations or made significant progress in negotiations to provide adequate intellectual 
property protection, 101 those that have "most onerous or egregious acts, policies, or 
practices that deny adequate and effective intellectual property rights" and whose acts 
have "the greatest adverse impact on the relevant US products" will be designated as 
"priority foreign countries" 1°21for possible retaliatory actions. 
Section 301 procedures have 'three controversial characteristics: 1) the agenda for Section 
301 negotiations is set by the US. It decides which foreign practices to be considered 
unfair. 103 The unilateral nature of the judgement as to what is fair or not makes the US 
both the prosecutor and judge. 104 2) the negotiations take place with the threat of trade 
retaliation. to obtain one-way trade concessions or policy changes from the designated 
country. By singling out a country for its unfair trade practices, the threat of unilateral 
retaliation is discriminatory and inconsistent with the multilateral dispute settlement 
mechanism under GATT; 105 3) a different concept of reciprocity applies under Section 
301. It puts emphasis on equal market access as the benchmark to evaluate the extent of 
success in trade liberalisation. And continued access to the US market depends upon the 
growth of market share of the US companies in the designated country. The threat of 
10° 19 U. S. C. §2242(a)(1) (1988). 
101 19 U. S. C. §2241(b)(1) (1988). 
102 19 U. S. C. §2242(a)(2) (1988). 
103 Abbott, 1996, note 85 above, p. 417. 
104 Hudec, Robert, The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy, 2nd ed., New Hampshire: 
Butterworth Legal Publishers, 1990 and Milner, note 81 above, p. 176. 
105 Ibid., p. 163. 
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retaliatory actions often involves the reduction of existing access to the US market by the 
designated country. 106 
The demand for reciprocal market access first appeared in the Trade Agreement Act of 
1979 implementing the agreements reached in the Tokyo Round. 107 Traditionally, 
market access has been referred to as the tariff treatment import country governments 
give to industrial products imported from other countries. But in the context of IPP, the 
demand for market access on a reciprocal basis is to mean that US firms should be given 
equivalent access to or commercial opportunities in a foreign market as firms from that 
particular foreign country have been offered in the US market. 108 This demand turns on ,, - 
the concept of fairness that has underlined the majority of US trade law. 109 
Section 301 was amended in the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984.110 The 1984 Act expands 
the application of Section 301 and sets out the negotiating objectives for IPRs. 111 It also 
authorises the President to impose trade sanctions against any countries that inadequately 
protect IP and engage in "unreasonable or unjustifiable" trade practices. It further adds 
IPP as one of the considerations to determine a country's eligibility for GSP. 112 The 
106 Bhagwati, 1991, note 92 above, p. 5. 
107 Trade Agreement Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 2(b)(2), 93 Stat. 144,295 (1979). The 1979 Act 
provides that a foreign country could benefit from agreements reached in the Tokyo Round only when it 
has accorded adequate benefits, including substantially equal commercial opportunities, to the US. 
tos Abbott, 1996, note 85 above, p. 449. 
109Ibid., pp. 417-422. See further discussion on the concept of fairness in Chapter 3.3. 
10 19, USCA 2462 (c) (5) (West Supp. 1987). 
"' The expanded application of Section 301 also covers trade-related investment measures, trade in high 
technology products, services, and FDI. 
112 The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, §§ 503 and 505,98 Stat. 2948,3019-23 (1984), 
(codified at 19 U. S. C. §§ 2462(c)(5), 2464(c)(3)(B)(ii)). 
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Generalised System of Preferences Renewal Act of 1984 directs the US president, when 
considering the renewal of GSP, to 
"give great weight to... the extent to which such country provides 
adequate and effective means under its law for foreign nationals to 
secure, to exercise, and to enforce. exclusive rights in intellectual 
property... ", 113 
This has caused. much concern among . 
GATT contracting parties who were the 
beneficiaries of the US GSP. 114 
Following the enactment of the 1984 Act, Section 301 cases 'involving subjects not 
covered by GATT have appeared with greater frequency. 115 But the Brazil 
Pharmaceutical case 116 had resulted in actual retaliation by the US Executive branch. 
This case concerns the US's retaliation against Brazil for its failure to offer adequate 
process and product patent protection to pharmaceuticals. The petition was filed in June 
113 Section 505, Trade and Tariff Act of 1984,19 U. S. C. 2464(c)(B)(ii) (Supp. 111 1985). See discussion in 
Bradley, note 73 above, pp. 73-74. 
"a Bhagwati explains that, these countries with trade surplus were targeted because, having been given 
DMFT by GATT thus were free to use tariffs and other trade barriers, and profited from the general 
reduction in trade barriers from ICs because of the unconditional MFN, they have secured unbalanced trade 
concessions and made overall access to their market significant restricted than their access to the market of 
ICs. Instead of allowing the US to use the leverage of its large market to address the imbalance in market 
access caused by perceived NTBs caused by inadequate or ineffective IPP, it should be the GATT to 
establish graduation guidelines for those DCs who had been successful in expanding their exports. 
Bhagwati, 1991, note 92 above, p. 29. 
115 Hudec, 1991, note 72 above, p. 124. 
116 This case was only part of a growing trade dispute between the US and Brazil in the mid-1980s. Other 
source of growing tension between the two countries derived from the US's reduction of Brazil's benefits 
under the GSP by virtue of Trade and Tariff Act 1984. Getland, Myles, `TRIPS and the Future of Section 
301: A Comparative Study of Trade Dispute Resolution', Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 34(1), 
1995, p. 185. 
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1987 by the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association (PMA), a trade association 
representing pharmaceutical companies exporting to Brazil. The USTR accepted the 
PMA's petition and initiated a Section 301 investigation in July 1987. At that time, 
Brazil agreed to debate the issue of patent protection, assuring the US that it had fulfilled 
its treaty obligation of NT under the Paris Convention. 
After allowing for public comment, President Reagan decided to impose retaliatory trade 
sanctions in October 1988 imposing an ad valorem tariff on certain Brazilian imports that 
had little or no relation to the pharmaceutical industry. 117 The value of the tariff was 
about the equivalent of the USTR's estimate of financial injury suffered by the US 
pharmaceutical industry resulting from Brazil's failure to provide patent protection. 118 
The USTR indicated that retaliatory measures would be lifted once Brazil addressed the 
problem by introducing new patent legislation. Brazil in reply described the US action as 
a hostile act against Brazil and was GATT-inconsistent. 
In 1989, Brazil asked a GATT panel to be set up to adjudicate the dispute, but panel 
proceedings were suspended by mutual agreement. In June 1990, when President de 
Mello of Brazil came to power, it was announced that patent protection for 
pharmaceuticals would be adopted as part of an overall economic reform. The USTR 
lifted the sanctions and terminated the Section 301 investigation in the following month. 
But Brazil failed to deliver the promise due to domestic legislative problems, which 
caused the USTR to name it as a priority foreign country in April 1993 and initiated a 
1" Hudec, 1991, note 72 above, p. 34. 
118 Getlan, note 116 above, p. 188. 
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Super 301 investigation. It was not until February 1994 that the USTR terminated the 
Super 301 investigation when Brazil introduced amendments to its pending industrial 
property law. 
Hudec points out that the US action against Brazil was GATT-illegal because GATT did 
not allow governments to use trade retaliation to attack inadequate IPP regimes.. 119 The 
US occasionally suggested that it might have a claim of non-violation nullification and 
impairment under Article XXIII: 1(b) of GATT 120 on the ground that inadequate IPP 
deprived it of the benefit of GATT trade obligations on pharmaceuticals, but the claim 
has no substance. The remedy of non-violation nullification and impairment is based on.. 
the notion that a reasonable expectation at the time one makes a concession has been 
frustrated by some unexpected action of the other government. 121 Brazil's policy was 
well known from the beginning of US-Brazil GATT relations, the US had no ground for 
any reasonable expectations. 
122 
A group of prominent economists, led by Bhagwati, condemned the GATT illegality of 
301 retaliation and the US's departure from GATT multilateralism in favour of bilateral 
119 Hudec, 1993, note 13 above, p. 227-229. 
120 Article XXIII: 1(b) states that: 
"1. If any contracting party should consider that nay benefit 
accruing to it directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being 
nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the 
Agreement is being impeded as the result of... 
(b) the application by another contracting party of any measure, 
whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement, ... 
" 
Jackson points out that there is no satisfactory definition to the concept of "nullification or impairment". 
But nullification may stem from a breach of "reasonable expectations" at the time the concession was 
considered. See Jackson, John H., World Trade and the Law of GATT, NY: The Bobbs - Merrill Co. 
Inc., 1969, pp. 178-187. 
12'See discussion in Chapter 4.4. 
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initiatives based on bullying small trading partners. 123 But Hudec is of the view that if 
GATT is in fact unable to rule, the complainant may be free to resort to "self-help" in 
some circumstances. 124 The disobedience of GATT rules is justified "where the dangers 
to the legal system caused by inaction in the face of a deadlock will exceed the damage 
caused by some disobedient actions trying to force a correction. " 125 But the one- 
sidedness of the Section 301 simply cannot justify disobedience. 126 
Feketekuty argues that Section 301 provisions. provide a. mechanism to deal with trade 
issues that were not yet covered by GATT at the time of enactment of the 1988 Act. 127 
By linking trade policies of Section 301 provisions with US negotiating objectives in the 
Uruguay Round, 128 he claims that bilateral negotiations carried out under Section 301 
provisions could be seen as complementing and reinforcing the MTNs in the Uruguay 
Round. And it sent the signal to GATT contracting parties that the US government 
would have to address IP issues bilaterally if they were not covered by the Uruguay 
Round MTNs. 129 
122 See also Abbott, 1989, note 86 above, p. 693. 
123 `Statement of Forty economists on American Trade policy', The World Economy, 12,1989, pp. 263- 
265. 
124 Hudec, 1991, note 72 above, p. 21. 
"5 Hudec, 1990, note 104 above, p. 127. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Feketekuty, note 83 above, p. 91. 
1213 Ibid., p. 100. Special 301 deals exclusively with IP issues. Super 301 deals with five areas of trade 
barriers: quantitative restrictions, government procurement policies, technical barriers to trade, trade related 
investment measures, and barriers to trade in services. Subsidies and Agricultural policies were dealt with 
outside Super 301 process. 
129 Ibid., p. 92. 
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The effects of the Section 301 actions had not been proven wholly satisfactory because 
the impact is limited to those countries which rely heavily on exports to US market, 130 
and it is less potent against larger DCs which are less dependent on trade. 131 Bhagwati's 
description that minor players will succumb while major players will be spared under 
Section 301 actions 132 is manifested in the examples involving Taiwan, South Korea 
which belong to the league of minor players, and the EC and Japan. In order to avoid 
being named as unfair traders, Taiwan and South Korea had initiated negotiations with 
the US to liberalise sectors demanded by the US, import more US goods, or to freeze 
their trade surplus with the US. 133. But the EC announced that it would refuse to 
negotiate if named as7an unfair trader, that Section 301 provisions were a violation of 
international law, and it was unilateralism at its worst; if the US sanctioned it, it would 
retaliate in full force. 134 The Japanese government declared that it had no intention to 
negotiate with the US when Japan was named an unfair trader under Super 301 in 1989. 
In the wake of Japan's refusal to negotiate, the USTR claimed that "the Super 301 
framework was found to be excessively rigid and confrontational" and initiated a set of 
'30 Evenson, Robert E., `Intellectual Property Rights, R&D, Inventions, Technology Purchase, and Piracy in 
Economic Development: An International Comparative Study', in Evenson and Ranis (eds. ), Science and 
Technology- Lessons fr om Development Policy, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990b, p. 325 and 
Reichman, J. H., `Intellectual Property in International Trade: Opportunities and Risks of a GATT 
Connection', VandJTL, 22(4), 1989, p. 756. Individual DCs have responded to US pressure over IPP 
issues in proportion to their overall export dependence on the US market. For example, Taiwan and South 
Korea had revised their IPP law considering 29.9% and 14.5% of GNP constituting export to the US 
respectively. India with its 2.1% of GNP as exports to the US had not revised patent law. See Gadbaw, 
Michael and Timothy J. Richard (eds. ), Intellectual Property Rights - Global Consensus, Global Conflict: 
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988b. 
131 Kastenmeier Robert W. and David Beier, `International Trade and Intellectual property: Promise, risks, 
and Reality', VandJTL, 22(2), 1989, p. 302. 
i32 Bhagwati, 1991, note 92 above, p. 38. 
33 New York Times, May 13,1989. 
134 New York Times, May 20,1989, Sec. A. 
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talks with Japan outside the 301 framework covering issues which were initially to be 
negotiated under Super 301.135 
When challenged by trading nations during the Uruguay Round MTNs of the unilateral 
nature of Section 301 actions, the US took the stance that many problems dealt with in 
the 1988 Act, for example IP issues, were not yet covered by GATT law so they had to be 
handled bilaterally. 136 The official line remained adamant'that the multilateral approach 
was only complementary to the unilateral and bilateral approaches. 
! 3ý : Following the 
conclusion of TRIPS, the US government reaffirmed its intention to retain freedom for_ 
unilateral actions under Section 301 provisions, 
138 and declared that no provision in any 
of the Uruguay Round agreements would prevail over any inconsistent US law, or is to be 
construed as modifying any US law. 139 -. 
135 In May 1989, the USTR named Japan as an unfair trader under super 301 for its procurement practices 
in supercomputers and satellite and technical barriers in lumber. New York Times, May 27,1989, Sec. A. 
'36 GATT, CIM/224, for the meeting of 22 September, 1988. 
"' Gadbaw and Gwynn, note 84 above, p. 64. Also USTR, Web kite, 9 April, 1996. 
138 The Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 314(f), 108 Stat. 4809 (1994). 
139 The Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 102,108 Stat. 4809 (1994). 
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2.4 DCs' position on TRIPS in MTNs 
DCs viewed the introduction of IPP into the Uruguay Round MTNs as a weapon in the 
struggle of "haves" against "have nots" in the diffusion of technology. 140 It was also 
seen as a way to establish a linkage between extraneous issues and trade in goods which 
might lead to the withdrawal of. concessions on goods given by ICs in the previous 
rounds of MTNs. 141 From the DCs'.. perspective, the-substantive standards of IP are 
related to socio-economic, industrial, and technological developments. 142 Imposing 
higher levels of IPP on DCs infringes the right. of self-determination 143 and freedom to 
pursue national economic goals. 144 .: 
They considered the approach under the Convention 
more desirable whereby a gradual elevation of minimum standards enables the members 
to the Union to determine the desired -balance between monopoly and competition for 
140 D'Amato, Anthony and Doris Estelle Long (eds. ), International Intellectual Property Law, The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, pp. 457-458 and Stern, note 3 above, p. 203. It was also suspected that, by 
bringing IPP negotiations in the Uruguay round, ICs tried to introduce the subject of FDI in the GATT in a 
indirect way fuelling the year-long differences between DCs and ICs in their emphasis vis-ä-vis FDI (DCs 
are largely concerned with the protection from FDI while ICs are interested in the promotion of it). 
141 The representatives from India and Argentina expressed this concern in the Preparatory Committee 
meeting of August 1986. See GATT, PREP. COM(86)SR/9,26 August 1986, p. 8. 
142 GATT, MTN. GNG/NGI 1/14,12 September 1989, p. 5. 
143 Self-Determination is a legal principle which forms part of jiffs cogens (rule of customary law that cannot 
be set aside with the status of peremptory norms). With reference to Article 1, Paragraph 2 and Article 55 
of the UN Charter, the practice of the UN organs has established the principle as a part of the law of the 
UN. See Brownlie, Ian, Principles of Public International Law, 4th ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
pp. 512 and 596-599. 
44 See the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of United Nations, GA Res. 2625 (XXXV), 25 UN GAOR 
Supp. (No. 28), UN Doc A/8028 (1970). Three principles stated in the Declaration are of relevance: The 
first principle concerns the duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any state in 
accordance with the UN Charter, i. e., each state has an inalienable right to choose its political, economic, 
social, and cultural systems without interference in any form by another state. The second one is the 
principle of equal rights and self determination of peoples enshrined in the UN Charter. It is the right of all 
peoples to pursue their economic, social, and cultural development without external interference. Lastly, 
under the principle of sovereign equality of states, each state has the right freely to choose and develop its 
political, social, economic, and cultural system; see Evans (ed. ), Blackstone's International Law 
Documents, 3`d ed., London: Blackstone Press Ltd., 1996. 
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themselves. 145 DCs pointed out that the standards currently prevailing in DCs 
resembled those prevalent in ICs when ICs were at a similar stage of development. 
146 As 
Raghavan points out, historically, countries in the process of industrialisation always 
limited the scope of protection granted to foreign technologies or excluded whole areas of 
activity on the view that a weak technological capacity cannot take advantage of the IPR 
regime. 147 For example, on patentable subject matters, ICs had been able to exclude 
sectors such as pharmaceuticals on public interest, health care, and social grounds. 
148 
And the introduction of patent protection for pharmaceuticals is a fairly recent .". 
phenomenon in many ICs. 149 DCs argued that they should-be-able to adjust their IP. 
legislation in accordance with their development needs as ICs have done at their earlier_ 
stage of development. 150 
145 Reichman, 1989, note 130 above, p. 867. 
' Some industrial countries have only recently introduced patent protection in pharmaceutical and 
chemicals after ensuring the development of their own domestic industry. Ringo, Frederick , `The 
Trade- 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement in the GATT and Legal Implications for Sub- 
Saharan Africa', JWT, 28(6), 1994. Also Reichmen, 1989, note 130 above. 
147 Raghavan, note 72 above, p. 134. 
148 GATT, MTN, GNGINGI 1/14,12 September 1989, p. 34. 
'49Patent protection for pharmaceuticals was introduced in the UK in 1949, France in 1960, Germany in 
1968, Japan in 1976, Switzerland in 1977, Italy in 1978, and Spain in 1992. 
150 Gadbaw and Gwynn, note 84 above, p. 63-64 and Bradley, note 73 above, p. 68-69 and 78-80. And see 
Maskus in support of this argument, Maskus, K. E., `Normative Concerns in the International Protection of 
Intellectual Property Rights', The World Economy, 12,1990, pp. 387-409. Switzerland is often quoted as 
an example. It was one of the original signatories to the Convention in 1883, but its Patent Act of 1888 
provided a very limited scope of protection to pharmaceuticals. Because of its free access to technologies 
others have developed, Swiss consumers paid no increased price for new technology, thus minimised 
outflow of its wealth to importers and removed all the social costs of patenting. By adhering to the 
principle of NT under the Convention and denied patent protection to domestic nationals and foreigners, it 
guaranteed Swiss industries receiving NT from foreign countries and ensuring them patent profits from 
exports. It was not until 1907 that Switzerland amended its 1888 Act under the pressure from Germany. 
See Oddi, Samuel A., `The International Patent System and Third World Development: Reality or Myth? ' 
Duke Law Journal, 1987, p. 869 and Moy, Carl R., `The History of the Patent Harmonisation Treaty: 
Economic Self-Interest as an Influence', John Marshall Law Review, 26,1993, p. 457. 
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DCs take a zero-sum approach 151 and implicitly consider losses suffered by ICs from the 
absence of adequate IPP as net benefits to DCs' economies. 152 The accusation that some 
DCs have a deliberate policy to pirate and counterfeit 153 has been rebutted on the ground 
that when a country chooses not to introduce IP, there is no breach of obligations under 
the Convention as long as NT is implemented. 154 There is no such an issue as 
infringement of IP in countries where an IPP system is not in place. 15 s 
Concerns have been expressed of the appropriateness of subjecting. IPP to, the negotiation 
process and trading private rights against commercial advantages in the form of quid-pro- 
quo trade concessions. IPP policy has to balance a wide variety of elements and interests 
including the public interest in competition and consumer welfare. 156 Patent protection 
could play a useful and important role in an-economic system constructed upon private 
initiative and competition; 157 but in a nation structured alone socialist lines, reign 
151 Zero-sun approach involves the notion that one's loss is the gain of the other as opposed to positive-sum 
approach whereby all people involved are to gain from the participation. See Finger, Michael J. and Paula 
Holmes, `Unilateral Liberalisation and the MTNs', in Finger and Olechowski (eds. ), The Uruguay Round - 
A Handbookfor the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Washington, D. C.: The World Bank, 1987. 
152 Cottier, note 61 above, p. 385. 
153 Gadbaw and Richards, 1988a, note 71 above, pp. 12-17. But Meessen opposes to this view and pointed 
out that there was no apparent government collusion but private acts, see Meessen, Karl M., `Intellectual 
Property Rights in International Trade', JWTL, 21(1), 1987, pp. 69 and 73. 
"4 Primo Braga, 1989, note 6 above, pp. 243-264. 
155 Ibid., p. 259 and Schumann, Gunda, `Economic Development and Intellectual Property Protection in 
Southeast Asia: Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Thailand', in Rushing and Brown (eds. ), Intellectual 
Property Rights in Science and Technology and Economic Performance, Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
Press, ch. 9. 
'56 Ullrich, Hanns, `GATT: Industrial Property Protection, Fair Trade and Development', in Beier and 
Schricker (eds. ), GATT or WIPO? New Ways in the International Protection of Intellectual Property, 
Munich: Max Planck Institute, 1989, op. cit. 
157 Kunz-Hallstein, Hans Peter, `The Revision of the International System of Patent Protection in the 
Interest of Developing Countries', 11C, 10,1979, p. 670. 
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technology could be acquired by the conclusion of government or private contract, or by 
the simple theft of foreign technology. 158 
The possible consequences of failure in IPP negotiations in the Uruguay Round also 
caused some concerns. Many believed that if no agreement was reached, ICs would seek 
to establish a set of IPP standards on their own. - Such an agreement is likely due to the 
similarity among ICs' relative level of development, domestic legal systems and their 
existing IPP legislation. 159 The failure to reach an agreement would also run the risk of 
increasing unilateral or bilateral actions, when dealing with IPP issues. 160 The possibility 
of unilateral or bilateral trade. retaliation must be included in the economic analysis of the 
costs and benefits of IPP reform. 161 Instead of being exposed to unilateral or bilateral 
actions, Cottier believes that it is more desirable to defend one's interest based on a set of 
multilaterally negotiated and well-defined trade rules and principles as under GATT. 162 
Despite the US's relative decline and its diminished power on the world scene, Low felt 
that the order in international trade relations would be difficult to maintain without the 
participation of the US and its commitment to preserve multilateralism. 163 
158 Lall, Sanjaya, `The Patent System and the Transfer of Technology to LDCs', JWTL, 10(1), 1976, pp. 
649-670. 
159 Kastenmeier and Beier, note 131 above, p. 300. This could happen, for example, among OECD 
countries. See also Emmert, Frank, `Intellectual Property in the Uruguay Round - Negotiating Strategies 
of the Western Industrialised Countries', MJIL, 11(4), 1990, p. 1397. 
160 In an interview on September 1986, the USTR Yuetter made it clear that the US would turn to bilateral 
and plurilateral arrangements If IPP issues are not included in the Uruguay Round. See Bradley, note 73 
above, p. 85 and Gibbons, Sam M., 'US Trade Legislation and Intellectual Property Rights', in Walker and 
Bloomfield (eds. ), Intellectual Property Rights and Capital Formation in the Next Decade, Lanham, MD.: 
University Press of America, 1988, p. 170. 
161 Primo Braga, Carlos Alberto, `Intellectual Property Rights in NAFTA: Implications for Intenational 
Trade', in Riggs and Velk (eds. ), Beyond NAFTA: An Economic, Political and Sociological Perspective, 
Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 1993, p. 107. 
162 Cottier, note 61 above, p. 389. 
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A rule-based global trading system that provides transparency and certainty is essential. in 
an increasingly interdependent global economy 164 where national markets are practically 
border-less. The rule-based system also needs to have the built-in capability to response 
to the fast changing world trading environments. Long observes that the relatively rigid 
system of GATT made it difficult to adapt to changes so that GATT adopted a pragmatic 
approach allowing governments to deviate from its provision so as to accommodate 
divergent national trade interests. 165 This pragmatism had led to the deviation from the 
adherence to the rule of law towards a more power-oriented approach : 166 in dealing with 
trade relations... The result was that participants in the global market lost confidence in 
the effectiveness and validity of GATT. And it was against this macro-environment 
background that the Uruguay Round MTNs commenced, with its overriding objective to 
reform the system. 
By giving the principle of reciprocity a modern interpretation and re-defining the 
benchmark for trade liberalisation, the US's justification for the legality of their 
legislation had also affected the conduct of MTNs. Itedomestic trade legislation 
introducing IPP as one of the considerations for unilateral and bilateral retaliations 
signaled their commitment to take up IPP issue unilaterally with or without a TRIPS 
163 Low, note 5 above, p. 140. 
164 Jackson, John H., `The Crumbling Institutions of the Liberal Trade System', JWTL, 12(2), 1978, p. 97. 
165 Long, Olivier, Law and its Limitations in the GATT Multilateral Trade System, Dordrecht: Martinus 
N-hoff Publishers, 1987, p. 22. % ' According to Jackson, the power-oriented approach involves the diplomacy of asserting the power of a 
nation so that it can be brought to bear to win advantage in particular negotiations. See Jackson, 1978, note 
164 above, p. 98. 
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agreement. 167 It exerted considerable pressure to compel CPs of GATT to persevere 
with TRIPS MTNs in the Uruguay Round and pushed the pace of negotiations forward. 
167 Getlan, note 116 above, pp. 173-218. 
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Chapter III 
GATT and TRIPS 
This chapter discusses the three underlying legal principles of GATT, MFN, NT, and 
reciprocity, based on which the assessment is made whether GATT provides the legal 
framework within which a multilateral agreement on TRIPS could be achieved. 
Particular attention is paid to the evolution of these legal principles in terms of how they 
have responded to demands from governments and business constituencies in an 
increasingly integrated global market. 
3.1 Introduction 
Long, the former Director-General of GATT, comments that, when dealing with trade 
problems, a balance has to be struck between the legal approach and pragmatism. 
' It is 
difficult to adhere strictly to legal interpretations in the application of trade rules and 
principles because of the political factors involved. 2 He further points out that, trade 
policies conducted by governments often faced a conflict between their international 
legal obligations and the demands of national interest, and that the limitations are merely 
a reflection of the difficulties inherent in any attempt to regulate within a legal framework 
something as dynamic and fluctuating as world trade. 3A trading system has to be 
'Long, Olivier, Law and its Limitations in the GATT Multilateral Trade System, Dordrecht: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1987, pp. 61-62. 
2 Ibid, pp. 7-8. The Economist points out that trade liberalisation 
is 
politically demanding because it could 
harm focused vested interests. The Economist, December 4,1999, p. 116. 
3 Long, note 1 above, pp. 7-8 and 61-62. 
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capable of accommodating different trading interests as what goes on in GATT almost 
daily. 4 
Supporters of the global trading system believe that GATT has built in both the pragmatic 
and judicial features. The pragmatic approach in the process of MTNs entails a rule-based 
\, 
_ý 
global trading system capable of accommodating. different domestic economic and 
political agenda. Its strict judicial pursuit of multilateral legal principles provides binding 
obligations and yields the transparency the business community looks for. 5 
The GATT system has evolved considerably since it was applied provisionally in 1947. 
MFN, NT, and Reciprocity have withstood the test of time. With the revised applications 
of these principles and the introduction of GATT- sanctioned exceptions in the 
consecutive rounds of MTNs, the system has responded to demands from governments 
and business communities in an increasingly integrated global trading environment. But 
faced with CPs' reduced level of tolerance with deviations from GATT provisions in 
recent years, the pragmatic approach of the GATT system to accommodate different 
national trade interests would require a rethink. 
How to eliminate the disparity existing among national IP system was another challenge 
CPs faced in the Uruguay Round which was specific to TRIPS MTNs. GATT contains 
rules that allow CPs to take defensive and compensatory actions when adversely affected 
f 
4 Jackson, John H., World Trade and the Law of GATT, NY: The Bobbs-Merrill Co. Inc., 1969, p. 763. 
5 Ibid. 
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by domestic policies of their trading partners, 6 but it made no attempt to harmonise 
domestic policies. 7 Solutions needed to be found to the problem of to what extent CPs 
could exercise their regulatory autonomy in deciding their policies which have cross- 
border effects. 8 If the purpose of GATT is the elimination of market distortions at 
source, it has to consider covering domestic policies. 9 
3.2 The creation of GATT- 
Wilcox, in his book A Charter for World Trade, described the 1930s and the devastation 
brought by the World War II in the following terms: 
"The foundations of economic liberalism were shaken by the First World 
War. The economy of Europe was disorganised, productive facilities 
were destroyed; channels of trade were broken; heavy debts were 
incurred. Nationalism and protectionism were stimulated by the revision 
of boundaries and the creation of new states. Economic and political 
uncertainty weakened devotion to principles that were once unquestioned. 
Governments assumed increasing responsibility for the direction of 
economic life... 
6 GATT, Trade Policies for a Better Future - The "Leutwiler Report ", The GATT and the Uruguay Round, 
Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987 (hereinafter The Leutwiler Report), pp. 76-77. 
7 Ibid. 
8 This question has added significance in a global market where economic activities among nations are 
highly interdependent. See discussion in Chapter 5.1. 
9 See discussion in Chapter 3.3.2. 
10 Wilcox, 'Clair, A Charter for World Trade, NY: Arno Press, Inc., 1949, pp. 5-9. 
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The foundations of economic liberalism, badly shaken by the First World 
War, were all but demolished by the Great Depression... There '. vas a 
sharp contraction in the volume of the world's trade. The attention of 
governments turned inward... Each for himself and the devil take the 
hindmost became the general rule... 
Intensive economic nationalism marked the rest of the decade. Exports 
were forced; imports were curtailed. All of the weapons of commercial 
warfare were brought into play: currencies. were depreciated, exports 
subsidised, tariffs raised, exchanges controlled, quotas imposed, and 
discrimination practised through preferential systems and barter deals. 
Each nation sought to sell much and buy little. A vicious restrictionism 
produced a further deterioration in world trade. " 10 
During that period of time, governments engaged in beggar-thy-neighbour policies, 
attempting to obtain economic advantages at the expense of others by restricting imports 
and subsiding exports. 11 Consequently, it triggered off retaliatory actions among nations 
and depressed the world economy. It was against this background that the three 
institutions of Brentton Woods were conceived to rebuild the post-war international 
order: the International Trade Organisation (ITO) for trade, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) for finance, and the World Bank for reconstruction. 12 
11 Rooseler, Frieder, `The Scope, Limits, and Function of the GATT Legal System', in GATT, Trade 
Policies for a Better Future - The "Leutwiler Report", The GAT7`and the Uruguay Round, Dordrecht: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987, p. 84. 
12 It was called International Bank for Reconstruction and Development when it was first established. 
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GATT, when first drafted, was intended to be a multilateral treaty administered by the 
ITO, designed to facilitate multilateral negotiations on the reduction of tariffs and to 
secure the liberalisation and expansion of world trade. The ITO never came into being 
mainly due to the failure of the United States government to seek congressional approval 
of the Havana Charter establishing the ITO. 13 Since January 1948, GATT has been 
applied through a "Protocol of Provisional Application".. 14 Legally, GATT has 
established a consensual framework of rules and prineiples for. the conduct of world 
trade. 15. _ 
Politically, GATT has provided- a framework of self-imposed constraints that 
enables CPs to regulate conflicts of interests, among -states, and to defend against 
protectionist lobbies from competing importers and interest groups within one's own 
country. Through time, GATT has evolved and adopted salient functions of an 
organisation for consultation, negotiation, and the application of rules and principles of 
international trade law, and governments have turned to GATT as a forum to handle trade 
disputes, although the drawbacks of its not being an organisation are well recognised. 16 
13 For the origins of GATT 1947, see Jackson, John H., Restructuring the GATT System, London: Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 1990, pp. 9-15, and Stewart, Terence P. (ed. ), The GATT Uruguay Round: 
A Negotiating History (19986-1992), vol. 2, Deventer: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993, pp. 
1986-1990. 
'a It ended with the establishment of the WTO in January 1995. 
15 The GATT system consists of a series of over one hundred agreements including those which amended 
the articles of the General Agreement, those which admitted new members, the agreements for the revision 
of and addition to the tariff schedules, and the side agreements and understanding completed in the Tokyo 
Round. Deardorff, Alan V. and Robert M. Stem, Multilateral Trade Negotiations and Preferential Trading 
Arrangements, in Deardorff and Stern (eds. ), Analytical and Negotiating Issues in the Global Trading 
System, Ann Arbor: The Michigan University Press, 1994, ch. 2, p. 29 and Jackson, 1990, note 13 above, p. 
27. 
16 The functioning of the GATT system was one of the agenda items for the Uruguay Round MTNs. As a 
result of the negotiations in the Functioning of the GATT System Negotiating Group (FOGS) in the 
Uruguay Round, the World Trade Organisation was established which came into force on January 1,1995. 
The WTO transformed the GATT into a full-fledged world trade`organisation. It provides an institutional 
framework for the administration and implementation of the agreements reached in the Uruguay Round. 
The constitutional flaws of GATT system were therefore rectified. See UNCTAD, The Outcome of the 
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As stated in the preamble of GATT, the objectives of GATT are: 
"to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and 1= 
steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, developing 
the full use of the resources of the world and expanding the production 
and exchange of goods". 
It was to secure the liberalisation and expansion of world trade in tangible goods 17 and to 
further the. economic. and social. development of member countries. By entering into. 
reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements, the objectives would be achieved by 
gradually removing and eliminating tariffs 18 and other barriers to trade and 
discriminatory treatments in international commerce. Tariff barriers were to be reduced 
through MTNs on the basis of reciprocity and MFN. Non-Tariff barriers (NTBs) were to 
be reduced based on the principle of good faith as manifested through the principle of 
non-discrimination and have objectivity and transparency in the administration of 
government regulations. 
The two principles of non-discrimination, namely MFN andNT, and reciprocity are the 
cornerstones of GATT. They were conceived by the post-war planners in the US and 
Uruguay Round: An Initial Assessment - Supporting Papers to the Trade and Development Report 1994, 
NY: UN, 1994, ch. 1, Stewart (ed. ), note 13 above, pp. 1943-1948 and Jackson, 1990, note 13 above, Part 
VIII. 
17 Havana Charter had an entire chapter (Chapter V) devoted to restrictive business practices that included 
provisions relating to rights under patents, trademarks, and copyrights, but GATT 1947 only deals with 
trade in tangible goods. See Jackson, 1969, note 4 above, p. 511. It excludes trade in intangible technology 
and services and foreign direct investment. 
18 Tariffs are custom duties on imports, the only form of protection permitted by GATT (Article I). 
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Britain 19 as the vehicle to eradicate the discriminatory system that dominated the 
international trade relations at that time. Reinforced by the application of reciprocity, 
MFN and NT were intended to help ensure that market access and equal competition 
opportunity commitments were implemented and maintained. 20 
3.3 GATT principles discussed 
3.3.1 The principle of Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment (MFN) 
MFN 21 as stated in Article I of GATT requires each CP to grant to every other CP the 
most favourable treatment which it grants to any country with respect to imports and 
exports of products. 22 It deals with issues of external discrimination. This principle of 
non-discrimination confers on CPs equal rights of market access irrespective 'of their size 
and bargaining power. It was conceived, at the time the General Agreement was drafted, 
as the best means of ensuringýequälity of competiti within an economic framework 
inspired by the ideas of free trade. 
When GATT was first drafted, MFN applied unconditionally, which meant that CPs are 
under the obligation to grant equivalent preferential treatments to other CPs without - 
receiving anything in return, and that each CP accords access to its market independently 
19 It was mainly the US and the UK which laid the ground work for the 1946-1948 GATT/ITO 
negotiations. See discussion in Hudec, Robert E., The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy, 
2° ed., New Hampshire: Butterworth Legal Publishers, 1990, p. 9. 
20 Hoekman, Bernard andMichael Kostecki, The Political Economy of the World Trading System from 
GATT to WTO, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 27. 
2! Or it is referred to by the US as the principle of Normal Trade Relations. 
22 Jackson, 1990, note 13 above, p. 106. % 
23 Espiell, Hector Gros, `The Most-Favoured-Nation Clause - Its Present significance in GATT', JIVTL, 
5(1), 1971, p. 35. 
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of the domestic policies of its trading partners. 24 Amid concerns over the problems of 
free riders and foot draggers, 25 a code approach was introduced in the Tokyo Round in 
dealing with agreements relating to NTBs. It constitutes a departure from the 
unconditional MFN and introduced the element of discrimination in the GATT system in 
so far as only the signatories to the agreement can benefit from it. 
The pragmatic aspect of the GATT system has. seen several exceptions to the MFN 
sanctioned by GATT. They include the Waiver provision (Article XXV), the Generalised 
System of Preference, Customs Union, Free Trade Area, and interim agreement (Article 
XXIV), Balance-of-Payment provisions (Article. XII), the escape. clause (Article XIX), 
national security exceptions (Articles XX and XXI), and grandfather clause exceptions 
derived from protocols of accession. 26. The waiver provision, the GSP and the code 
approach will be discussed here for their particular relevance. 
The waiver provision (Article XXV: 5) - This provision legalises a CP's request to 
derogate from any obligations imposed by GATT 
".. in exceptional circumstances not elsewhere provided for in the 
agreement so long as the necessary votes are obtained. " 
24 Rooseler, Frieder, `Diverging Domestic Policies and Multilateral Trade Integration', in Bhagwati and 
Hudec (eds. ), Fair Trade and Harmonisation, Vol. 2: Legal Analysis, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1996, 
31. 
A foot dragger refers to a country that is influential enough that other countries are reluctant to subscribe 
to an agreement and accord the MFN without its participation. Ithas the effect of strengthening the 
bargaining power of the influential country. 
26 For detailed discussion of these exceptions, see Jackson, 1969, note 4 above. 
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It has been utilised in some controversial cases such as the US's obtaining a waiver in. its 
agricultural products in 1955 27 which not only put trade liberalisation of agricultural 
sector in jeopardy but also put to the test the effectiveness of GATT in regulating trade in 
agricultural products. The other two commonly known examples are the waiver granted 
in 1971 to DCs to confer preferential treatment on one another, and the operation of the 
GSP between 1971 and 1981. 
The waiver provision is subject to broad interpretation. "Exceptional circumstances" is 
not defined, and there is no stipulation of rules or principles under which a waiver shall - 
or shall not be granted. Furthermore, the absence of an expiration date has led a number:. 
of waivers to becoming an almost permanent feature of the GATT system. 28 All these 
criticisms were met with rectification in the Uruguay Round MTNs. The 
Understanding29 on the Interpretation of Article XXV: 5 reached not only fixes expiry 
dates for the existing waivers but also requests the member states who apply for a waiver 
or for an extension of an existing waiver to describe the measures, the specific policy 
objectives, and the reasons for utilising the waiver provision. 
Generalised System of Preference (GSP) - The GSP is a scheme that authorises ICs to 
derogate from MFN and provide differential and more favourable treatments (DMFT) to 
DCs in regard to, among others: 
27 The 1955 waiver was applied in order to implement Section 22 of the US Agricultural Adjustment Act of 
1933 which deals with imposition of import fees and quotas. GATT, BISD 3`d Supp. 1955, p. 32. 
28 GATT, MTN/GNG/NG7/W/69,23 February 1990. 
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2. (a) preferential tariff treatment accorded by developed 
contracting parties to products originating in developing 
countries in accordance with the Generalised System of 
Preferences; 
(b) differential and more favourable treatment with 
respect to the provisions of the General Agreement 
concerning non-tariff measures governed . 
by the 
provisions of instruments multilaterally negotiated under 
the auspices of the GATT... 30 
The GSP was initially adopted as a policy by the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) 31 in 1968 32 as the result of a general movement toward 
more favourable treatment to DCs in aspects of economic relations. This movement 
gained momentum in the 1960s with the recognition that preferences should be accorded 
because of the differences that existed in the level of development among CPs, which 
resulted in economic inequality that could only be corrected through unequal treatment. 33 
29 "Understanding" is used to designate a statement to set forth an interpretation of a treaty provision. It is 
not intended to alter or limit the effect of a treaty. See D'Amato, Anthony and Doris Estelle Long (eds. ), 
International Intellectual Property Law, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997, p. 224. 
30 GATT, BISD 26th Supp., 1980, p. 202, paragraph 2 of the 1979 Decision. Also GATT, The Tokyo Round 
of Multilateral Trade Negotiation, Report by the Director-General of GATT, Geneva: GATT, 1979, p. 149. 
31 UNCTAD was set up by UN General Assembly in 1964 and became an organ of the General Assembly 
in 1995 (GA resolution 1995 (XIX) of 30 December 1964, as amended). Its major functions are to promote 
international trade between countries at different stages of development, between DCs and between 
countries with different systems of economic and social organisation, and to formulate principles and 
policies on international trade and related problems of economic development. UNCTAD Website, 
http: //www. unctad. org, 29 January, 1999. % 
32 The UNCTAD II meeting was held in New Delhi, see UNCTAD, TDB/330,1968, Part I. 
33 Espiell, note 23 above, p. 36. 
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Granting DMFT to DCs was therefore viewed as a means of overcoming 
underdevelopment and economic backwardness. 34 
The GSP was incorporated into the GATT system by the Decision of CONTRACTING 
PARTIES of 25 June 1971 35 which made it possible for ICs to rely on the waiver 
provision to deviate from unconditional MFN and to grant GSP in favour of DCs for an 
initial period of ten years. In 1979, as a part of the outcome of the Tokyo Round of 
MTNs, Another Decision was adopted 36 . which gave 
GSP a legal basis for 
implementation in the GATT system. 37, Under the scheme, a beneficiary country is 
selected according to the criteria of the donor country. 38 It is unilateral and temporary in 
nature because ICs are not obliged to offer any concessions and they can abandon the 
scheme at will. It does not establish a legal obligation, 39 but it was given a contractual 
34 Yusuf, Abdulgawi A., `Differential and More Favourable Treatment - The GATT Enabling Clause', 
JWTL, 14(5), 1980, pp. 488-507. 
35 GATT, BISD 18th Supp., 1972, p. 26. 
36 The decision of 28 November 1979 was titled "Differential and More Favourable Treatment Reciprocity 
and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries" (commonly referred to as "the enabling clause"). 
GATT, BISD 26th Supp., 1980, p. 203. 
37 Ibid. Paragraph 5 of the 1979 Decision reads as followed: 
"The developed countries do not expect reciprocity for commitments 
made by them in trade negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and 
other barriers to the trade of developing countries, i. e., the developed 
countries do not expect the developing countries, in the course of 
trade negotiations, to make contribution which are inconsistent with 
their individual development, financial and trade needs. Developed 
contracting parties shall therefore not seek, neither shall less- 
developed contracting parties by required to make concessions that 
are inconsistent with the latter's development, financial and trade 
needs. " . 
38 It is an arbitrary self-selection process under the GATT to decide whether a CP is a DC or not. The 
selection or identification of least LDCs under the GATT follows the UN definition. 
39 Long, note 1 above, p. 102. 
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status that ICs prefer in the form of a permissive clause as an exception to MFN 40 which 
fell short of the demand from DCs to amend the GATT. 
The impact of GSP had been minimised after several rounds of MTNs which have 
resulted in significant reduction of tariffs. The necessity and the format of conferring 
differential and more favourable treatment were much discussed in view of NIEs' playing 
increasingly active roles in the world trading system following their progressive 
improvement in trade and their competitiveness in the world market. 
The GSP was challenged by the concept of "graduation" introduced by ICs during the 
Tokyo Round which refers to the removal from the GSP of a beneficiary country or 
specific products from a beneficiary country which deemed to have achieved a degree of 
competitiveness in the world market. It was a call for the fuller participation of DCs and 
the termination of DMFT when their economic status had improved. As stated in the 
Paragraph 7 of the 1979 Decision: 41 
" Less-developed contracting parties expect that their capacity to make 
contributions or negotiated concessions or take other mutually agreed 
action under the provisions and procedures of the general agreement 
would improve with the progressive development of their economies and 
improvement in their trade situation and they would accordingly expect to 
participate more fully in the framework of rights and obligations under the 
40 Yusuf, 1980, note 34 above, p. 506. 
41 GATT, 1980, note 36 above, p. 203. 
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general agreement". 
40 
The call for fuller participation of LDCs was also reiterated as one of the general 
principles governing MTNs in the Punta del Este Declaration launching the Uruguay 
Round MTNs. 42 The Ministerial Declaration further committed CPs to apply DMFT in 
the Uruguay Round MTNs.. But the political c '- ate-of-the-1-980s was such that CPs 
became less tolerant toward any departure from the leg ý al-rules-and 'r Ples of GATT 
and that other alternatives might have to be found in substitution of any scheme that 
might allow CPs to enjoy the benefits of MTNs without taking up. corresponding 
obligations. -.: 
The Code Approach and NTBs - As tariff escalation was blamed as one of the major 
causes of the great depression before the World War II, the removal and reduction of 
tariff barriers became the focus of negotiations in the first six major rounds of MTNs 
conducted under the auspices of the GATT. 43 With the impressive accomplishment in 
tariff reductions in these rounds, ` NTBs became alternative measures for governments 
to protect domestic economic interests and to counter competition from imports in the 
42 The Punta del Este Declaration. See GATT, MIN. DEC, 20 September 1986. 
43 The six major rounds are Geneva Round (1947), Annecy Round (1949), Torquay Round (1950), Geneva 
Round (1956), Dillon Round (1961), Kennedy Round (1962-1967). Kennedy Round was the first round of 
MTNs that discussed NTBs in the Anti-Dumping Code with very little success. The seventh round of 
MTNs, the Tokyo Round, was the first in placing NTBs at the centre of MTNs. 
°`' From an average tariff of 40% in the mid-1930s before the creation of GATT to 4%-8% on the 
manufactured products of ICs after the Tokyo Round. Olechowski, `Andrzej, Non-tariff Barriers to Trade', 
in Finger and Olechowski (eds. ), The Uruguay Round. A Handbook for the Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, Washington, D. C.: The World Bank, 1987, p. 122. 
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1970s. 45 They often appeared to be legitimate domestic policy but, when implemented, 
they could have significant market distortion effects. 46 
The emphasis of MTNs on NTBs 47 distinguished the Tokyo Round from earlier trade 
rounds. In the absence of detailed rules for the conduct of negotiations on NTBs, a Code 
approach was introduced . to . deal with agreements reached on NTBs. The Code (or 
referred to as the side agreement) forms a separate legal instrument and exists side by 
side with the General Agreement. 48 The existing GATT provisions were neither 
amended nor were new provisions added to accommodate the side agreement. 49 Each 
Code has established its own institutional framework to facilitate regular meetings of the 
signatories, and the procedures for. handling disputes and regular exchanges of 
information. 
The code approach was introduced by the US, with the support of the EC, to eliminate the 
problems of free-riding and non-participation by DCs 50 Under the Code, only the 
signatories who submit to the discipline could enjoy the benefits of the subscribed 
as By 1973, an inventory of 800 NTBs, listed by countries, was established by cps for dealing with 
notification in the Tokyo Round from countries whose exports were adversely affected by their use. See 
discussion in Long, note I above, p. 74 and Ray, Edward J., `Protection of Manufacturers in the US 
Protectionism', in Greenaway, Hine, O'Brien, and Thornton (eds. ), Global Protectionism, Hampshire: 
MacMillan Academic and Professional Ltd., 1991, pp. 13-17. By 1982, there remained as many as over 
600 NTBs included in GATT Inventory List, see GATT, Focus, #11,1982. 
46 Stewart (ed. ), note 13 above, p. 707. 
47 It involved a process of identifying negotiable NTBs from the GATT Inventory List of NTBs. See 
discussion in Nau, Henry R., `Bargaining in the Uruguay Round', in Finger and Olechowski (eds. ), The 
Uruguay Round: A Handbook for the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Washington, D. C.: The World 
Bank, 1987, p. 76 and GATT, 1979, note 30 above, pp. 49-87. 
48 Long, note 1 above, pp. 26-28. 
49 Six codes were agreed in the Tokyo Round. They relate to government procurement, technical barriers 
to trade, import licensing, customs valuation, anti-dumping, and subsidies and countervailing duty 
measures. Code-conditionality was applied only in the subsidies code and the code on government. 
procurement. 
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agreement. This approach is described by Jackson as code-conditionality, 51 which 
constitutes a departure from unconditional MFN, 52 but is different from conditional 
MFN. Jackson explained that, under conditional MFN, when country A grants a 
privilege to country C while owing MFN to country B, country A must grant the 
equivalent privilege to country B but only after country B has given country A some 
reciprocal privilege. 53 
For a departure from unconditional MFN to be GATT-legal, amending the. general 
agreement was one of the options. Any amendment to MFN requires unanimity among 
CPs, which is very difficult to reach. 54 Furthermore, some felt that the code-approach 
seemed a feasible alternative taking into consideration the diversified nature of NTBs. 
NTBs are erected for different purposes by national governments ranging from national 
security to infant industry protection. The mechanism of MTNs becomes burdensome 
when it is difficult to draw uniformity among these non-standard government measures. 55 
It is not at all an easy task to identify the tariff equivalent value of NTBs and conversion 
factors in the exercise of ensuring the mutuality of concession. 56 
so Hudec, 1990, note 19 above, p. 129. 
51 Jackson, The World Trading System - Law and Policy of International Economic Relations, 
Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1992, p. 137. 
52 Long, note I above, p. 30. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Amendments to Article II (Schedules of Concessions) and Article XXX (Amendments) require 
unanimity. Amendments to other provisions of GATT require a two-third majority (Article XXVI), and as 
the case may be, the two-third majority has to constitute 50 per cent or more of the CPs. 
ss Stem, Robert and Hoekman, Bernard, `The Code Approach', in Finger and Olechowski (eds. ), The 
Uruguay Round -A Handbook on the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Washington, D. C.: The World 
Bank, 1987. 
56 Olechowski, note 44 above, p. 126. 
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The elimination or removal of trade distortions caused by NTBs in the form of inadequate 
and ineffective IPP was the focal point of TRIPS MTNs in the Uruguay Round. 
Although the existing international Conventions dealing with IP do not contain MFN, the 
major trading nations such as the US and the EEC proposed the adoption of conditional 
MFN. 57 Many other nations called for unconditional MFN to be applied to all 
agreements 58 in. view of the US and some other ICs' demand of reciprocal market access 
concession as a condition for access : to. their markets... They believed that the 
unconditional nature of MFN would limit the. possibility of GATT. CPs to use the threat 
of discriminatory : withdrawal of market access to induce other CBs to accept new 
commitments . which affect their 
domestic policies, or.. to use them for bargaining 
purposes. 59 Furthermore, the application of unconditional MFN might make bilateral 
arrangement less attractive because any advantage obtained -from bilateral negotiations 
have to be passed on to all other CPs. In addition, the application of unconditional MFN 
coupled with the introduction of technical or other forms of assistance 60 in lieu of the 
differential and more favourable treatment DCs enjoyed under the GATT system was 
seen as the way forward to equip DCs to fulfil their treaty obligations in order to bring 
57 See GATT, MTN. GNG/NG11/W/70,11 May 1990, Draft Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights: Communication by the US, GATT, MTN. GNG/NGI 1/W/68,29 March 1990, 
and Cottier, `The Prospects for Intellectual Property in GATT', CMLR, 28,1991, p. 300. According to 
Cottier, the EEC advocated conditional MFN because it wished to reserve IPP as an area for bilateral 
preferential treatment to selected countries. 
$ The call came toward the end of the Uruguay Round when free-rider was brought up as an issue. See 
Hudec, Enforcing International Trade Law - The Evolution of the Modern GATT Legal System, New 
Hampshire: Butterworth Legal Publishers, 1993, p. 123. 
59 Roessler, 1996, note 24 above, p. 53. 
60 Kastenmiere Robert W. and David Beier, `International Trade and Intellectual Property: Promise, Risks, 
and Reality', VandJTL, 22(2), 1989, p. 306. 
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DCs in from the fringe of the international trading system by participating more fully. in 
the mainstream. 
61 
3.3.2 The principle of National Treatment (NT) 
NT as stated in Article III(4) of GATT 62 obliges CPs to apply domestic law in a non- 
discriminatory manner and accord no less favourable treatment to imported products as it 
has conferred on like products of domestic origin. It is not only to prevent domestic taxes 
and government regulations : from being used "so as to afford protection to domestic. 
productions",, 63 but is relevant to the reduction and elimination of NTBs operating. within . 
the territory of the importing country. 64 Its application is therefore to ensure "effective 
equality of opportunity" 65 for imported products to compete once the foreign products 
have crossed the border for legitimate sale in the domestic market. In a situation when 
61 As elaborated in both the 1979 Decision (see note 36 above) and the Punta del Este Declaration (see note 
42 above). 
62 Article 111(4) of GATT states that: 
"The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any 
other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded 
to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements ... 
" 
63 Article III (1) of GATT. 
64 NT traditionally confines its application to the issue of internal discrimination. But in the case of 
economic integration arrangement such as the European Union, NT applies at the border as well as in the 
territory of each member state. 
65 A 1990 Panel Report concerning the definition of words "treatment no less favourable" in Article 111(4) 
states that: 
... The words 
`treatment no less favourable' in paragraph 4 call for effective equality 
of opportunities for imported products in respect of the application of laws, regulations 
and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, 
distribution or use of products. This clearly sets a minimum permissible standard as a 
basis. One the one hand, contracting parties may apply to imported products different 
formal legal requirements if doing so would accord imported products more favourable 
treatment. On the other hand, it also has to be recognised that there may be cases 
where application of formally identical legal provisions would in practice accord less 
favourable treatment to imported products and a contracting party might thus have to 
apply different legal provisions to imported products to ensure that the treatment 
accorded them is in fact no less favourable. " 
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imported products are subject to different legal provisions from those applying to 
products of national origin, it in itself is not conclusive to establish inconsistency with 
Article 111: 4. An assessment has to be made whether differences in the legal provision in 
practice discriminate against imported products. 66 And the onus of proof is on the 
contracting party applying differential treatment to prove that it is not the case. 67 
NT is also the pivotal principle of the Paris Convention (the Convention). 68 Its definition 
is substantially the same as that in the GATT. The difference is that NT provides no less 
favourable property protection to IP holders, legal or nature, under the Convention, while 
it deals with goods under the GATT system. -. Its. application under the Convention does 
not take into account disparity among member states domestic legislation, i. e., it is not a 
concern whether a host country offers similar or equivalent protection to its nationals as 
in the home country. Under these circumstances, MNCs have to be content with the 
treatment offered in the host country even if the standard might be much lower than in the 
home country. The principle of state sovereignty is thus observed and the states to the 
Convention mutually recognise each other's system. 69 This comity approach recognises 
See United States - Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, GATT, BISD 36`' Supp., 1990, p. 345. 66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Article 2 of the Paris Convention. 
69 Ullrich, Harms, `GATT: Industrial Property Protection, Fair Trade and Development', in Beier and 
Schricker (eds. ), GATT or WIPO? New Ways in the International protection of Intellectual property, 
Munich: Max Planck Institute, 1989, p. 138. 
4 
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each country's laws and judicial decisions 70 but has its limitation on eliminating the 
disparity existed among national laws. 71 
Any suggestions of harmonising IP standard among nations 72 could lead to the 
curtailment of regulatory autonomy, which the-GATT system had been reluctant to 
allow. 73 GATT contains rules which allo cps- t take defensive and compensatory 
70 Dhanjee, Rajan and Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, `Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS): Objectives, Approaches and Basic Principles of the GATT and of Intellectual Property 
Convention', JWT, 24,1990, p. 6, and Stern, Richard H., `Intellectual Property', in Finger and Olechowski 
(eds. ), A Handbook for the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Washington, D. C.: The World Bank, 1987, pp. 
198-206: 
71 Stern, note 70 above, p. 205, and Primo Braga, Carlos, `Trade Related Intellectual Property Issues: The 
Uruguay Round Agreement and its Economic Implication', in Martin and Winters (eds. ), The Uruguay 
Round and the Developing Countries, Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1996, p. 342. 
n The US proposed the code approach with the obligation of applying same domestic IPP standard among 
the signatories. See Ullrich, note 69 above, p. 132. 
73 Two GATT panel reports could provide illustration as to how GATT would deal with the question of 
regulatory autonomy. In the GATT Panel Report (United States - Measures Affecting Alcohol and Malt 
Beverage, GATT, BISD 39`s Supp., 1993. ) concerning the definition of "like products" in Article 111: 4, the 
panel stated that: 
"... The Panel recognise that the treatment of imported and domestic products as like 
products under Article III may have significant implication ... 
for the regulatory 
autonomy of contracting parties with respect to their international tax laws and 
regulations... In the view of the Panel, it is imperative that the like product 
determination in the context of Article III be made in such a way that it does not 
unnecessarily infringe upon the regulatory authority and domestic policy option of 
contracting parties. " 
Another 1993 Panel Report examining Article III: 4 relates to the US' restrictions on imports of tuna from 
Mexico which permit fishing methods endangering dolphins (United States -- Restrictions on Imports of 
Tuna, GATT, BISD 39`s Supp., 1993. ) The Panel stated that: 
"Article III calls for a comparison of the treatment of imported tuna as a product with 
that of domestic tuna as a product. Regulations governing the taking of dolphins 
incidental to the taking of tuna could not possibly affect tuna as a product. Article 
111: 4 therefore obliges the United States to accord treatment to Mexican tuna no less 
favourable than that accorded to United States tuna, whether or not the incidental 
taking of dolphin by Mexican vessels corresponds to that of United States vessels. " 
The Panel rejected the US's justification based on Article XX(b), which exempts CPs from the obligations 
under GATT "measures... necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health" and stated that: 
" 
.. 
It seemed evident to the Panel that, if the Contracting Parties were to permit import 
restrictions in response to differences in environmental policies under the General 
Agreement, they would need to impose limits on the range of policy differences 
justifying such response and to develop criteria so as to prevent abuse. If the 
Contracting Parties were to decide to permit trade measures of this type in particular 
circumstances it would therefore be preferable for them to do so not by interpreting 
Article XX, but by amending or supplementing the provisions of the General 
Agreement or waiving obligation thereunder. " 
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actions when their trading interests are adversely affected by domestic policies of their 
trading partners, 74 but it made no attempt to harmonise domestic policies when dealing 
with tariff or non-tariff measures. 75 Furthermore, there have been no provisions in the 
General Agreement that deal with harmonisation of domestic policies, and no effort had 
ever been made to do so. CPs had retained freedom as regards their domestic trade 
policies and they have been reluctant to accept any specific rules that go beyond border 
measures. 76 
The issue of-harmonisation was a challenge CPs faced in the TRIPS MTNs. It touches 
upon the sensitive issue of national sovereignty. The respect for sovereignty and the 
principle of territoriality are closely linked, which underpin the system of IPP under the 
Convention. It is this respect for state sovereignty which gives effect to the territorial 
nature of patent protection. If the objective of the TRIPS MTNs is to eliminate at source 
trade distortions caused by disharmony of national IP systems, a multilateral agreement 
covering domestic policies must be considered. 77 The ability of governments to 
determine their national policies within their own territory would invariably be affected if 
the obligation of NT is to be fully complied with. 78 
In this case, the Panel did not allow the US to apply import restrictions to force Mexico to change their 
domestic policies. It resisted the pressure from the US to apply GATT provisions in such a way to offset 
differences in domestic policies and affirmed CPs' regulatory autonomy. 
74 The Leutwiler Report, note 6 above, pp. 76-77. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid., p. 76. 
" Ibid. 
78 Hart, Michael M., `The WTO and the Political Economy of Globalisation'. JNT, 31(5), 1997, p. 38, and 
Jackson, 1992, note 51 above, p. 189. 
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3.3.3 Reciprocity 
Reciprocity is pivotal in the removal and elimination of trade barriers under GATT. As 
stated in Article XXVIII bis: 1: 
"... negotiations on a. reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis, 
directed to the substantial reduction of the general level of tariffs and 
other charges on imports and exports ... are of great importance to the 
expansion of international trade... " 
The traditional concept of reciprocity in GATT applies through mutually accepted tariff 
and non-tariff concessions across negotiated sectors based on an overall balance of rights 
and obligations. It serves to limit the scope for free-riding that may arise from the 
application of unconditional MFN in a multilateral setting. 79 The mutuality of 
concession suggests fairness, which makes adjustment to trade liberalisation potentially 
more acceptable to domestic politicians who oppose such changes. 80 And reciprocal 
trade liberalisation provides a political counterweight when governments are faced with 
oppositions from industries negatively affected as political supports could be expected 
from industries benefiting from such a policy. 81 
79 Hoekman and Kostecki, note 20 above, p. 27. 
8° Roessler, 1987, note 11 above, p. 83 and Jackson, 1992, note 51 above, p. 125. 
81 Ibid. 
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Reciprocity is not defined in GATT, and there are conflicting arguments whether it is a 
legal principle. 82 As stated by Arthur Dunkel, 83 the former Director-General of GATT: 
"Reciprocity cannot be determined exactly; it can only be agreed upon. " 84 According to 
Jackson, GATT does not require reciprocity but the practice in GATT among the major 
negotiation parties for tariff reductions was always to seek reciprocity. 85 Espiell 
comments that the principle of reciprocity is implicit in GATT and that the General 
Agreement is founded de facto on this . principle applicable to the granting of trade 
concessions when substantially equivalent advantages are exchanged on a reciprocal 
basis. 86 
Historically, reciprocity is an instrument for bilateral negotiations. 87 The basic 
assumption underlying this -principle 
is the equal bargaining power between negotiating 
parties. It would be a concept difficult to apply in a multilateral setting if the parties 
involved are of unequal bargaining power. Khan observes that the assumption of 
economic equality did have its validity in the early stages of GATT when the majority of 
its CPs were ICs. 88 But this assumption was later proven to be dubious when more and 
more DCs joined the GATT in the 1950s. 
82 See Hudec, Robert H., Developing Countries in the GATT Legal System, London: Trade Policy Research 
Centre, 1987. 
83 Arthur Dunkel was the Director General of GATT from 1980-1993. 
84 GATT, Press Release no. 1312,5 March, 1982. 
85 Jackson, 1992, note 51 above, p. 123. 
86 Espiell, note 23 above, p. 36. 
87 The concept of reciprocity in GATT was introduced by the US based on their Reciprocal Trade 
Agreements Act of 1934. In the 1934 Act, the US president was authorised to negotiate reciprocal 
reduction of tariffs mostly on bilateral basis with the aim to improve market access and increase exports, 
see Winters, `Reciprocity', in Finger and Olechowski (eds. ), The Uruguay Round: A Handbook for the 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Washington D. C.: The World Bank, 1987. 
88 Khan, K. R., `International Law of Development and the Law of the GATT', in Snyder and Slinn (eds. ), 
International Law of Development: Comparative Perspectives, Abingdon: Professional Books, 1987. The 
twenty three founding members of GATT 1947 were: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, 
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DCs were of the view that they were placed in a disadvantaged position in reciprocal 
trade negotiations. Depressed prices and demand for primary commodities relative to 
industrial products in the late 1950s 89 highlighted the intrinsic weakness of DCs' 
economic dependence on primary commodities such as agricultural products and raw 
materials as their major export interests. 90 The virtual exclusion of these products from 
GATT MTNs had been seen as protectionist measures adopted by ICs and legitimised by 
GATT to the detriment of DCs. 91 
It was not until 1958 that, for the first time, the Haberler Report documented the fact that 
DCs had failed to benefit from the tariff reductions and that DMFT were necessary to 
redress the balance which could not be achieved by the normal operation of trading rules 
alone. The response from CPs was the adoption of Part IV of GATT entitled "Trade and 
Development" which came into force in June 1966.92 The adoption of Part IV resulted 
Chile, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia, Syria, South Africa, United Kingdom, and the United States. 
89 The Haberler Report noted that: 
".. since the end of 1955, and leaving aside the effects of the Suez crisis, 
the slowing down in economic activity in North America and Western 
Europe has given rise to an average decline in the prices of primary 
products which in early 1958 reached five per cent. Its impact upon the 
position of non-industrial countries taken as a whole is aggravated by the 
simultaneous rise-by about six per cent-in the prices of manufactured 
goods. " 
See GATT, Trend in International Trade (The Haberler Report) (hereinafter The Haberler Report), 
Geneva: GATT, 1958, pp. 3,6, and 189-230. For further discussion of the report, see Jackson, 1969, note 4 
above, ch. 25.4. 
90 Barry Jones, R. J., Globalisation and Interdependence in the International Political Economy, London: 
Pinter Publishers, 1995. 
91 The Haberler Report had highlighted the problem of agricultural protectionism of ICs as one of the 
contributory factors to DCs' failure to develop international trade. The Report was commissioned by the 
Ministers in the 12`s Ministerial Meeting in 1957. See The Haberler Report, note 89 above. 
92 Part IV was prepared by a Committee on the Legal and Institutional Framework of GATT in Relation to 
Less-Developed Countries, and was adopted as an amendment to the GATT articles for the cps who had 
accepted it and signed up to a `Declaration De Facto Implementation', Jackson, note 4 above, p. 646. 
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in the amendment of the basic principle of reciprocity and introduced the concept of non- 
reciprocity into. the GATT system. As a result, ICs would no longer expect reciprocity 
for commitments they made in trade negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and other 
barriers to the trade of less d ýl ped CPs. 93 -ý 
There was controversy relating to the nature and legal effects of Part IV. The prevailing 
view in the western countries was that it did not create any new legal obligation 94 but 
simply put an economic . and political agenda 
for future negotiations in legal 
terminology. 95 On the other. hand, the Development School " advocated a functional 
approach recognising that the provisions of Part IV did not create a fully developed legal 
obligation, but it did formally recognise inadequacies of reciprocity and a need for 
providing concessions to DCs on a non-reciprocal basis. 96 Consequently, it corrected the 
false assumption of equal bargaining powers among the CPs on which the original 
provisions of GATT were established, and recorded ICs' commitments to give 
concessions to DCs on a non-reciprocal basis. 
During the era of "new protectionism" in the 1970s, 97 reciprocity was given a new 
interpretation of ensuring equal market access among trading countries, which was 
93 Article XXXVI: 8 of GATT states that: 
"The developed contracting parties do not expect reciprocity for 
commitments made by them in trade negotiations to reduce or 
remove tariffs and other barriers to the trade of less-developed 
contracting parties. " 
94 Jackson, 1969, note 4 above, pp. 646-647. 
95 Takase, T., `The Role of Concessions in the GATT Trading System and Their Implications for 
Developing Countries', JWTL, 1987, pp. 67-89. 
96Hudec, 1987, note 82 above. 
97 See discussion in Chapters 2.2 and 2.3. 
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consistent with the US domestic trade legislation. It puts emphasis on the equivalent 
market access of a specific sector 
98 as the benchmark to evaluate the extent of success in 
trade liberalisation. The US defined it to mean that its trading partners should accord 
equal market access to American exports as what the US had accorded to the imports of 
its trading partners in the US. 
This revised application of reciprocity. is synonymous with the concept of fair trade. This 
concept of fair trade ' is .' different 
from its counterpart contained in the safeguard 
provisions of the General Agreement. 99 According to the General Agreement, when 
imports are considered to be fair trade practices but are deemed to have harmed a 
importing country's economy, or domestic competing industries, and caused burdens of 
Went ro country could impose border-import restraints as a temporary 
when imports. 1j When unfair trade practices such as dumping or subsidies are 
the is ýsue, _anJmp6rting country 
is allowed to take import restraining actions if such 
practices cause domestic industries temporary difficulty in adjusting to fair competition 
and are being injured by a sudden surge in imports at artificially low or subsidised price. 
The traditional GATT system tried to distinguish between the rules dealing with fair and 
unfair trade policies by requiring a higher standard of harm to domestic competing 
98 Sector harmonisation was introduced in the US Trade Act of 1974. See the Trade Act of 1974, Title I, 
§104,88 Stat. 1985,19 USCA §2114 (1980 and Supp. 1988). With the perceived weakening of the 
competitiveness of the US, suffering from what Bhagwati describes as Diminishing Giant Syndrome, the 
US again switched the emphasis of its trade policy from the balance of rights and obligations to the notion 
of reciprocity that leads to equal levels of market access. See Bhagwati, J., `The Demands to Reduce 
Domestic Diversity Among Trading nations', in Bhagwati and Hudec (eds. ), Fair Trade and 
Harmonisation, vol. 1, Ch. 9, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1996 and Bhagwati, J., Protectionism, 
Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1988, pp. 35-36. % 
99 They relate to Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duties (Article VI) and Subsidies (Article XVI). 
100 Jackson, 1992, note 51 above, p. 149-152. 
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industries and a more stringent requirement of causal effect between imports and the 
resultant harm. 
When applying the new concept of fair trade in the context of IPP, any attempt by foreign 
sellers to evade legitimate IPP regulations in the importing country could be regarded by 
the US as unfair trade practices which justified the imposition of import restraining 
actions by the importing country. 101 The perception of unfairness derives from 
differences in domestic legal systems, and could lead to political pressures from. 
importing countries to change their systems. 102 What constitutes fair trade, from the US' 
perspective, is for its trading partners to accord American exports substantially equivalent 
treatments as what the US gives to imports. These exporting countries have to consider 
harmonising their domestic IP legislation to mirror those of the US 103 if they wish to 
maintain market access to the vast US market. 
The harmonisation of IPP in the TRIPS MTNs would be the equivalence of introducing 
substantive reciprocity into an international agreement on IPP for the first time. It 
highlights a different interface between NT and Reciprocity from the existing IP 
Conventions. Any reciprocity built into the Convention derives from those minimum 
standards contained within the agreement, 104 which serve as the basis of NT. 105 But 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid., p. 152. 
103 Hay, Keith and B Andrei Sulzenko, `U. S. Trade Policy and `Reciprocity", JWTL, 1982, p. 472-476. 
104 Bodenhausen's view serves as the basis for the present discussion here. See discussion in Chapter 2.5. 
105 What is prohibited by NT under the Convention is for members to take unilateral measures of 
substantive reciprocity. See Kunz-Hallstein, Hand Peter, `The United States Proposal for a GATT 
Agreement on Intellectual Property and the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property', 
VandJTL, 22(2), 1989, p. 87, Reichman, J. H., `Intellectual Property in International Trade: Opportunities 
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when NT is to be applied under the premise of harmonised national IP system, it would 
then work within the context of substantive reciprocity. Only by moving forward from a 
NT based on the standard of protection of individual countries to the one that required 
substantive reciprocity by harmonising domestic IPP on a level found in most of the 
advanced countries, 106 could ICs be successful in their pursuit of an effective and 
adequate IP protection in the Uruguay Round. 
3.4 GATT provisions relating to intellectual property protection 
Although IPP was present in- the Havana Charter, 107 the General Agreement did not 
incorporate any substantive standards with respect to IPP. 108 It dealt with IPP in a 
permissive manner 109 allowing CPs to adopt EP-related measures or legislation, provided 
that such measures were not inconsistent with GATT. 110 Primo Braga interprets this 
permissive approach as the result of a lack of concern for IP in trade in 1940s. 111 
Another plausible explanation put forward by Reichmen is that the drafters of GATT 
decided to place the traditional institutions of the world's IP system beyond GATT in 
order to avoid potential conflict or overlap between GATT and the international unions 
and Risks of a GATT Connection', VandJTL, 22(4), 1989, p. 779, and Dhanjee and de Chazoumes, note 
70 above, p. 9. 
1°6 Ullrich, Hanns, `TRIPS: Adequate Protection, Inadequate Trade, Adequate Competition Policy', Pacific 
Rim Law & Policy Journal, 4(1), 1995, pp. 172 and 184. 
107The Havana Charter drafted for the defunct ITO had an entire chapter V devoted to Restrictive Business 
Practices which included provisions relating to rights under patents, trademarks, and copyrights. Hartridge, 
David and Arvind Subramanian, `Intellectual Property Rights: The Issues in GATT', VandJTL, 16(6), 
1982 and Reichman, 1989, note 105 above. 
108 Prima Braga, Carlos Alberto, `Guidance from Economic Theory', in Siebeck, Evenson, Lesser and 
Primo Braga (eds. ), Strengthening Protection of Intellectual Property in Developing Countries -A Suurvey 
of the Literature, Part VII, World Bank Discussion Papers #112, Washington, D. C.: The World Bank, 
1990a. 
109 Cottier, note 57 above. 
110 Dhanjee and de Chazournes, note 70 above, p. 6. 
.. 
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already regulating IP. 112 Yusuf believes that the rapid technological changes and the 
competitive importance of technology to international trade means that trade distorting 
effects are more likely to arise from the application and enforcement of domestic IP 
legislation these days, so that a multilateral agreement on trade-related IP provisions thus 
becomes more important. 
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In contrast to the permissive approach adopted by the Convention, GATT embraces a 
comparatively more prescriptive approach stipulating relatively clearly the rules and 
principles CPs have to abide by. lla But the language of GATT is broad enough to be 
capable of covering new subjects such asIPP. 115 Two categories of GATT provisions 
have been identified by the GATT Secretariat as relevant to IPP. The first category 
contains four articles with specific reference to IPP: Articles XX(d), IX, XII: 3(c )(iii), 
and XVIII: 10,116 and the second category encompassing the consultation provision 
(Article XXII) and the dispute settlement provision in Article XXIII: 117 
111 Primo Braga, 1990a, note 108 above. 
112 Reichmen, 1989, no53 105 above, p. 833. He also pointed out that in the 1940s, the ICs involved in the 
drafting of the GATT were all parties to the Paris Convention, and except the US, all signatories to the 
Berne Convention. 
13 Yusuf, Abdulqawi A., `Developing Countries and Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights', in UNCTAD, Uruguay Round: Papers on Selected Issues, NY: UN, 1989, p. 197. 
"4 Dhanjee and de Chazournes, note 70 above, p. 6. 
115 See Jackson, 1992, note 51 above, p. 136. Hartridge and Subramanian observe that MFN under Article I 
should be capable of covering relevant actions of government in the area of IPP (see Hartridge and 
Subramanian, note 107 above, p. 899). And Abbott gives the example of private petitions under Section 
301 legislation in the US to demonstrate that NT under Article III is capable of conferring the same degree 
of IPP to both domestic and foreign nationals as the majority of petitions involved alleged violation of the 
General Agreement, and most of the NTBs reported in the area of IP were discriminatory in the NT sense. 
Abbott, Kenneth W., `Defensive Unfairness: The Normative Structure of Section 301' in Bhagwati and 
Hudec (eds. ), Fair Trade and Harmonisation - Prerequisites for Free Trade? Vol. 2: Legal Analysis, 
Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996, pp. 420-422. 
116 GATT, MTN. GNG. NG11/W/6,22 May 1987, on GATT Provisions bearing on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights - Note by the Secretariat (hereinafter GATT Note on Provisions). 117 Ibid. 
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Article XX(d) is a general exception provision which allows actions to be taken to secure 
compliance with patent, trademark, and copyright laws, which would otherwise be 
inconsistent with the provisions of GATT. The provisions of Article XX(d) reads as 
follows: 
"Subject to the requirement that such meaasures are 'not applied in a 
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or 
a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this agreement 
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any 
contracting party of measures: 
Zeessary 
to secure compliance with laws or regulation which are 
not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, including those 
relating to... the protection of patents, trade marks and copyrights, and 
the prevention of deceptive practices. " 
According to Article XX(d), three conditions have to be met in order for the exceptional 
measures to be justified under the GATT: Firstly, the measures relating to IPP must not 
be inconsistent with the provisions of the General Agreement. Secondly, the measures 
taken to secure compliance with laws and regulations relating to IPP must be 
"necessary". Thirdly, the measures must not be applied in such a manner so to constitute 
a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail or become a disguised restriction on international trade. Article XX(d) 
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does not oblige CPs to adopt any enforcement measures. 118 It only ensures that GATT 
obligations do not stand in the way of effective enforcement of domestic IP legislation. 119 
Article IX is entitled "Marks of Origin". Its first five paragraphs are to ensure that 
marking requirements and marks of origin are not used in such a way so as to hamper 
unnecessarily international trade or discriminate between CPs: 
Each contracting party shall accord to the products of the territories of 
other contracting parties treatment: with regard .. to marking 
requirements no less favourable than the treatment accorded to like 
products of any third country. 
The contracting parties recognise that, in adopting and enforcing laws 
and regulations relating to marks of origin, the difficulties and 
inconveniences which such measures may cause to the commerce 
and industry of exporting countries should be reduced to a 
minimum, due regard being had to the necessity of protecting 
consumers against fraudulent or misleading indications. 
Whenever it. is administratively practicable to do so, contracting parties 
should permit required marks of origin to be affixed at the time of 
importation. 
The laws and regulations of contracting parties relating to the marking 
of imported products shall be such as to permit compliance without 
118 Jackson, 1969, note 4 above, p. 743. 
119 Hartridge and Subramanian, note 107 above, p. 900. 
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seriously damaging the products, or materially reducing their 
value, or unreasonably increasing their costs. 
As a general rule, no special duty or penalty should be imposed by any 
contracting party for failure to comply without marking 
requirement prior to importation unless corrective marking is 
unreasonably delayed or deceptive marks have been affixed or the 
required marking has been intentionally omitted. 
Article IX: 6 is essentially. concerned . with the protection of geographical indications. It 
requires CPs to co-operate-to prevent the use of trade names "in such a manner as to 
misrepresent the true origin of a product, to the detriment of such distinctive regional or 
geographical names of products of the territory of a contracting party as are protected by 
its legislation... " This is the only GATT provisions that obliges o take actions 
against the deceptive use of names of products if so required. 120 
Articles XII: 3(c)(iii) and XVIII: 10 both require import restrictions aimed at 
safeguarding the balance of payments not to be applied in such a manner so as to 
"prevent compliance with patent, trademark, copyright, or similar procedures. " 
The other type of provisions in the General Agreement that could be invoked in IPP 
matters are the principle of non-discrimination which encompasses MFN (Article I) and 
t. 
120 Yusuf, 1989, note 113 above, p. 196. 
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NT (Article III), an the two relevant procedural provisions, the consultation provision 
(Article XXII) and the consultation provision (Article XXII). 121 
The consultation provision in Article XXII requires CPs to afford adequate opportunity 
for consultation with respect to any matter affecting the operation of the General 
Agreement. This provision could be interpreted to cover, matters related to IPP which 
affect the operation of the General Agreement. 
The nullification or impairment provision contained in Article XXIII: 1 states that: 
"1. If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to 
it directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or 
impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the Agreement is 
being impeded as the result of 
(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations 
under this Agreement, or 
(b) the application by another contracting party of any measure, whether . 
or not it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement, or 
(c) the existence of any other situation, .... " 
According to Article XXIII: 1, there are three circumstances under which claims of 
nullification or impairment could be brought. The vast majority of cases involve Article 
121 GATT Note on Provisions, note 116 above. 
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=II: 1(a). 122 When a member state adopts measures that have de facto, if not de jure 
discrimination against foreign products, and the relevant government measures are 
inconsistent with GATT, a violation complaint under Article XXIII: 1(a) could be filed by 
the representative government of foreign products. 123 If the relevant government 
measures are not inconsistent with GATT, but nullify or impair "reasonable expectations" 
at the time trade concessions were considered, : 
124. a non-violation complaint under Article 
XXIII: 1(b) could be filed. And Article XXIII: -I(c). is similar. to the frustration clause 
often seen in contracts, it deals with "situation complaints", which CPs have never based 
any ruling or recommendation on. 
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There is no definition of the concept of "nullification or impairment" in the General 
Agreement nor in subsequent GATT practices. 126 In the case of . 'a violation complaint, 
the concept of nullification or impairment was introduced to protect contracting parties 
from the failure of other parties to carry out their obligations under the General 
Agreement. 127 The proof of a violation is in itself sufficient to prove a prima facie 
122 See the analysis of past GATT panel reports in Hudec, 1993, note 58 above, pp. 375-383. 
123 Violation complaints often involve the violation of Articles III (national treatment), XVII (rules on state 
trading enterprises), and XI (quantitative restrictions) of GATT 1994. Article XI refers to quantitative 
restrictions exercised by business entities but enforced by government to restrict market access. Under 
XVII, member states are obliged to ensure that state trading enterprises covered by the provision do not act 
in a manner inconsistent with the general principles of non-discrimination. See discussion in Hoekman, 
Bernard M. and Petros C. Mavroidis, `Competition, Competition Policy and the GATT', The World 
Competition, 1994, p. 129. 
124 GATT, MTN. GNG/NGI3/W/31,14 July 1989, Non-Violation Complaints Under GATT Article 
XXIII: 2 - Note by the Secretariat (hereinafter Note on Non-Violation Complaints) and Jackson, 1969, note 
4 above, pp. 178-187. 
iu Ibid., p. 30. 
126 The legal uncertainty caused has been criticised as reducing the legal predictability of GATT dispute 
settlement proceedings. 
127 Jackson, John H., William Davey and Alan 0. Sykes Jr., LegaL Problems of International Economic 
Relations - Cases, Material and Text on the National and International Regulation of Transnational 
Economic Relations, 3`d ed., St Paul: West Publishing Co., 1995 (hereinafter Jackson et al), ch. 7 in general, 
and specifically p. 350. 
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case. 128 The impact of a measure inconsistent with GATT is not relevant for a 
determination of nullification or impairment. 129 
In the case of non-violation complaints, the objective is to protect the balance of 
reciprocal exchanges of tariff concessions. 130 According to past panel reports, there is an 
assumption of prima facie nullification or impairment of benefits when competitive 
benefits deriving from tariff concessions were upset as a result of subsequent unexpected 
government measures. 131 And the proof of cause-and-effect trade damage was not-:. 
required in the case of non-violation complaints. 132 
On the question of the applicability of non-violation complaints to disputes involving 
IPP, various commentators have expressed different opinions. Petersmann argues that 
Article XXXIII: 1(b) is to protect the balance of reciprocal tariff concessions and 
competitive opportunities from being impaired by unforeseen measures that do not 
128 And the initial burden of proof is on complaining party. See GATT, BISD 34`' Supp., 136, (1988), 
United States - Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances. This case involves the US's 
Superfund Act dealing with the cleanup of hazardous waste sites. The legislation imposes a tax of 8.2 cents 
per barrel on domestically refined crude oil and 11.7 cents on imported petroleum products. The US 
argued that the tax indeed violates national treatment obligations under Article 111: 2. But the tax 
differential is so small that its trade effects were minimal, that it did not nullify or impair benefits accuring 
to Canada, the EEC and Mexico. 
'29 Ibid. 
130 GATT, BISD 37th Supp., 228,261, (1990). There were thirteen cases of non-violation complaints out of 
130. Only one panel report did not base its non-violation finding on Schedule of Concessions (Article II). 
131 Hudec, 1993, note 58 above, pp. 268-269 and Hoekman and Kostecki, note 20 above, p. 46, where the 
three conditions required to bring a non-violation complaints are set out: firstly, the measure must be 
applied by a government; secondly, it must alter the competitive conditions established by the agreed tariff 
bindings; and thirdly, the measure must be unexpected in that it could not have been reasonably foreseen at 
the time the concessions were negotiated. t 132 Ibid. Hudec, in support of the decision, commented that it is difficult to prove that a particular trade 
measure had any cause-and-effect impact on trade, that one can identify the trade measure and gather the 
trade data, but there is no way to link the two in a logically valid manner. 
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violate GATT provisions. 133 But an agreement containing substantive standard of IPP 
does not provide for reciprocal tariff bindings, nor guarantee market access for IP- 
protected goods. It is more likely that disputes will arise from the direct breach or bad- 
faith implementation of treaty provisions. 134 
Jackson opines that an IP agreement which contains substantive rules and standards 
should not need to allow non-violation claims, and that problems of protecting legitimate 
expectations should be resolved through the application of legal principles. 135 But Lee 
and von Lewinski argue that the non-violation provision should remain available to deal . 
with cases such as when a national regime requiring an excessively high level of 
inventive step as a criterion for patentability which, in the absence of bad faith, could be 
subject to a non-violation complaint. 136 
133 Petersmann, Ernest-Ullrich, `The Dispute Settlement System of the World Trade Organisation and the 
Evolution of the GATT Dispute Settlement System since 1948'. CMLR, 31,1994, pp. 1230-1233. 
Pescatore comments that a legal judgement is to decide who is right and who is wrong. The consideration 
of maintaining a balance between the rights and obligations of members is criticised by him as contributed 
to the incoherent legal patchwork of GATT dispute settlement system, see Pescatore, Piere, `The GATT 
Dispute Settlement Mechanism', JWT, 27(1), 1993, pp. 13 and 18. 
134 Petersmann, 1994, note 133 above, pp. 1232-1233. 
135 Jackson et al, note 127 above, ch. 7. See also discussion in Lee, Karen and Silke von Lewinski, `The 
settlement of International Disputes in the Field of Intellectual Prpperty', in Beier and Schricker (eds. ), 
From GATT to TRIPS, IIC Studies in Industrial Property and Copyright Law, Munich: Max Planck Institute 
for Foreign and International Patent, Copyright and Competition Law, 1996, pp. 278-328. 
136 Lee and von Lewinski, note 135 above, p. 313. 
136 
Chapter IV 
Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticals under the TRIPS Agreement 
This chapter begins by setting out the negotiation history of the TRIPS Agreement to 
illustrate the interface of political, legal, and economic dimensions of MTNs and how it 
has influenced the result of the Agreement. - The substantive provisions of the TRIPS 
Agreement are then discussed, with particular reference to the patent system for 
pharmaceuticals. 
4.1 Introduction 
The TRIPS Agreement was completed as part of the Uruguay Round MTNs in April 
1994.1 Its completion was held as a significant achievement for the global trading 
system in light of the North-South dimensions of the subject. 2 
NT, unconditional MFN and reciprocity form the backbone of the TRIPS Agreement. 
And the Agreement contains a set of minimum IPP standards, domestic enforcement 
procedures, and the inter-governmental dispute settlement mechanism. The set of 
minimum IPP standards are at a level which approximates to what could be found in the 
major western countries at the time of the Uruguay Round MTNs. 3 The TRIPS 
Agreement continues on with the tradition of the Convention leaving the implementation 
1 GATT, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiation, 15 
April 1994 (hereinafter the Final Act). 
2 See discussion in Chapters I and II. Also Hoekman Bernard M. and Michael M. Kostecki, The Political 
Economy of the World Trading System - From GATT to WTO, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, p.. 
151 and Zutshi, B. K., `Bringing TRIPS into the Multilateral Trading System', in Bhagwati and Hirsch 
(eds. ), The Uruguay Round and Beyond, Heidelberg: Springer, 1998, p. 40. 
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of the Agreement to the discretion of national governments, 4 and does not propose to 
achieve the harmonisation of domestic intellectual property legislation among WTO 
members. 5 
According to a 1996 UNCTAD report: 6 the strengthening of IP regime is expected to 
engender a greater degree of uncertaintyto DCs depending upon their economic policy: 
and the stage of development they are in. The positive impacts are likely to be more local 
innovation and inward FDI and technology transfer, 7 but these benefits will only incur if 
DCs co-ordinate IPP with a broader modernisation programmes for technology 
development. The negative impacts could include higher prices for protected products 
and technologies, and restricted abilities to achieve diffusion through imitation or 
copying. 
The negotiation history of the TRIPS Agreement has seen the working of the power- 
oriented approach in the global trading system. It was illustrated by the initiative and 
insistence of major trading nations on the inclusion of IPP as a subject for the Uruguay 
3 WTO, Press/57, October 9,1996, p. 49. 
4 Article 1.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
S But UNCTAD 1994 report regards TRIPS as providing a harmonised legal protection system. It could be 
argued that the element of harmonisation goes so far as to bind all WTO members of the provisions 
contained in TRIPS. See UNCTAD, The Outcome of the Uruguay Round. An Initial Assessment - 
Supporting Papers to the Trade and Development Report, NY: UN, 1994 (hereinafter UNCTAD 1994 
Report), pp. 185-190. 
6 UN, The TRIPS Agreement and Developing Countries - Prepared by the UNCTAD Secretariat, NY: UN, 
1996, pp. I and 18. 
7 UNCTAD 1994 Report, note 5 above. The UNCTAD report further points out that the effect of 
strengthened IPP on the decision of technology transfer is dependent on its interrelation with other factors 
such as the size of the domestic market, local infrastructure, and the degree of stability of the 
macroeconomic environment, etc. 
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Round MTNs, 8 and the similarity between proposals submitted by ICs and the final 
agreement. 9 During the Uruguay Round MTNs, countries such as India sought to 
exclude pharmaceutical products from patent protection to avoid the impact of predicted 
price rises and to ensure the accessibility and affordability of advance medicines. 10 But 
it was the insistence of some ICs to cover pharmaceuticals in TRIPS MTNs, coupled with 
the change of attitude from some DCs to accept the subject which carried the day. 11 
The Uruguay Round MTNs also saw. the dissolution of DCs acting as a group with an 
unified negotiation stance, 12 with many DCs co-operg ith ICs on issues important to 
11 
their own domestic interests. 13 It demonstrated that common grounds could be found 
among DCs and ICs in the process of MTNs even on controversial issues. With a shift in 
many DCs' attitudes towards favouring inward FDI in the 1980s, 14 they came to realise 
8 Srinivasan, T. N., Developing Countries and the Multilateral Trading System - From the GATT to the 
Uruguay Round and the Future, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998, p. 34 
m d. And Zutshi, note 2 above, p. 44. 
lo 
The 
pharmaceutical industry was of particular concern to DCs in respect of higher drug prices and more 
strict terms of access to technology following the introduction of patent protection. See UNCTAD 1996 
Report, pp. 18-19. See also the statement made by Dr. Subramanian Swamy of India in GATT, 
MTN. GNG/MIN(90)/ST/46,4 December 1990, the statement made by India in US v India Appellate Body 
Report and Zutshi, note 2 above, p. 43. 
11 The inclusion of pharmaceuticals in the TRIPS negotiation was considered non-negotiable for many ICs 
such as the US, the European Economic Community, and Switzerland. Cottier, Thomas, `The Prospects 
for Intellectual Property in GATT', CMLR, 28,1991, p. 406. 
12 Cottier comments that TRIPS MTNs could not be generalised in a simplified manner as constituting a 
north-south divide. Domestic political resistance to changes was foreseeable in many ICs because 
legislative changes are required as the result of an IPP agreement. See Ibid, p. 389 and Zutshi, note 2 
above, p. 49. 
13 Cottier, note I1 above, pp. 390 and 391. 
14 Haggard describes the situation in a nutshell: During the borrowing boom of the 1970s, the middle 
income DCs could depend on easy access to external financing through the Eurocurrency markets. With 
the evaporation of international commercial lending after debt crisis and severe balance-of-payments 
constraints, governments became more sensitive toward the interests of foreign investors with the aim to 
attract foreign investment. Efforts to attract foreign investment spilled over into the deep integration in 
ways such as bringing domestic IPP legislation into conformity with international standard. See Haggard, 
Stephan, Developing Nations and the Politics of Global Integration, Washington D. C.: The Brookings 
Institution, 1995, p. 19. Also Hoekman, Bernard, `Services and Ihtellectual Property Rights', in Collins 
and Bosworth (eds. ), The New GATT - Implications for the United States, Washington D. C.: The 
Brookings Institution; 1994, p. 106. 
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that the introduction of adequate IPP standards was necessary to compete successfully for 
foreign investment in a world economy, 15 especially if they wish to attract FDI in high- 
tech industries. 16 On the home front, strengthened IPP would also likely to encourage 
domestic research in the process of building up knowledge capital essential for economic 
development. 17 Furthermore, major DCs such as India had also come to accept that it 
was in their. own interest to provide IPP. They are not just users of foreign technology 
but also producers of IP in areas such as software 18 and pharmaceuticals, . 
i9. and their 
innovators would benefit from strengthened IPP when competing in export markets. 
20 
By bringing IPP issues into the global trading system, DCs believe that the. WTO's one 
member one vote majority decision making in the absence of a consensus 
21 has a better 
prospect of keeping powerful trading nations in check. 
22 A multilateral trading system 
underpinned by NT, unconditional MFN and reciprocity is necessary, given the political 
influence of domestic industry lobby in many ICs 23 and the continuing threat of 
15 Mansfield, Intellectual Property Protection, Foreign Direct Investment, and Technology Transfer, 
International Financial Corporation, Discussion Paper 919, Washington D. C.: The World Bank, 1994. The 
set of minimum IPP standards will be regarded as the common denominator when MNCs evaluate their 
choice of location for foreign investment. 
16 Hoekman, note 14 above. 
17 Srinivasan, note 8 above, p. 52. 
18 Bhagwati, Jagdish, comment given to Hoekman's article `Services and Intellectual Property Rights', in 
Collins and Bosworth (eds. ), The New GA7T - Implication for the United States, Washington D. C.: The 
Brookings Institution, 1994 (hereinafter Bhagwati Comment), p. 114. The growth of the Indian software 
industry since the late 1980s has been a remarkable success, and has emerged as a leading offshore 
software development centre in the fast-growing global information technology market. And in the wake 
of the success came the demand from the industry for IPP. See discussion in FT, FT Survey - South Asian 
Software and Services, June 2,1999, p. I and FT, October 25,1999, p. 22. 
19 FT, Life Sciences 4 -Asia, July 15,1999, p. N and FT, August 30,1999, p. 8. 20 Jackson, John, comment given to Hoekman's article `Services and Intellectual Property Rights', in 
Collins and Bosworth (eds. ), The New GATT- Implication for the United States, Washington D. C.: The 
Brookings Institution, 1994 (hereinafter Jackson Comment), p. 118. 
21 Article IX of the Agreement Establishing WTO. 
22 In contrast to the dominance of ICs in the World Bank and IMF because of the weighted voting system. 
See discussion in Srinivasan, note 8 above, p. 34. 
23 Bhagwati Comment, note 18 above, p. 113. 
140 
unilateral and bilateral actions. By bringing inter-governmental disputes into a rule-based 
multilateral regime where unilateral actions are outlawed, 24 there is a better chance of 
keeping unilateralism at bay. 25 
The TRIPS Agreement, along with all other multilateral agreements concluded in the 
Uruguay Round, forms an integral package that all WTO members have to adhere to. 26 
And the WTO provides the common institutional framework for the conduct of trade 
relations among WTO members in matters relating to these agreements. 27 This Single 
Undertaking approach makes trade-off between negotiated subjects possible and paves . 
the way for engaging in reciprocal exchange of concessions. 28 It also, facilitates the 
application of cross-sectoral retaliation under the dispute settlement mechanism 29 when 
. the offending party to a 
dispute fails to implement rulings-or recommendation contained 
in panel or Appellate Body Reports. 30 
Specific provisions on patent protection for pharmaceuticals have been provided in the 
TRIPS Agreement. Under the TRIPS regime, both product and process are subject to 
IPP, the term of protection is for the minimum of twenty years from the date of filing, 
and the burden of proof for process patent has been reversed. If DCs and. LDCs take 
advantage of transitional arrangements available to them under TRIPS, they are obliged 
24 Article 23 of The Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing Settlement of Disputes, Annex 2 to 
the Agreement Establishing the WTO. 
25 j Haggard, note 14 above, p. 111. 
26 Article 2.2 of the Agreement Establishing WTO. 
27 Article 2.1 of the Agreement Establishing WTO. 
28 Hoekman and Kostecki, note 2 above, p. 241, and Hartridge, David and Arvind Subramanian, 
`Intellectual Property Rights: The Issues in GATT', VandJTL, 22(4), 1989, p. 898. 
29 See discussion in Chapter 4.3. - 
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to implement the pipeline provision to allow patent applications filed after TRIPS comes 
into operation to retain their novelty and priority of filing for patent consideration when 
domestic patent systems come into operation. They are also under legal obligation to 
confer a five-year marketing exclusivity a product which has been granted patent 
protection and marketing approval in another WTO member country during the period of 
dispensation. 
During the Uruguay Round MTNs,. ICs strived for a broad and comprehensive 
multilateral agreement on the protection of IPRs, while DCs) sought latitude in the 
implementation of the agreement so as to maintain the consistency with their economic 
development goals and their legal obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. The result is 
an agreement which provides a legal framework of substantive norms, enforcement and 
dispute settlement mechanisms of ICs' standard, and the enunciation of broad principles 
and non-specific rules and guidelines capable of broad interpretation. For the 
pharmaceutical industry, the full impact of the TRIPS Agreement will not be seen until 
2003-2005 if the development time for new drugs remains averaging 8-10 years. 31 But 
as WTO members have competency to determine the appropriate methods of 
implementing TRIPS domestically, it has already given rise to uncertainty the degree of 
stringency in their implementation of the Agreement and the effect on IP right holders. 
11 
f 
30 Petersmann, Ernest-Ullrich, `The Dispute Settlement System of the World Trade Organisation and the 
Evolution of the GATT Dispute Settlement System since 1948', CMLR, 31,1994, p. 1161. 
31 Redwood, Heinz, New Horizons in India, Suffolk: Oldwicks Press, 1994, p. 52. 
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4.2 The negotiation history of the TRIPS Agreement 
The Punta del Este Ministerial Declaration formally opened the Uruguay Round in 
September 1986. The Ministers agreed to conclude the round within four years. 32 
TRIPS was one of the subjects for MTNs under Trade in Goods 33 mandated in the first 
part of the Punta del Este Declaration. 
34 The Ministers stated the negotiation mandate 
for TRIPS as follows: 
--d 
"In order to reduce the distortions and impediments to international trade, 
and taking into account the need to promote effective and 'adequate 
protection of intellectual property rights, and to ensure that measures and 
procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves 
become barriers to legitimate trade, the negotiations shall aim to clarify 
GATT provisions and elaborate as appropriate new rules and disciplines. 
Negotiations shall aim to develop a multilateral framework of principles, 
32 At the institutional level, the Trade Negotiations Committee was set up to oversee the entire round of 
negotiations which was divided into MTNs on Trade in Goods and trade in Services. The chairman of the 
Committee was Arthur Dunkel, Director-General of GATT at that time. See GATT, MIN. DEC, 20 
September 1986 for The Punta del Este Declaration. 
33 The subjects covered are: Tariffs, Non-Tariff Measures, Natural Resource-Based Products, Textiles and 
Clothing, Agriculture, Tropical Products, GATT Articles, MTN Agreements and Arrangements, 
Safeguards, Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, TRIPS, Trade-Related Investment Measures, Dispute 
Settlement, Functioning of the GATT System. 
34 The Punta del Este Declaration, note 32 above. A Group of Negotiations on Goods was established to 
carry out the programme of negotiations contained in Part I for Negotiations on Trade in Goods. It reports 
directly to the Trade Negotiations Committee. Part II of the Declaration deals with Negotiations on Trade 
in Services. A Group of Negotiations on Services was set up and reports to the Trade Negotiations 
Committee as well. MTNs on services were conducted outside GATT separated from MTNs on goods. 
This is described as the twin track approach to gain support from DCs for the inclusion of services on the 
agenda of the Uruguay Round. 
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rules and disciplines dealing with international trade in counterfeit goods, 
taking into account work already undertaken in GATT. 
These negotiations shall be without prejudice to other complementary 
initiatives that may be taken in the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation and elsewhere to. deal with these matters. " . 
This negotiation mandate was seen as a political compromise between DCs' opposition 
and US' insistence to include IPP on the negotiation agenda.. 35 There were different . 
opinions as to what the negotiating objectives for the TRIPS are based on the reading of 
the negotiation mandate. DCs held the view that norms and standards per se were not 
trade related, therefore they were not covered by the mandate. 36 Raghavan agrees with 
the DCs' interpretation and suggests that the three indents should be read separately: the 
first indent is to ensure that the enforcement of GATT Articles relating to IPRs does not 
hamper or retard international trade, the second indent is to develop a multilateral 
framework to deal with international trade in counterfeit goods, and the last indent is to 
ensure that the effort under the first and the second indents are complimentary to the 
initiatives taken by other world organisations. 37 But ICs interpreted the Declaration to 
cover the norms and standards of IPRs. And as Stewart states, the goal of the negotiation 
was a multilateral agreement on minimum levels of protection for intellectual property 
f 
35 Cottier, note 11 above, p. 387. 
36 Zutshi, note 2 above, p. 40.41 
37 Raghavan, hakravarthi, Recolonisation - GATT, the Uruguay Round & the Third World, London: Zed 
Books Ltd. And Third World Network in Malaysia, 1990, pp. 127-128. ''"" 
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rights. 38 These divergent views persisted during the early stage of TRIPS MTNs and led 
to very little progress made during the first phase of the TRIPS MTNs which commenced 
in 1987. 
During the initial phase of the TRIPS MTNs, many participating countries, such as the 
US, 39 Switzerland, 40 Japan, 41 the EC, 42 Nordic Countries, 43 Mexico, 44 and Brazil, 45 
submitted proposals on how to achieve the negotiation objective based on their 
understanding of the. negotiation mandate. With the aim to persuade countries to . 
negotiate a multilateral framework of substantive standards on IPP, the US 1987 proposal 
states that IPRs promote innovation and intellectual creativity, the protection and 
enforcement of which are essential to the expansion of international trade, investment, 
economic development and the diffusion of technology. It calls for, among others, the 
introduction of more stringent standards and norms of IPP, the provision of a basis for an 
effective enforcement mechanism, and an extension of international dispute settlement 
procedures to protect and enforce IPRs. 46 The Swiss proposal suggested a framework 
v 
38 Stewart, Terence P. (ed. ), The Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1992), vol. I& II, Deventer: 
Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993, p. 2265. 
39 Suggestion by the United States for Achieving the negotiating Objective, GATT, 
MTN. GNG/NG11/W/14,20 October 1987, (hereinafter US 1987 Proposal). 
40 Suggestion by Switzerland for Achieving the Negotiating Objective, GATT, MTN. GNG/NG11/W/25,29 
June 1988. 
at Suggestion by Japan for Achieving the Negotiating Objective, GATT, MTN. GNG/NGI 11W/17,23 
November 1987. 
42 Guidelines Proposed by the EC for the Negotiations o Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, GATT, MTN. GNG/NG111W/16,20 November 1987 and EC 1988 Guidelines, op. Cit.. 
43 Suggestion by the Nordic Countries for Achieving the negotiating Objective, GATT, 
MTN. GNG/NG 11/W/22,12 February 1988, (hereinafter Nordic Countries 1988). 
44 Statement Made by the Delegation of Mexico at the Meeting of 17,18, and 21 October 1988, GATT, 
MTN. GNG/NGI I/W/28,19 October 1988, (hereinafter Mexico 1988). 
as Submission from Brazil, GATT, MTN. GNG/NGI I/W/30,31 October 1988), (hereinafter Brazil 1988). 
46 The US also gave assurance that that measures of protection or enforcement would not become barriers 
to legitimate trade. And it called upon non-signatory government to join the agreement, as at this stage, the 
US advocated a code approach to an IP agreement by which only the signatories to the agreement would be 
bound. See US 1987 Proposal. The code-approach has been discussed in details in Chapter 2.4.2. 
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for a TRIPS agreement and mentioned the need to improve the enforcement of IPP. 
Japan's submission was similar to that of the US. While the EC suggested that the 
TRIPS Agreement should cover new subjects of intellectual property such as semi- 
conductor layouts along with patents, trademarks, industrial designs, geographical 
descriptions, designations of origin, new plant varieties, and copyright, and that the 
agreement should also incorporate GATT principles of NT and MFN. 
The Mexican submission cautioned that the negotiating objective regarding the 
improvement of intellectual property rights should not become a barrier to access 
technologies produced in developed countries. 47 The Brazilian proposal stated that the 
negotiations seemed to be on the side of the owners of IPRs. If DCs were to have a 
realistic and balanced analysis of the implications of IPP on their growth and 
development, it is fundamental to give due consideration to aspects relevant to the users 
of the IPRs. 48 The representative from Brazil further made the point that other proposals 
submitted did not establish the link between granting of IPR and the promotion of 
domestic technological development. 49 This missing link was significant to DCs 
because "the furtherance of the public interest was the fundamental goal pursued by 
governments when granting IPRs. " 50 
The failure to resolve the disagreement on the interpretation of TRIPS negotiation 
mandate meant that no agreement was reached in preparation for the Montreal Mid-Term 
47 Mexico 1988, note 44 above, p. 2. 
°$ Brazil 1988, note 45 above, p. 3. 
49 GATT, MTN. GNG/NG11/10,30 November 1988, p. 4. 
50 Ibid. 
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Review in December 1988.51 It was not until April 1989 when the Trade Negotiations 
Committee met again in Geneva that the disagreement was resolved, and a framework 
agreement for TRIPS MTNs was reached. 52 What remained unresolved was the question 
of whether GATT was the preferred forum for implementing a TRIPS agreement. 53 
The framework agreement for TRIPS sets out the` issues for subsequent MTNs: 54 
(a) the applicability of the basic principles of the GATT and of relevant 
international intellectual property agreements *orconventions; 
(b) the provision of adequate standards and principles concerning the 
availability, scope and use of trade-related intellectual property 
Tights; 
(c) the provision of effective and appropriate means for the enforcement 
of trade-related intellectual property rights, taking into account 
differences in national legal systems; 
(d) the provision of effective and expeditious procedures for theme 
multilateral prevention and settlement of disputes between 
governments, including the applicability of GATT procedures; 
(e) transitional arrangements aiming at the fullest. participation in the 
i 
st See GATT, MTN. TNC/7,9 December 1988 for the Trade Negotiations Committee Meeting at 
ministerial level in Montreal. There were no agreements reached for TRIPS, Agriculture, Textiles, and 
Safeguards in Montreal. Negotiation progress in Textiles and Safeguards was seen to be contingent on 
progress in TRIPS and Agriculture. But negotiations in Agriculture reached a deadlock because the US and 
the EEC refused to compromise their positions on agricultural subsidies. See Ford Foundation, op. Cit., p. 
107 for detailed discussion. 
52 GATT, MTN. TNC/11,21 April 1989, (hereinafter Mid-Term Meeting 1989). 
53 Zutshi, note 2 above. 
54 Mid-Term Meeting 1989, note 52 above, p. 21 and GATT, Focus - GATT Newsletter, May 1989, p. 8. 
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results of the negotiations. 55 
It was also agreed that considerations would be given to the underlying public policy 
objectives of national IP systems, such as developmental and technological objectives. 56 
In June 1991, a , "Chairman's 
Draft'' was distributed. 57 It identified the proposals 
submitted by ICs 58 and a group of fourteen DCs based on the framework agreement, 59 
and set out the substantive differences among them. - It later became a formal document 60 
and served as the basis of the agreement reached in TRIPS MTNs. 
By December 1990, most of the negotiation subjects had reached agreements, including 
TRIPS. But the Brussels Ministerial Meeting failed to complete the round of MTNs as 
scheduled because the US and the EC failed to reach an agreement on Agriculture. 61 
One year later, the Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of 
55 Ibid. 
56 mid. 
57 See GATT, MTN. GNG/NGI 1/W/76,23 July 1990. The document was prepared by then Negotiating 
Group Chairman Lars Anell from Sweden. 
58 It included the EEC (Draft Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, GATT, 
MTN. GNG/NG1 l/W/68,29 March 1990, the US (Draft Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights, GATT, MTN. GNG. NG11/W/70,11 May 1990, Switzerland (Deaft 
Amendment to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade on the Protection of Trade-Related Intellectual 
Property Rights, GATT, MTN. GNG. NG I I/W/73,14 May 1990, Japan (Main Elements of a Legal Text for 
TRIPS, GATT, MTN. GNG/NG11/W/74,15 May 1990. 
59 See GATT, MTN. GNG/NG11/W/71,14 May 1990. 
60 The July draft had been revised in October. The October draft retained most of the text from July draft 
with two additions. One is the sentence to make the provisions in the Agreement the minimum GATT, 
MTN. TNC/11,21 April 1989, requirements CPs have to abide by. It also added a new section on 
Exhaustion. It became a formal document known as the Chairman's Report to the Group of Negotiation 
on Goods. See GATT, Doc. 2341, October 1,1990, Status of Work in the Negotiating Group. Also 
Gervais, Daniel J., `The TRIPS Agreement', EIPR, 21(3), 1999, p, 157. 
61 Low, Patrick, Trading Free - The GA 1T and US Trade Policy, NY: The Twentieth Century Fund Press, 
1993, p. 229 and Srinivasan, note 8 above, p. 33. 
148 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations was tabled for approval. 62 It was only after the renewal 
of the US president's fast track procedure was approved by the Congress in June 1993 63 
and the new Director General of GATT taking office 64 in July of the same year that the 
negotiation momentum was regained. 65 With minor changes, the Dunkel Draft was 
66 finally agreed in December 1993 and adopted by Ministers in April 1994 in Marrakesh. 
After seven torturous years of negotiations, the Uruguay Round finally came to a 
successful e ýý 
4.3 Salient features of the TRIPS Agreement 
f ý. 
The TRIPS Agreement, which came into effect on 1 January 1995, is the most 
comprehensive multilateral agreement on IPP to date. It contains NT and unconditional 
MFN as its two basic principles, 67 substantive standards concerning the availability, 
scope and use of IPRs, 68 procedures for enforcement 69 and dispute prevention and 
ti 
settlement, 70 acquisition and maintenance of IPRs, 71 transitional arrangements, 72 and 
62 GATT, MTN. TNCIW/FA, 20 December 1991. The document was-commonly referred to as "the Dunkel 
Draft" because it was prepared by Arthur Dunkel, then Director-General of GATT. It included a new 
TRIPS text which contained an arbitrated resolution to issues undecided by the negotiation parties. The 
pharmaceutical industry was quite negative toward the Dunkel Draft for various reasons, the main one 
being the absence of pipeline protection, see Stewart (ed. ), note 38 above, pp. 2313 and 2282, note 267. 
63 The US president's fast-track authority expired in February 1993, and was renewed by the Congress on 
June 30,1993. 
64 Peter Sutherland took over as the new Director-General of GATT from Arthur Dunkel in July 1993. 
65 GATT, GATT-WTO News, GW/11,21 December, 1994, pp. 10-11. 
66 Ministers representing 124 governments and the EC participated in the Marrakesh Ministerial Meeting to 
mark the conclusion of the Uruguay Round MTNs, and the Final Act of the Uruguay Round was signed on 
15 April, 1994. 
67 General Provisions and Basic Principles, Articles I to 8 in Part I of the TRIPS Agreement. 
68 Standards Concerning the Availability, Scope and Use of Intellectual Property Rights, Articles 9 to 40 in 
Part II of the TRIPS Agreement. 
69 Articles 41 to 61 in Part III of the TRIPS Agreement. 
70 Articles 63 to 64 in Part V of the TRIPS Agreement. ` 
'1 Article 62 in Part IV of the TRIPS Agreement. 
72 Articles 65 to 67 in Part VI of the TRIPS Agreement. 
149 
institutional arrangements. 73 And it provides legal protection to Copyright and related 
rights, Trade marks, Geographical Indications, Industrial Designs, Patents, Lay-Out 
Designs of Integrated Circuits, and the Protection of Undisclosed Information. 74 
The WTO provides an institutional framework for the implementation, administration, 
and operation of the TRIPS Agreement. 75 It is also a negotiation forum for future MTNs 
on the TRIPS Agreement. 76 As Jackson points mout, the provision of an institutional 
framework is essential to provide a rule-based multilateral . mechanism to ensure the 
highest possible degree of adherence to the agreed rules and to resolve trade conflicts. 77 
The establishment of the WTO rectifies the constitutional limitations of GATT. 78 Much 
of the discussed inadequacy of the absence of a formal institutional framework under 
GATT was eradicated. 79 
In establishing the substantive norms of PP, the Agreement incorporates the main rules 
in the existing Conventions administered by WIPO, 80 and adds a substantial number of 
73 Articles 68 to 73 in Part VII of the TRIPS Agreement. 
74 In relation to other part of the TRIPS Agreement, Part I, III to VII are applicable to the seven IPRs 
covered in the Agreement. 
75 Article 111.1 of the Agreement Establishing the WTO. 
76 Article 111.2 of the Agreement Establishing the WTO. 
" Jackson, John H., `The Crumbling Institutions of the Liberal Trade System', JWTL, 12(2), 1978, p. 99. 
78 The Economist, Forty Years on from GATT, October 24,1987. 
79 See discussion in Long, Olivier, Law and its Limitations in the GATT Multilateral Trade System, 
Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987, ch. 4 and Jackson, John H., Restructuring the GATT System, 
London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1990, part VIII. 
80 The Doctrine of Incorporation was applied to promote the complimentarity and consistency between the 
work of GATT and WIPO. By doing so, it ensures that WIPO members who are also members of the 
WTO could subscribe to the TRIPS Agreement without being in breach of their legal obligations under the 
Conventions administered by WIPO. According to Article 19 of the Paris Convention, member states to the 
Convention could choose to enter into a "special agreement" if the provisions of the new agreement do not 
contravene with those contained in the Convention, and it contains further substantive obligations designed 
to improve the system of the Union. The existing Conventions whüch have been incorporated into the 
TRIPS Agreement include: the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property; as revised in 
Stockholm in 1967, (hereinafter Paris Convention); Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
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obligations on matters that the Conventions are silent or seen as being inadequate. It does 
not seek to achieve a global harmonisation of domestic EP law. 81 But by incorporating 
the minimum standards stipulated in the Agreement in their domestic legislation, WTO 
members are obliged to take positive actions to protect IP. 82 With the Council for TRIPS 
monitoring the compliance of the Agreement, 83 member states are free to determine the 
appropriate methods of implementation so long as their legal system and practices are 
consistent with the TRIPS Agreement. 84 
As IPRs are private rights, NT and unconditional MEN contained in the TRIPS 
Agreement confer the protection to legal and natural persons. 85 NT forbids 
discrimination between one's own nationals 86 and nationals of other member states so as 
to confer no less favourable treatment than that is accorded to its own nationals. 87 This 
definition is underpinned by the principle of reciprocity in that the rules and standards set 
Artistic Works (1971), (hereinafter Berne Convention); The International Convention for the Protection of 
Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisation (1961) (hereinafter Rome 
Convention); the Treaty on Intellectual Property in respect of Integrated Circuits (1989) (hereinafter IPIC 
Treaty). - $ý UNCTAD, The TRIPS Agreement and Developing Countries, NY; UN, 1996, p. 29. 
82 Other agreements reached in the Uruguay Round, namely GATT 1994 and GATS;. contain lists of 
practices members should not implement or rules which allow members to take defensive and 
compensatory actions when their trade interest is adversely affected, negative list of practices member 
states should not implement. See GATT, Trade Policies for a Better Future - The'Leutwiler Report@, 
The GATT and the Uruguay Round, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987 (hereinafter the 
Leutwiler Report), p. 77 and Hoekman, Bernard, `Services and Intellectual Property Rights', in Collins and 
Bosworth (eds. ), The New GATT- Implications for the United States, Washington, D. C.: The Brookings 
Institution, 1994, p. 100. 
83 Article 68 in Part VII of the TRIPS Agreement. 
84 Article 1.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
85 Article 1.3 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
86 "Nationals" refer to persons, natural or legal, who are domiciled or who have a real and effective 
industrial or commercial establishment in a separate customs territory Member of the WTO. See Footnote 
I of the TRIPS Agreement. % 
87 But subject to the exceptions provided in other international agreements which have been incorporated 
into the TRIPS Agreement. See Article 3 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
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out in the TRIPS Agreement serve as the minimum levels of protection under domestic 
laws. 
Unconditional MFN contained in Article 4 is a new addition to an international IP 
agreement. Under this principle, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted to 
any nationals should be accorded immediately and -unconditionally to nationals of other 
member countries. 88 By introducing unconditional MFN into the TRIPS Agreement, 
WTO members might be discouraged from making trade concessions bilaterally, and it 
could help to dispel fears of small countries being left out of bilateral agreements 
between major trading nations. 89 
In the area of Copyright and related rights, the TRIPS Agreement requires member states., 
to comply with the substantive provisions of Berne Convention except for the protection 
of moral rights. 90 It further confers copyrights on computer programs and treats them as 
literary works, 91 and provides authors and their successors in title exclusive rental rights 
to authorise or prohibit the commercial rental of their works to the public. 92 Title 
holders of sound recordings could also benefit from exclusive rental rights but only when 
".. such rental has led to widespread copying of such works which is materially impairing 
88 For the purpose of Articles 3 and 4, "protection" is to include matters affecting the availability, 
acquisition, scope, maintenance and enforcement of IPRs as well as other matters affecting the use of IPRs 
addressed in the TRIPS Agreement. See Footnote 3 in the TRIPS Agreement. 
89 Any benefit accrued from bilateral negotiations has to be made available to WTO member states under 
unconditional MFN obligation. Ullrich, Hanns, `TRIPS: Adequate Protection, Inadequate Trade, Adequate 
Competition Policy', Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, 4(1), 1995, p. 183. 
90 Article 9.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. Moral rights are the rights to claim authorship and to object to any 
derogative actions in relation to a work which would be prejudicial to the author's honour or reputation. It 
was conferred under Article 6b15 of the Berne Convention. 
91 Article 10.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
92 Article 11 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
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the exclusive right of reproduction conferred: on authors and their successors in title". 93 
Performers, producers of phonograms and broadcasting organisations are also protected 
for the term of at least fifty years for the former and two and twenty years for the latter. 94 
Trademarks are defined, for the first time in a multilateral treaty, to include "any sign, or 
any combination of signs, capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one 
undertaking from those of other undertakings". 95 The protection under the TRIPS 
Agreement covers both goods and services, 96 and the term of protection is for a 
minimum period of seven years with indefinite renewals if renewal conditions are met. 97 
Well-known marks of goods and services 98 are also protected even if they are not used in 
a country. 99 The knowledge of the trademark in the relevant sector of the public is to be 
taken into account when determining whether a particular trademark is well-known or 
not. 100 
The TRIPS Agreement is the first multilateral treaty to recognise geographical 
indications 101 as an g, 102 The Agreement requires WTO members to legislate to 
93 Ibid. 
94 Article 14.5 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
95 Article 15: 1 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
96 Article 16.2 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
97 Article 18 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
98 Article 16.3 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
99 Article 16 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
100 Article 16.2 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
101 In Article 22 of the TRIPS Agreement, geographical indications are defined as: 
" indications which identify a good as originating in the territory of a Member, or a 
region or locality in that territory, where a given quality, reputation or other 
characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin. " 
From the reading of this provision, quality, reputation, or other characteristics of a good can each be a 
sufficient basis for eligibility as a geographical indication. See WTO, WTO Intellectual Property - An 
Overview of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, http: //www. wto. ora, 
February 2,1998. 
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prevent the use of any designations or presentations which could mislead the public as to 
the true geographical origin of a good 103 or yield unfair competitive advantages as a 
result. 104 The registration of a trademark must be refused or invalidated ex officio if a 
geographical indication is used which misleads the public as to the true place of origin if 
the legislation so permits or at the request of an interested party. 105 
Article 23 provides additional protection for geographical indications for wines and 
spirits, according to which interested parties must be provided the legal means to prevent 
the usage of :a geographical indication identifying wines or spirits not originated, from a 
place as indicated by the geographical indication, regardless of whether or not. the true 
origin of the good is indicated or the geographical indication is accompanied by 
expressions such as "kind", "type", "style", "imitation" or the like. 106 Further 
negotiations are mandated to be undertaken in the Council for TRIPS to establish a 
multilateral system of notification and registration for wines eligible for protection. 107 
Article 25.1 mandates protection for independently created industrial designs that are new - 
or original. Taking into consideration short life cycle and sheer number of new designs 
in the textile sector, 108 Article 25.2 requires member states to design a system of 
protection for textile design which will not fail the application due to requirements on 
cost, examination or publication. 
102 Article 22 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
103 Article 22.2(a) of the TRIPS Agreement. 
104 Article 22.2(b) of the TRIPS Agreement. 
105 Article 22.3 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
106 Article 23.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
107 Article 23.4 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
108 WTO. Website, http: //www. wto. org, 2 February 1998. 
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The Treaty on Intellectual Property in respect of Integrated Circuits (IPIC Treaty) serves 
as the foundation for the protection of layout designs of integrated circuits in the TRIPS 
Agreement, 109 with further elaboration on the term of protection for layout designs to be 
for the duration of ten years, 110 the treatment of innocent infringements in Article 37.1, 
and the application of the compulsory licensing provision (Article 31) in the event of 
non-voluntary licensing of a layout design or of its use by or for the government without 
the right holder's authorisation. 111 
Article 39.1 of the TRIPS Agreement provides protection for undisclosed information, 
commonly known as trade secret or know-how. Although the Agreement does not 
require undisclosed information to be treated as a form of, property, it is the first time 
undisclosed information is protected in a multilateral treaty. 112 Trade secret protection is 
increasingly important in ICs 113 because patent protection and trade secret are mutually 
reinforcing. 114 Any persons in lawful control of such information should have the 
possibility of preventing it from being disclosed to, acquired by, or used by others 
109 Article 35 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
"o Article 38.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
111 Article 37.2 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
112 Although the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) guarantees the protection of trade secrets, 
it is a regional agreement. The Paris Convention deals with unfair competition (Article 1O), and it is for 
the domestic legislation to determine what constitute acts of unfair competition It does not deal with trade 
secret directly. See Bodenpausen, G. H. C., Guide to the Application of the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property, Paris: BIRPI, 1968, p. 144 
113 Clemente, C. L., `A Pharmaceutical Industry Perspective', in Walker and Bloomfield (eds. ), Intellectual 
Property Rights and Capital Foundation in the Next Decade, American Centre for Capital Formation 
Centre for Policy Research, Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988, p. 127. 
114 Patent protection provides safeguard for a invention from the discovery of NCE to the launch of the new 
drug in the market. Trade Secret comes into play, for example, to prevent participants of R&D from 
leaking valuable information before patent application can be filed or during the period after filing of patent 
protection and before the commercial scale production. If a product could be copied easily by reverse 
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without consent in a manner contrary to honest commercial practices. 115 To qualify for 
the protection, the information has to be of commercial value and is perceived as secret to 
those who are within the business circles dealing with the kind of information in 
question, and the person in control of the information has taken reasonable steps to keep 
it secret. 
116 
Article 39.1 also provides protection for test data, under which governments have legal 
duty to protect undisclosed clinical test data submitted by pharmaceutical companies for 
marketing approval of new chemical entities (NCEs) from unfair commercial use or 
disclosure. 117 It is an important area of protection for pharmaceutical companies to 
prevent rivals from free-riding on the confidential information to undermine the 
competitive position of the original manufacturers. 118 
Prior to the completion of the TRIPS Agreement, various Conventions only imposed 
general obligations for legal remedies in case of infringement 119 and left the enforcement 
of IPRs to domestic legislation. The lack of recourse in domestic courts was heavily 
engineering, patent protection is preferred because trade secret only has a delaying effect, See Sherwood, 
Intellectual Property and Economic Development, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990, pp. 55-57. 
115 According to Footnote 10 of the TRIPS Agreement, "a manner contrary to honest commercial practices" 
shall mean at least practices such as breach of contract, breach of confidence and inducement to breach, and 
includes the acquisition of undisclosed information by third parties who knew, or were grossly negligent in 
failing to know, that such practices were involved in the acquisition. Does it preclude continued use or 
further discrimination of a trade secret by an innocent third party when improper practices were involved in 
the acquisition of the trade secret by the second party? See Hufbauer, Gary Clyde and Jeffrey J. Schott, 
NAFTA -An Assessment, Washington, D. C.: Institute for International Economics, 1993, p. 89. 116 Article 39.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
117 The International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (IFPMA) which represents 
the major global research-based pharmaceutical companies calls for a ten-year right of data exclusivity for 
the data files compiled for applications for drug regulatory approval. See IFPMA Position Paper: WTO 
Millennium Round, Geneva: IFPMA, 1999. 
18 "... except where necessary to protect the public, or unless steps are taken to ensure that the data are 
protected against unfair commercial use. ", see Article 39.2 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
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criticised by governments and MNCs alike, and regarded national legislation redundant 
when it is unenforceable, and the rectification of which was a must if IPP is to be 
strengthened. 
The result is the enforcement procedures contained in Part III of the TRIPS Agreement. It 
imposes the obligation on all member states to provide. for civil, administrative and 
criminal proceedings and border measures, allowing private parties to contest alleged 
violation of IPRs domestically. In order for private parties to invoke the TRIPS:. . 
Agreement provisions before national courts, the implication is that its provisions are 
capable of becoming part of, and interact with, domestic legal order. 120 But the current 
status of the direct applicability of the TRIPS Agreement remains that private individuals 
cannot invoke its disciplines in domestic litigation because the Agreement only addresses 
member states and sets out the contractual rights and obligations between them. 
WTO member states are obliged to ensure that fair and equitable domestic enforcement 
procedures are in place 121 so as to permit effective actions against any act of 
infringement of IPRs covered by the TRIPS Agreement. 122 Any decision made should 
119 Articles 9,10,10b1', and 10"(1) of the Paris Convention. 
'20 Hoekman, Bernard M. and Petros C. Mavroidis, `Policy Externalities and High-Tech Rivalry: 
Competition and Multilateral Co-operation Beyond the WTO', in OECD, Market Access after the Uruguay 
Round: Investment, Competition and Technology Perspectives, Paris: OECD, 1996, p. 213. 
121 Article 41.2 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
122 See Article 41.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. Under Article 41.5, members are not under obligations to set 
up separate legal system or reserve special resources for the legal protection of IP. 
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be based on the merit of individual cases. 123 And the opportunity for a judicial review 
has to be provided in civil cases. 124 
Article 42 provides civil judicial proceedings for the enforcement of IPRs. The civil 
remedies available include injunctions, 125 adequate damages, . 
126 the destruction of 
infringing goods. or the disposal of them outside the channel of commerce. 127 As it may 
take time to reach decisions in judicial proceedings, provisional measures. are available to 
enable judicial authorities to order. prompt and effective actions to prevent an 
infringement from occurring or to prevent . 
infringing goods. from entering -into the 
channels of commerce, and to preserve relevant evidence in . regard. to - the alleged 
infringement. 128 Provisional measures could be adopted without prior hearing of the 
other party, 129 but such a decision is subject to judicial review. 130 
The enforcement measures discussed above only deal with domestic infringing activities 
at the point of production. In dealing with counterfeit and pirated goods presented for 
importation, it is compulsory to apply border measures to suspend the release of these 
'23 Article 41.3 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
124 But there is no obligation to provide a judicial review in criminal cases. See Article 41.4 of the TRIPS 
Agreement. 
175 Article 44: 1 provides injunctive relief as "... to desist from an infringement, inter alia to prevent the 
entry into the channels of commerce in their jurisdiction of imported goods that involves the infringement 
of an intellectual property rights... " which has to be available immediately after customs clearance of the 
goods. 
126 Article 45 authorises the judicial authority to order the infringer who knowingly, or with reasonable 
ground to know, engaged in infringing activity to pay adequate damages to compensate for the injury the 
right holder has suffered. 
'27 Article 46 of the TRIPS Agreement. When considering this remedy, the test of proportionality applies, 
under which the judicial authority has to take into consideration the seriousness of the infringement, the 
remedies ordered, and the interests of third parties. 
128 Article 50.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
129 It is an ex parse action. And parties affected have to be notified 
no later than when the measures are 
executed. Article 50.2 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
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goods into free circulation. 131 Criminal procedures and penalties are also available when 
it involves a willful commission on a commercial scale. 132 
Article 62.2 provides that the procedure for reviewing applications and registering an IPR 
should be completed within a reasonable period of time so to prevent unwarranted 
curtailment of the duration of protection. And any procedures concerning the acquisition 
or maintenance of IPRs should be fair, equitable, and based on the merit of individual 
cases. 133 This provision provides a legal basis to challenge practices such as burdensome 
or lengthy acquisition procedures which could constitute disguised restrictions to trade 
for protectionist reasons. 
134 
- 
According to Article 64.1 of the TRIPS Agreement: 
"The provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 
1994 as elaborated and applied by the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding shall apply to consultations and the 
settlement of disputes under this Agreement ... " 
135 
130 Article 50.4 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
131 Article 51 of the TRIPS Agreement. And it requires the co-operation between IP right holders and 
customs authorities. 
132 The remedies available include fines and imprisonment sufficient to provide a deterrent, seizure, 
forfeiture and destruction of the infringing goods, see Article 61 of the TRIPS Agreement. Furthermore, it 
is a matter for individual members whether to subject goods which infringe other IPRs to the same 
measures, see Articles 51 and 61 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
133 Article 62.4 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
134 Wineberg, Arthur, `The Japanese Patent System: A Non-Tariff Barrier to Foreign Businesses? ' JWT, 
22(1), 1988, pp. 11-12. It has been common for MPCs to claim the erection of non-tariff barriers when 
product registration process in a country takes longer than the industry average. 
3s But Article 64.2 excludes non-violation complaints (Article XXIII: 1(b) being brought under the TRIPS 
Agreement until January 2000. What happened in January 2000 was that many DCs claimed that they were 
still not ready to fully implement the TRIPS Agreement, hence technically in violation of the Agreement. 
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It is important to point out that private entities could not be held as infringing 
international obligations under the TRIPS Agreement because it is an inter-state 
agreement. 136 And it is difficult to establish liability of states for the independent action 
of private entities on the basis of WTO laws. 137 Anti-competitive practices pursued by 
private entities without the support from governments cannot be challenged under Article 
=II: 1(a). 138 Only if it involves positive actions or specific support from governments 
that nullify or . 
impair established domestic competition conditions 139 could a non----' 
violation complaint be brought. Otherwise, private restrictive business practices (RBPs) 
that are not subject to any government involvement are excluded. from the scope of 
Article XXIII: 1(b). 
The Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing Settlement of Disputes (DSU) is 
contained in Annex 2 to the Agreement Establishing the WTO. It is an integrated system 
applicable to all multilateral trade agreements covered by the WTO. 140 It provides a 
The US and the EU have agreed to exercise restraint in filing complaints against these offenders and 
expressed their willingness to consider extending the transitional period on a case-by-case basis. See 
Financial Times, January 20,2000. It is not clear whether Article XXIII: 1(b) would be available under the 
TRIPS Agreement as in January 2000. 
136 Hoekman, Bernard M. and Petros C. Mavroidis, `Competition, Competition Policy and the GATT', The 
World Competition, March 1994, p. 145, Malaguti, Maris-Chiara, `Restrictive Business Practices in 
International Trade and the Role of the World Trade Organisation', JWT, 1998, pp. 137-138, and Scherer, 
F. M., Competition Policies for an Integrated World Economy, Washington, D. C.: The Brookings 
Institution, 1994, pp. 105-107. 
137 Ibid. 
138 Hoekman and Mavroidis, 1994, note 136 above, p. 129, and Scherer, note 136 above, p. 105. 
139 Private RBPs producing extra-territorial effects cannot be brought before the DSB. See Hoekman and 
Mavroidis, 1994, note 136 above, pp. 140-141. 
140 Article 1.1 of the DSU reads that: 
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legal framework for third-party adjudication 141 in disputes brought by governments, 142 
and all WTO members are bound by it. 143 
The DSU is administered by the WTO. 144 The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) is set up 
with the authority to establish panels, adopt Panel and Appellate Body reports, maintain 
surveillance of implementation of rulings and recommendations, and authorise 
suspension of concessions and other obligations under the covered agreement. 
145 The 
DSB reach their decisions by the principle of consensus, 146 which is the continuation of 
the pre-existing GATT practice. 147 
"The rules and procedures of this Understanding shall apply to disputes brought 
pursuant to the consultation and dispute settlement rules and procedures of the 
agreements listed in Appendix 1 to this Understanding, hereinafter referred to as the 
"covered agreements. " The rules and procedures of this Understanding shall also apply 
to consultations and the settlement of disputes between Members concerning their rights 
and obligations under the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organisation and of this Understanding taken in isolation or in combination with any 
other covered agreement. " 
The Agreements covered by the Understanding are: the Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organisation, the Agreements on trade in goods, the General Agreement on Trade in Services, the TRIPS 
Agreement, the DSU, the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, the Agreement on Government 
Procurement, International Dairy Arrangement, and Arrangement Regarding Bovine Meat. 
141 Hudec, Robert, `The Role of the GATT Secretariat in the Evolution of the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Procedure', in Bhagwati and Hirsch (eds. ), The Uruguay Round and Beyond - Essays in Honour ofArthur 
Dunkel, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1998, pp. 101-122, p. 107. 
142 Article 1.1 of the DSU. Private parties are not allowed recourse under the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism. It is up to their respective governments to take up the issue and act on their behalf. 
143 Article 2 of the Agreement Establishing the WTO states that "The agreements and Associated legal 
instruments included in Annexes 1,2, and 3 are integral parts of this-Agreement, binding on all Members". 
144 Article III: 3 of the Agreement Establishing the WTO. 
145 Article 2: 1 of the DSU. 
146 Article 2.4 of the DSU states that "Where the rules and procedures of this Understanding provide for the 
DSB to take a decision, it shall do so by consensus. " And in Footnote 1 of the DSU, it further states that: 
"The Dispute Settlement Body shall be deemed to have decided by consensus on a 
matter submitted for its consideration, if no Member, present at the meeting of the 
Dispute Settlement Body when the decision is taken, formally objects to the 
proposed decision. " 
147 UNCTAD 1994 Report, note 5 above, p. 207. According to Jackson, there was little or no formal voting 
system at the CPs' sessions under GATT that actions were frequently taken by consensus as interpreted by 
the Chairman in the absence of objection from any CP on the floor. Even though "consensus" is defined in 
Article 2.4 of the DSU, it is not the same as unanimity, since consensus is defeated only by a formal 
objection by a member present at the meeting. Thus those absent do not prevent a'consensus, nor does an 
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As stated in Article XVI: 1 of the Agreement establishing the WTO, the global trade 
organisation shall be guided by the decisions, procedures, and customary practices 
established under GATT. In the context of dispute settlement, the past GATT dispute 
settlement practices remain relevant. 148 It therefore lays the groundwork for the 
establishment . of a rule-based approach which will promote predictability expected of a 
legal system. 
The legal features. of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism are to affirm due process of 
law with the rights to the establishment of a panel and the right to appeal. And panels 
and appellate bodies operate within defined terms of reference. 149 There are three areas 
in the DSU which have been held as significant improvements 'in comparison with the 
dispute settlement mechanism under GATT: 150 (1) the first area is to do with the 
application of negative consensus 151 at four different stages of the dispute settlement 
process. It first appears in the process when a complaining party requests the 
abstention prevent a consensus. The practice in GATT was that some countries that had difficulty with a 
particular decision would remain silent out of deference to countries with a substantially higher stake in the 
pragmatic economic consequences of a decision, therefore, the practice of consensus itself involves some 
deference to economic power. See Jackson, John H., `The World Trade Organisation, Dispute Settlement, 
and Code of Conduct', in Collins and Bosworth (eds. ), The New G, 47 7- Implication for the United States, 
Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994, p. 68, and Jackson, John H., World Trade and the Law 
of GATT, NY: The Hobbs-Marrill Co. Inc., 1969, p. 123, and WTO, Focus, May 1998, p. 6. 
148 The most important GATT document relevant to the DSU is The Understanding Regarding Notification, 
Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance, adopted in the Tokyo Round MTNs on 28 November 
1979, codified GATT dispute settlement procedures (GATT, BISD 26 Supp., 210,1980). Other 
document includes the Decision on"Procedures under Article XXII on Questions Affecting the Interests of a 
Number of Contracting Parties, approved by CPs on November 1958, 
lag Articles 3(2) and 19(2) of the DSU. 
150 For example, see Hudec, Robert, Enforcing International Trade Law - The Evolution of the Modern 
GATT Legal System, New Hampshire: Butterworth Legal Publishers, 1993, pp. 235-238, UNCTAD 1994 
Report, note 5 above, pp. 205-219. 
151 With the application of negative consensus, a decision is deemed to have been reached by consensus if 
no member present at the meeting objects to the proposal put forward. See, for example, discussion in 
Qureshi, Asif H., International Economic Law, London: Sweet & Maxwell, pp. 295-296. 
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establishment of a panel either after the failure to settle the dispute by consultations, 152 or 
the other party fails to reply to the request for consultations. 153 A panel is to be set up as 
promptly as possible unless the DSB decides by consensus not to do so. 154 Such a 
negative consensus could be blocked by one of the parties involved in the dispute, it is in 
effect an automatic procedure for the establishment of a panel; (2) when it comes to the 
adoption of the panel report, Article 16.4 stipulates that: 
"Within sixty days of the issuance of a panel report to the Members, 
the report shall be adopted at a DSB meeting unless one of the parties 
to the dispute formally notifies the DSB of its decision to appeal or the 
DSB decides by the consensus not to adopt the report... " 
Therefore, unless the complaining party decides to appeal, a panel report should be 
adopted by the DSB unless they veto the adoption by consensus. The adoption of panel 
reports can no longer be blocked by the losing party as often happened under the GATT 
system; (3) the establishment of an Appellate Body is an innovation in the GATT dispute 
settlement mechanism. On appeal, the Appellate Body will only consider legal issues 
covered in the panel report and the legal interpretation developed by the panel. 155 And, 
as stated in Article 17.14, an appellate report is binding unless overturned by the DSB by 
consensus, 156 (4) when a member involved in a dispute is found to be in breach of its 
legal obligation, but fails to bring the measure concerned into conformity with the rulings 
152 Article 4.7 of the DSU. 
153 Articles 4.1,4.2, and 4.3 of the DSU. 
154 Article 6.1 of the DSU. 
iss Article 17.6 of the DSU. 
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or recommendations of the panel or appellate report, the other party to the dispute may 
request the DSB to authorise the suspension of concessions or other obligations 157 unless 
the DSB rejects the request by consensus. 158 
The second area of improvement is the stipulation of specific time frames for different 
stages of the dispute settlement process. For--example, according to Article 12.9, the 
panel is to conclude its work within six months from the time the composition and terms 
of reference of the. panel have been agreed upon : to the time when the final report is 
provided to the parties to the dispute. And in no case should the period exceed nine 
month in case of delay. 1$9 In case of appeal, the appeal procedure shall not exceed 60 
days from the date a party formally notify the intention to appeal to when the Appellate 
Body issues its decision. 160 
The third area of improvement is the availability of cross-sector retaliation in which the 
suspension of concessions is allowed across covered agreements. The suspension of 
concessions is a temporary remedy available if the party found to be in breach fails to 
comply fully with the rulings or recommendations of the panel or Appellate Body within 
a reasonable period of time. 161 The complaining party should first seek to suspend 
concessions within the same sector where the breach is found. 162 When it is 
impracticable or ineffective to do so, the complaining party may seek to suspend 
'56 The decision whether to adopt the Appellate Report has to be made within 30 days following its 
issuance to the WTO members, see Article 17.14 of the DSU. 
'57 Article 22.3 of the DSU. 
iss Article 22.6 of the DSU. 
159 Article 12.9 of the DSU. 
'60 Article 17.5 of the DSU. 
161 Article 22.1 of the DSU. 
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concessions in another sector within the same agreement. 163 For example, with respect 
to the TRIPS Agreement, the IPRs covered in Part II, the enforcement obligations under 
Part III, and Part IV are regarded as separate sectors for the purpose of cross-sector 
retaliation. 164 Only if the circumstances are serious enough and seeking suspension of 
concessions from other sectors are not practical or effective, the complaining party may 
- seek an authorisation to suspend concessions made in another covered agreement. 
165 
. 
For example, when a breach of obligations under the TRIPS Agreement is found, market 
access concessions in one of the Agreements on Trade in Goods might be targeted for the 
suspension of trade concessions. 166 
The comprehensiveness of the dispute settlement mechanism exceeded the negotiating 
- mandate articulated 
in the Punta del Este Declaration. 167 It brings all grievances within 
the WTO system so that the WTO members could not justify resorting to unilateral 
actions. 168 And for small countries, the strengthened mechanism might redress some of 
the imbalance of power when it comes to handling disputes. 169 Unilateralism was one of 
162 Article 22.3(a) of the DSU. 
'63 Article 22.3(b) of the DSU. 
164 The definition of "sector" with respect to traade-related IPRs is found in Article 22.3(f) of the DSU. It 
means each of the categories of IPRs covered in Sections, or Section 2, or Section 3, or Section 4, or 
Section 5, or Section 6, or Section 7 of Part II, or the obligations under Part III, or Part IV of the TRIPS 
Agreement. 
165 Article 22.3(c) of the DSU. The definition of "agreement" could be found in Article 22.3(g) to include 
Agreements on Trade in Goods, General Agreement on Trade in Services, and the TRIPS Agreement. 
166 Examples can be drawn from the unilateral retaliation the US imposed on Brazil in 1988 for the alleged 
infringement of patents on products and processes of US pharmaceutical companies. Retaliations were 
imposed on products such as pulp and paper and electronic appliances exported to the US from Brazil, see 
Moreira, Marcilio Marques, `The Point of View of an Emerging Trading Nation: Brazil', in Bhagwati and 
Patrick (eds. ), Aggressive Unilateralism -Americ's 301 Trade Policy and the World Trading System, 
London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991, pp. 257-258. 
167 Stewart (ed. ), note 38 above, p. 2913. 
168 Hudec, 1993, note 150 above, p. 237. 
169 Jackson, John, `The Uruguay Round Results and National Sovereignty', in Bhagwati and Hirsch (eds. ), 
The Uruguay Round and Beyond - Essays in Honour ofArthur Dunkel, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1998, pp. 
293-304, p. 296. 
165 
the major concerns expressed by many participating countries during the Uruguay Round 
MTNs as undermining the integrity of the global trading system. Incorporating a treaty 
commitment to curtail unilateral actions, such as Section 301 actions imposed by the US 
on its trading partners, 170 was seen as necessary after the Montreal Mid-Term meeting. 171 
This demand was duly incorporated into the DSU that obliges WTO members to bring all 
grievances rising from the covered agreements within the WTO system. 172 Any member 
who takes unilateral retaliations could be in violation of the treaty obligations. under 
Article 23.1, and is itself an actionable offence. 
Under the TRIPS Agreement, time-limited derogation in the form of different transitional 
periods is available depending upon the development status of a country, 173. By delaying 
the full implementation of TRIPS obligations, the arrangement allows WTO members 
time to effect legal, institutional, and administrative reforms required. 174 However, the 
obligation to provide NT and unconditional MFN came into effect when the Agreement 
Establishing WTO entered into force in January 1995.175 
10 See discussion in Chapter 2.3.1. 
171 Hudec, 1993, note 150 above, p. 237. 
172 Reading Articles 1.1 and 23 of the DSU jointly, it is mandatory to bring trade disputes relating to 
covered agreement to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. Article 23 reads that: 
"When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligation or other nullification or 
impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or an impediment to the 
attainment of any objective of the covered agreements, they shall have recourse to, and 
abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding. " 
And members shall not make an unilateral decision that a violation has occurred without following the 
rules and procedures of the DSU (Article 23.2(a)). 
173 The status of DCs is determined on the basis of self-selection process existed under the UN system. In 
determining the status of LDCs, the WTO follows the UN list of LDCs. See UNCTAD, The Least 
Developed Countries: 1993-1994 Report, UN: NY, 1994, p. xi, and WTO Website for the WTO's adoption 
of the UN list for the purpose of effecting transitional arrangements. 
174 Srinivasan, note 8 above, p. 53. 
175 Article 65.2 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
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Following the date of entry into force of the Agreement Establishing WTO, ICs were 
given one year to bring their domestic legal and administrative apparatus into line with 
the TRIPS Agreement. 176 DCs and countries in transition 177 are given the option of four 
more years until 2000 to implement the TRIPS Agreement. 178 For DCs who did not 
provide patent protection in their domestic legislation in January 1995, they have to fully 
comply with the patent protection under TRIPS in 2005.179 LDCs are not required to 
apply the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement until 2006.180 However, during the 
transitional period, WTO members are obliged to ensure that any changes in their laws, 
regulations, and practice made during that period do not result in a lesser degree of 
consistency with the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. 181 
4.4 The legal provisions of patent protection for pharmaceuticals under the TRIPS 
Agreement 
By incorporating the main rules of patent protection from the Paris Convention, 182 and 
adding further obligations of its own, the substantive norms of patent protection 
contained in the TRIPS Agreement go beyond what is stipulated in the Convention. They 
176 Article 65: 1 of the TRIPS Agreement states that "... no Member shall be obliged to apply the provisions 
of this (TRIPS) Agreement before the expiry of a general period of one year following the date of entry into 
force of the Agreement Establishing the WTO, " which was January 1,1995. See GATT, Focus, The 
Marrakesh Declaration, May 1994, p. 7. 
" Countries in transition include those which are "in the process of transformation from a centrally- 
planned into a market, free-enterprise economy... ", see Article 65.3 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
78 Articles 65: 2 and 65: 3 of the TRIPS Agreement 
19 Article 65: 4 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
180 And the Council for TRIPS should accord LDCs further extensions upon their request. Article 66: 1 of 
the TRIPS Agreement. 
181 See Article 65.5 of the TRIPS Agreement which came into effect on 1 January 1995. 
182 See Articles 1.3 and 2.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
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are expressed in abstract legal concept and principles, 183 which gives a general 
understanding of the legal framework, but does little in the way of harmonising domestic 
practices. 
184 
Article 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement deals with patentable subject matters. It states that 
".. patent shall be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields 
of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of 
industrial application... " It further stipulates that patents should be available without 
discrimination as to the place of invention, which effectively repudiates the US domestic 
legislation of limiting evidence. used in support of patent applications to be solely of 
domestic origin. 
185 
There are three exceptions to Article 27 which exclude inventions from patent protection: 
1) when the commercial exploitation of an invention is necessary to protect ordre public 
or morality, including to protect human, animal, plant life, health, or to avoid serious 
prejudice to the environment, WTO members may exclude the invention from being 
183 In contrast with the protection of Trademarks where TRIPS requires a fairly precise mode of 
implementation as the standard of protection is built upon the elaborate rules on the subject found in the 
Paris Convention. 
184 UNCTAD, 1996, note 81 above, pp. 29 and 32. Concurrent to MTNs on TRIPS, WIPO has been 
working on a Patent Law Harmonisation, Treaty. It sets forth a number of concrete provisions that will 
have the effect of harmonising certain administrative and substantive rules for obtaining and enforcing 
patents in countries subscribed to it.. See Gorlin, Jacques J., `Updating on International Negotiations on 
Intellectual Property Rights', in Wallerstein, Mogee and Schoen (eds. ), Global Dimensions of Intellectual 
Property Rights in Science and Technology, Washington, D. C.: National Academy Press, 1993, pp. 179- 
180. 
185Under the first-to-invent system in the US, Section 104 of the US patent law states that "In patent 
interference proceedings... an applicant for a patent... may not establish a date of invention by reference to 
knowledge or use of the invention... in a foreign country". It effectively restricts the evidence of inventive 
acts to the territory of the US. See 35 U. S. C. § 104 (1988), which was superseded by 35 U. S. C. § 104(a) 
(1993) that permits proof of inventive activity in Mexico and Canada. 
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patentable; 186 2) diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of 
humans or animals could also be excluded from patentability; 187 3) plants and animals 
other than micro-organisms, and essentially biological processes for the production of 
plants or animals other than non-biological and microbiological processes could both be 
considered to be excluded from patentability. 188 But plant varieties should be protected 
by patents or by an effective sui generis system or a combination of both. 189 
Article 29 concerns the requirement of disclosure of the nature of patentable invention. 
It requires the disclosure in a patent application to be sufficiently clear and complete for 
the invention to be carried out by a person skilled in the art. How specific or detailed the 
disclosure has to be is a matter for domestic law. The time-frame for the publication of 
patent application after filing could also have a direct consequence on the speed 'of 
diffusion of technological information. 190 
A process patent provides protection not only for use of the process but also for products 
derived directly from the process. 191 And the burden of proof has been reversed in cases 
of civil proceedings involving process patent. It is now on the defendant to prove that the 
process to obtain an identical product to the patented one is different from the patented 
process. 192 When the product obtained by the patented process is new, 193 or if there is a 
1" Article 27.2 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
187 Article 27.3(a) of the TRIPS Agreement. 
'88 Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPS Agreement. 
189 Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPS Agreement. This provision does not cover genetically engineered plant 
life, it is subject to review four years from the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement. 
190 Oddi, Samuel A., `TRIPS - Natural Rights and a 'Polite Form of Economic Imperialism", VandJTL, 
29(3), 1996, p. 463. 
191 Article 28.1(b) of the TRIPS Agreement. 
192 Article 34.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
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substantial likelihood that the identical product was made by the process and the patent 
owner has not been able to determine the process actually used through reasonable 
efforts, 194 any identical product produced without the consent of the patent owner will be 
deemed to have been obtained by the patented process in the absence of proof to the 
contrary. 
A product patent confers on the patent owner the exclusive rights to prevent third parties 
from making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing 195 the patented product 
without authorisation. 196 Importation is one of the exclusive rights conferred by patent 
protection, but. whether importation itself constitutes working . 
is left unanswered by the 
TRIPS Agreement. What is clear is that if a patent holder supplies a domestic market by 
import only, it does not constitute a ground for granting compulsory licences as in Article 
5A(l) of the Paris Convention. 197 
Compulsory licenses and government use without the authorisation of the right holder 
remains available under TRIPS, but are subject to safeguard clauses contained in Article 
31 to protect the legitimate interests of the right holders. Prior negotiations with the right 
holder to negotiate a licensing agreement on reasonable commercial terms and conditions 
193 Article 34.1(a) of the TRIPS Agreement. 
194 Article 34.1(b) of the TRIPS Agreement. 
195 While the TRIPS Agreement recognises the exclusive right of patent owners to use, sell, import or 
distribute the patented products, these exclusive rights are subject to Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement, the 
provision dealing with the Doctrine of Exhaustion. See Footnote 6 of the TRIPS Agreement. The Doctrine 
of Exhaustion will be discussed in Chapter 5.3. 
196 Article 28.1(a) of the TRIPS Agreement. 
197 See discussion in Chapter 1.5. 
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is necessary. 198 Failing that, the authorisation of compulsory licences should be based on 
the merit of each cases. 199 Once granted, the compulsory licence should be non- 
exclusive 200. and non-assignable. 201 Any use of the licence should be limited to 
predominantly supplying the domestic market of the host country. 202 The right holder is 
entitled to adequate remuneration 203 taking into account the economic value of the 
.. authorisation. 
204 Furthermore, the legal validity of the authorisation should be subject to 
- judicial review. 205 But when anti-competitive practices are established which forms the 
ground for the granting of a compulsory licence, the requirement of prior negotiations 
with the right holder is waived, and its use is not restricted to the supply of the domestic 
market of the host country only. 206 
- Article 33 provides a minimum of 20 years of patent protection from the date of filing. It 
does not deal with the extension of patent term to compensate for delays caused by 
governmental regulatory approval processes. 207 Some countries have introduced patent 
198 Prior negotiations with the right holder may be waived in the case of a national emergency or other 
circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use. Article 31(b) of the TRIPS 
Agreement. 
199 Article 31(a) of the TRIPS Agreement. 
200 Article 31(d) of the TRIPS Agreement. 
201 Article 31(e) of the TRIPS Agreement. 
202 Article 31 (f) of the TRIPS Agreement. 
203 The concept of "adequate" compensation derives from the Hull Formula which was initially designed by 
capital exporting countries to `legalise' the taking of foreign property by host countries. Under the 
formula, compensation should be paid adequately (fully), promptly and effectively, the property is taken for 
public interest, and the principle of non-discrimination was observed. But the Charter of Economic Rights 
and Duties (UN General Assembly Resolution 3281 (1974)) recognises the right of a state to take foreign 
property on the payment of "appropriate" compensation, which is considered to be less than what is 
provided by the Hull Formula. 
204 Article 31(h) of the TRIPS Agreement. 
205 Article 31(I) of the TRIPS Agreement. 
206 Article 31(k) of the TRIPS Agreement. 
207 In some countries, health authorities demand extra local clinical trial to be conducted on the basis that 
genetic and metabolic differences limit the validity of the evidence of a drug's safety and efficacy gathered 
in the west. Extra local clinical trials could take up 2 to 3 years to complete. Ullrich, 1995, note 89 above, 
p. 177, note 106. 
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term restoration measures to compensate for the time lost on conducting pre-marketing 
clinical trials and waiting for regulatory approval. 208 This is seen by the pharmaceutical 
industry as the recognition by governments of the importance of patent protection to 
pharmaceuticals. 209 
Patent protection under the TRIPS Agreement does not apply retrospectively. 210 It 
therefore does not cover products which existed prior to the application of -the. 
Agreement. 211 But with regard to pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical pipeline 
products, 212 Articles 70.8 and 70.9 operate in tandem to impose special obligations on 
WTO members who choose to delay the introduction of patent protection by making use -:. 
of transitional arrangements available to DCs and LDCs. 
Article 70.8 states that: 
208 De jure patent term extensions have been enacted by the EC, Switzerland, the US, Japan, Australia and 
Israel. Under the US Drug Price Competition and Patent Restoration Act of 1984, the patent term could be 
extended for the duration of the drug application review time by the Federal Drug Administration plus one 
and a half of clinical test time. The maximum extension is five years with no extension allowed beyond 14 
years of effective patent life. See discussion in WTO, WTIDS114/R, the Panel Report on Canada - Patent 
Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, pp. 153-154 and Nogues, Julio, Patents and Pharmaceutical Drugs: 
Understanding the Pressures on Development Countries, International Economic Department, Washington, 
D. C.: The World Bank, p. 100. 
209 Redwood, 1994, note 31 above, p. 18. 
210 Article 70.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
211 Article 70(3) of the TRIPS Agreement states that "existing products and pipeline products with patents 
that have been published abroad will not be qualified for protection". Therefore, for leading drugs with 
development time averaging 8-10 years, the full impact of TRIPS will be seen in 2003-2005. See 
Redwood, 1994, note 31 above, p. 52. 
212 Pipeline products include those whose patent applications are being evaluated by the national patent 
office, products that are in the development stage, and products that are not yet sold in countries that are 
updating their intellectual property laws. See Industry Functional Advisory Committee for Trade in 
Intellectual Property Rights, Report of the Industry Functional Advisory Committee for Trade in 
Intellectual property Rights (IFAC-3) on the North American Free Trade Agreement, September 1992, p. 
17 and Hoekman, 1994, note 14 above, p. 105. 
172 
"Where a Member does not make available as of the 
date of entry into force of the Agreement Establishing 
the WTO patent protection for pharmaceutical and 
agricultural chemical products commensurate with its 
obligations under Article 27, that Member shall: 
(i) Notwithstanding the provisions of Part VI above, 
provide as from the date of entry into force of 
the Agreement Establishing the WTO a means 
213 by which applications for patents for such 
inventions can be filed; 
(ii) apply to these applications, as of the date of 
application of this agreement, the criteria for 
patentability as laid down in this Agreement as if 
those criteria were being applied on the date of 
filing in that Member or, where priority is 
available and claimed, - the priority date of the 
213 The "means" under Article 70.8(i) is the equivalent of a sound legal base for the filing of patent 
applications. What constitutes a sound legal basis is a matter of domestic law (Article 1.1 of the TRIPS 
Agreement. ) See WTO, WT/DS50/AB/R, 19 December 1997, Report of the Appellate Body on India - 
Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products (hereinafter US v India Appellate 
Body Report), p. 22. The US v India case was the first IP dispute before the DSB, brought by the US 
against India on two accounts. Firstly, India was accused of failing to establish a means for the filing of 
patent application for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products pursuant to the mail box provision 
of Article 70.8. Secondly, India also failed to establish a mechanism for the granting of exclusive 
marketing rights effective from the date of entry into force of the Agreement Establishing WTO pursuant to 
Article 70.9. 
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application; 
(iii) provide patent protection in accordance with this 
agreement as from the grant of the patent and for 
the remainder of the patent term, counted from 
the filing date in accordance with Article 33 of 
this Agreement, for those of these applications ... . 
that meet the criteria for protection referred to in 
sub-paragraph (ii) above. " 
Starting from January 1995,214 any member who opts to benefit from transitional 
arrangements is under the obligation to provide the pipeline protection for pharmaceutical 
and agricultural chemical products. DCs' obligations under Article 70.8 is "to provide a 
legal mechanism for the filing of mailbox applications that provide a sound legal basis to 
preserve both the novelty of the inventions and the priority of the applications 215 as of 
the relevant filing and priority date. " 216 When the domestic patent system is 
implemented in full upon the expiration of the transitional period, these patent 
applications are . to 
be treated as normal applications. If and when a patent is granted, it 
214 The ordinary meaning of the term "notwithstanding the provisions of Part VI" in Article 70.8(I) of the 
TRIPS Agreement is to be interpreted as indicating that transitional arrangements do not apply to the 
implementation of Article 70.8. See WTO, WT/DS79/R, 24 August 1998, Report of the Panel on India -- 
Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products (hereinafter EC v India Panel 
Report), p. 66. The EC v India case concerns a complaint brought by the European Community against 
India in India's failure to implement Articles 70.8 and 70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
215 For patent protection, the right of priority, as stipulated in Article 4 of the Paris Convention, is 
incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement by virtue of Article 1.3 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
216 See US v India Appellate Body Report, note 213 above, pp. 6 and 22. 
174 
will be for the remainder of the twenty-year patent term from the date the application was 
filed. 217 
For pharmaceutical products which are granted marketing approval during the transitional 
period, Article 70: 9 confers on them exclusive marketing rights for the duration of five 
years, or until a product. patent is granted or rejected, whichever period is shorter. In 
order to be eligible for this protection, the relevant product has to have been granted 
patent and free sales certificate in another member state. 218 This. exclusive marketing 
rights are a quid pro quo for the delay of the . availability. of.. product patents 
for 
pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products until January 2005 based on a careful 
balancing of obligations between interested parties participated in the Uruguay Round 
MTNs. 219 
The emphasis on striking a balance between rights and obligations permeates through the 
whole negotiation process of the TRIPS Agreement. It is reflected in the negotiation 
mandate for TRIPS MTNs 220 and the preamble of the TRIPS Agreement. 221 They 
21 Article 70: 8(c) of the TRIPS Agreement. 
218 Free sales Certificate is issued by governments as a proof of granting marketing approval to a product in 
the issued country. Under usual circumstances, NCEs are first marketed in ICs where MPCs' target 
customers are. Most of ICs have patent system in place, NCEs with marketing approval from them should 
have gone through regulatory scrutiny to prove their efficacy, quality and safety, which provide the 
assurance DCs seek. 
219 The Panel made this observation by looking into the drafting history of the TRIPS Agreement, see EC v 
India Panel Report, note 214 above, p. 68. 
220 The Punta del Esta Declaration states that: 
"In order to reduce the distortions and impediments to international trade, and taking 
into account the need to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual 
property rights, and to ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual 
property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade, the negotiations 
shall aim to clarify GATT provisions and elaborate as appropriate new rules and 
disciplines... " 
See note 32 above. 
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address the need to strengthen IPP in order to reduce distortions and impediments to 
international trade, and the importance of ensuring that the negotiated measures and 
procedures themselves do not become barriers to legitimate trade. They also 
acknowledge the interface between IPP, international trade, and competition law. 222 
4.5 Post-TRIPS Agreement: uncertainties 
In the era of post-TRIPS, -Agreement, MPCs are concerned with how individual 
governments will implement . the provisions which contain 
broad language, and 
consequential impacts on competition: ' 
The compulsory licensing provision is one example in point. There have been criticisms 
of the vagueness of the wording, 223 such as the absence of the actual wording 
"compulsory licence" in Article 31. But some argue that it then gives the flexibility 
needed when member states implement their domestic patent legislation. To prevent 
potential licensing abuses 224 is very much on the agenda when DCs could design their 
patent legislation for fears of unequal bargaining power between themselves as buyers of 
technology, and sellers. Especially when many DCs have no sophisticated domestic anti- 
221 The first paragraph of the preamble of the TRIPS Agreement reads: 
"Members, desiring to reduce distortions and impediments to international trade, and 
taking into account the need to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual 
property rights, and to ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual 
property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade; " 
222 In the current discussion, competition policy and anti-trust law are used interchangeable. 
See, for example, Redwood, 1994, note 31 above, p. 48. 
22' One examples of potential licensing abuse is when an agreement is used as a vehicle for a cartel 
arrangement to fix prices, limit output or divide markets, see OECD, Competition Policy and Intellectual 
Property Rights, Paris: OECD, 1989, pp. 23-26 for further details. 
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competitive legislation to control restrictive business practices of MPCs. UNCTAD 1996 
Report advises against DCs' applying compulsory licensing provisions too stringently, or 
the innovation could be held in the form of trade secret rather than as patents, and the 
diffusion of technological knowledge would likely to be restricted. 225 The Report also 
points out that strengthened patent protection could induce more use of licensing 
agreements by MPCs to facilitate monitoring of drug quality in order to elevate quality. 
standards of drug production in DCs. Stringent compulsory licensing provisions are 
often a deterrent for MPCs to do so. 226 
Article 27 dealing with patentable subject matters is another provision capable of broad 
interpretation. With no international standard of absolute novelty or non-obviousness, 227 
member countries could apply the criteria of patentability in accordance with their 
domestic patent law. 228 Whether a country allows second uses of known products when 
stringent novelty criteria are applied could have direct consequences on MPCs' 
development of "me-too drugs". 229 Since no definition of "invention" is provided in 
Article 27, WTO members are relatively free to draw the line between non-patentable 
discovery and actual inventions. 230 They could be construed to allow, for example, the 
225 UNCTAD, 1996, note 81 above, p. 13 and Taylor C. T. and Z. H. Silberstone, The Economic Impact of 
the Patent System: A Study of British Experience, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 350 and 
359. 
226 Ibid. 
227 It was in November 1963 when inventive step and non-obviousness were recognised by the European 
Patent Convention and the Strasburg Convention on the Unification of Certain Points of Substantive Law 
on Patents for Inventions as the common standards of patentability. Other countries not members to the 
Conventions are free to specify their own criteria. 
228 UNCTAD, 1996, note 81 above, p. 32. 
229 See discussion in Oddi, 1996, note 190 above, pp. 464 and 465. 
230 UNCTAD, 1996, note 81 above, p. 34. 
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exclusion of eligibility of biotechnology inventions from patent protection. 231 Such a 
policy will have significant effects on the future of new drug introduction and 
competitive strength of the research-based pharmaceutical industry. 232 
Articles 27.2 allows WTO members to exclude inventions from patentability for the 
protection of human, animal, plant life, health, or environment.: It is difficult to predict 
how broadly these exceptions will be applied. For those' economies dependent on 
agriculture, for example, the issue of patenting plant life in food industry has been 
controversial. 233 Despite the claim that genetically engineered plants are commercially 
more viable, DCs argue that : patented genetically engineered,. plant life. --would 
be 
23I Ullrich comments that the TRIPS Agreement left open the issue of patent protection for genetic 
engineering inventions because ICs had not yet decided on the proper policy to deal with it domestically. 
See Ullrich, 1995, note 89 above, p. 175. There are many problems surrounding patent protection for bio- 
pharmaceutical inventions. For example, genetic engineering involves replicating a natural compound 
already existed in nature, its patentability per se is dealt with differently in ICs. Furthermore, patent 
protection for these products is not strong because patent claims for bio-pharmaceutical products are often 
defined in broad terms, which leads to difficulty in proving an infringement. See discussion in Correa, 
Carlos M., `The Pharmaceutical Industry and Biotechnology Opportunities and Constraints for Developing 
Countries', World Competition, vol. 15, no. 42,1992, pp. 43-63. 
232 Ibid., pp. 44-47 and FT, The New Drug Race, June 1,1999, p. 19. Biotechnology products are the 
application of genetics in human medicine, which is bases on biology. Instead of testing thousands of 
molecules until a useful one is identified, which is costly and time-consuming, biotechnology enables 
researchers to target the biochemical reaction that a disease triggers and devise a chemical compound to 
stop them. As pharmaceutical companies' competitiveness is partly based on the introduction of new 
chemical entities, the industry sees the development in biotechnology as their future. If biopharmaceuticals 
are excluded from patent protection, the future of new drug development will be put in jeopardy. See also 
OECD, TD/TC/WP99815FINAL, February 2,1999, p. 9. In the preparatory stage for the Ministerial 
Meeting in Seattle in November 1999, Canada, Australia and Japan were pushing for a working group on 
biotechnology to examine how WTO rules could be applied to genetically modified products, especially 
regarding the issue of safety of GM products. See The Economist, November 27,1999, p. 26. 
233 See FT, December 3,1999, p. 13 and Ringo, Frederick, ` The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights Agreement in the GATT and Legal Implications for Sub-Saharan Africa', JWT, 28(6), 
1994, p. 131. According to FT, The EC faced opposition from its member states of its attempt to endorse 
the US's demand that the WTO sets up a working group on biotechnology as part of a new world trade 
round. Many DCs support a separate initiative on a bio-safety protocol negotiated under the aegis of the 
United Nation bio-diversity convention 
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expensive, damaging to the environment, and it is unsustainable as it does not have 
drought or sickness resistant strains found in crops cultivated by traditional method. 234 
The desire to seek a rule-based global trading system reflects MPCs preference for an 
open global market with a minimum of intervention by national governments as 
demonstrated by the support they have given to inter-governmental free trade agreements 
aimed at reducing jurisdictional conflicts. 235 What MPCs also recognise is the 
legitimacy of nation states as economic units in international relations who assert their 
sovereignty by participating in the setting of global trading rules. 236 And that host 
governments' domestic policy-making power will affect how MNCs conduct their 
business and utilise their created assets in host countries. 237 
The last two decades has also seen a shift of governments' efforts from regulating the 
behaviours of MNCs to conform to national or regional economic objectives to 
encouraging cross-border mechanisms that promote a positive interaction between 
national governments and MNCs. 238 The globalisation of economic activities brought 
about the realisation by governments that the success of their domestic economic policies 
will be judged on the strength of the country's international competitive position. Faced 
234 Ibid., p. 132 and UNCTAD, 1996, note 81 above, Annex 2. 
235 Vernon, Raymond, In the Hurricane's Eye - The Troubled Prospects of Multinational Enterprises, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1998, p. 150 and Vernon, Raymond, `Research on Transnational 
Corporations: Shedding Old Paradigms', Transnational Corporation, 3(1), 1994, p. 152. 
236 Vernon, 1998, note 235 above, p. 8 and FT, December 3,1999, p. 19. The other side of the coin is that 
any international agreement affecting MNCs will need MNCs' support if it is to be adopted and applied. 
See Vernon, 1994, note 235 above, p. 152. 
23' Dunning, John H., Multinational Enterprise and the Global Economy, Reading Mass: Addison-Wesley 
Publishing Company, 1993, pp. 528-529 and Vernon, 1998, note 235 above, p. 8. 
239 Dunning, 1993, note 237 above, ch. 19 and Barry Jones, R. J., Globalisation and Interdependence in the 
International Political Economy, London: Pinter Publishers, pp. 177-178. 
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with the limit of their economic boundaries and the susceptibility of their domestic 
policies to international economic events, they found it necessary to attract MNCs' 
inward investment 239 and to foster the unique technological and organisational assets of 
MNCs to optimise the contribution of MNCs to the competitiveness of nation states. 240 
They also need to effectively influence MNCs' patterns of behaviour and to ensure that 
MNCs' activities are in support of their economic and social goals.. 241 A co-operative 
approach thus has emerged between host governments and MNCs to strive for mutually 
beneficial outcome in their interaction. 
239 Cross-border investments by MNCs often create jobs, upgrade the quality of local workforce, and 
strengthen host governments' currency on the foreign exchange markets, for example. See Vernon, 1998, 
note 235 above, p. 31. 
240 Ibid., pp. 575-616. 
241 But as Vernon points out, in comparison with domestic firms that are confined to a single national 
market, host governments tend to be uncertain about how MNCs are likely to behave. One of the reasons is 
the lack of transparency in the availability of operational data of MNCs. Ibid., pp. 14,22,207, and 219 and 
Barry Jones, ote 238 above, p. 176. Nonetheless, some governments have learned that their actions toward 
MNCs are the outcome of their own past economic and political strategies, and are now appraising their 
policies in the light of globalisation of markets and productions. As explained by Dunning, the structure 
and performance of foreign-owned firms in a particular host country in time t is partly a function of the 
macro and micro economic policies pursued by the government in time t-1. See Dunning, 1993, note 237 
above, p. 547. 
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Chapter V 
Unresolved Issues 
This chapter starts by looking into the roles multinational corporations and nation states 
play in an increasingly integrated global economy, and how globalisation has affected 
these two major players in their participation of shaping the rules governing the global 
market. It is against this background that this chapter proceeds to discuss how the two 
major areas of concern expressed by MPCs would affect the adequacy and effectiveness 
of the TRIPS Agreement in ensuring the legal recognition of the exclusive marketing 
rights conferred by patent protection among WTO member states: 
5.1 Introduction 
The global market is now dominated by MNCs, the catalyst of the globalisation of 
economic activities. 1 They are wealth creators accounting for an increasing proportion 
of value-added activities in the global economy, with influence reaching beyond their 
national borders. 2 Since the configuration of their activities depends less on the 
availability of unimproved national resources, and more on. knowledge-based created 
1 Despite the number of MNCs being only in the thousands, they account for about half of the world trade 
in goods, with about two-third of their trade taking place between related units of the same enterprise. 
Their role in international markets has been concentrated in the more dynamic sectors of the world 
economy which are technology-related and information-based networks of value-added activities such as 
pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and electronic products. See Lipsey, Robert E., `Outward Direct Investment 
and the US Economy', in Feldstein, Hines, and Hubbard (eds. ), The Effects of Taxation on Multinational 
Corporations, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995, pp. 7-33 and Dunning, John H., Multinational 
Enterprise and the Global Economy', Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1993, p. 602. 
2 An example of MNCs' influence is their contribution in the shaping of inter-governmental trade 
agreements by assisting in the drafting of the fine print of WTO and NAFTA Agreements. See Vernon, 
Raymond, In the Hurricane's Eye - The Troubled Prospects of Multinational Enterprises, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1998, p. 144. 
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assets, 3 they are able to shift value-added activities across national borders, which 
distinguishes them from traditional trade involving simple import-export of physical 
goods. 
Cross-border investment challenges the assumption of immobility of factors of 
productions in the theory of comparative advantage. 4 Natural endowments such as 
labour, land, and minerals have assumed second place and in their place are the "created ;-. 
assets" in assessing the competitiveness of both firms and nations. Created assets can be 
tangible and intangible. Tangible created assets include the stock of fmancial and 
physical, assets such as communication. infrastructure or marketing networks. While the 
intangible created assets encompass knowledge as the common denominator and include, 
for example, R&D and technological and innovative capabilities. 5 These created assets 
3 Dunning, 1993, note 1 above. The accessibility and quality of these created assets in a country reflect 
government policies in areas such as education, science and technology, trade, transport and 
communication. 
4 David Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage shows that countries benefit not by focussing on 
absolute advantage in production efficiency but on their comparative advantages; even where a country is 
more efficient in producing all goods than its neighbours, it still pays to trade by concentrating on where its 
advantage is the greatest and importing other goods where its advantage is less even if they could be made 
more efficiently domestically. With the assumption of the immobility of assets crossing borders, this theory 
assumes that market forces will allocate a nation's resources to those relatively productive industries. See 
Rowthorn, Robert and Richard Kozul-Wright, Globalisation and Economic Convergence: An Assessment, 
Discussion Paper no. 131, Geneva: UNCTAD, February 1988, p. 5, The Economist, A Survey of World 
Trade, October 3,1998, p. 5, Porter, Michael E., The Competitive Advantage of Nations, London: 
MacMillan, 1990, p. 11, and Kogut, Bruce, `Designing Global Strategies: Comparative and Competitive 
Value-Added Chains', in Vernon-Wortzel and Wortzel (eds. ), Global Strategic Management - The 
Essential, 2°d ed., NY: John Wiley & Sons, 1990, p. 86. Based on this theory, governments measure 
national competitiveness in terms of trade performance as shown in the balance of payment, particularly in 
current assets and the presumed effect on the exchange rate. See Stopford, John M., `The Growing 
Interdependence between Transnational Corporations and Governments', in Vernon-Wortzel and Wortzel 
(eds. ), Strategic Management in a Global Economy, 3`' ed., NY: John Wiley & Sons, 1990, p. 61. 
5 UN, World Investment Report: Trends and Determinants, NY: UN, 1998, p. 114. They could be in the 
form of human capital - the stock of knowledge, technology, infrastructure, and governing policies, see 
Stopford, note 4 above, p. 61. 
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are not naturally endowed. Their mobility is evidenced by the increase in MNCs' cross- 
border investment as an alternative to trade. 6 
The advancement of information technology, the integration of global capital markets, 8 
and the increase in cross-border trade and investment by MNCs have facilitated the 
globalisation of economic activities among nations in the past two decades and put on .: 1 
track the acceleration of a long-term trend toward greater. economic interdependence .:: . 
among nation states. ' During the last decade and a half, global integration has proceeded..: . 
at a faster pace through cross-border investment than through-trade which made FDI 
flows and stocks an important benchmark along side the. traditional -trade. 
10 The impact - :.. 
of FDI on globalisation is best described by UNCTAD as follows: 
6As foreign direct investment has grown four times faster than trade since 1982. 
7 The accelerated advancement of information technology came about mainly as the result of privatisation 
and deregulation of telecommunication industry in recent years. It effectively removed the geographical 
and political distance of conducting business and contributed to the integration of global markets. See 
Kinnock, Neil, `Beyond Free Trade to Fair Trade', California Management Review, 1994, p. 126. 
8 The mid-1970s saw the dismantling of exchange controls on capital movement by countries such as the 
US, Japan, and UK. Coupled with further deregulation of national financial services markets in ICs and 
DCs, it reflected governments' realisation that relaxation of regulatory control was necessary if they were 
not to lose valuable business to overseas financial centres. These change of government policy contributed 
to the increase of cross-border financial flows and unify world financial market. The result was an 
increased share of international capital flow and the flows within national markets in the form of 
transaction in securities instead of bank lending with the implication on the private capitals available for 
DCs which was not there before. As UNCTC points out: falling communication costs have strengthened 
the trend of large number of banks locating themselves in the least regulated environment. This has been a 
powerful incentive for national authorities to deregulate their domestic markets to attract bank business to 
home centres. Some DCs have adopted more a liberal stance particularly in respect of setting up 
establishments specialised in off-shore banking. See UNCTC, Foreign Direct Investment, the Service 
Sector, and International Banking, NY: UN, 1987, Rowthom and Kozul-Wright, note 4 above, P. 3, and 
Pecchioli, R. M., The Internationalisation ofBanking: The Policy Issues, Paris: OECD, 1983. 
9 Vernon, 1998, note 2 above, pp. 1-29, Dunning, 1993, note 1 above, pp. 474-482, Barry Jones, R. J., 
Globalisation and Interdependence in the International Political Economy, London: Pinter Publishers, 
1995, and UNCTAD, World Investment Report 1995, NY: UN, 1995. 
10 The growth of world trade is the traditional indicator of global economic integration. According to 
World investment Report 1998: for the world as a whole, the ratio of FDI stock (inward plus outward) to 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has increased steadily since 1980; the ratio of world FDI flows (inflows 
plus outflows) to GDP has also risen although not steadily (For example, in 1997, the FDI inflows grew by 
19% to US$400 billion and the FDI outflows rose by 27% to reach US$424 billion). The ratio of world . 
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" The relationship ... runs both ways: each affects the other. It was the 
liberalisation of national policy frameworks that helped unleash one of 
the key driving forces of globalisation as we know it today with 
increasing international production by transnational corporations 
(TNCs). At the same time, progress in the liberalisation of trade, as 
well as technological progress in telecommunications and transportation 
permits TNCs to pursue increasingly regional-and global strategies, and 
to integrate their production. structures : on, regional or, global bases, 
which in turn creates incentives to liberalise FDI policies. This 
mutually reinforcing process has in fact shaped international production 
in recent years and led to its integration : at "a deeper level than the 
shallow integration based on arm's length trade and flows of financial 
capital. " 11 
The globalisation of economic activities have had a profound influence on national 
economies. 12 The success of domestic economic policy will be judged on the strength 
of the country's international competitive position. 13 In ä practically border-less world 
trade (imports plus exports) to world GDP has remained relatively constant during the same period. UN, 
1998, note 5 above, pp. 7-8. 
11 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 1993, NY: UN, 1993. 
12 For some, "globalisation" marks the hegemony of transnational capitalism in general, and institutional 
primacy of multinational corporations in particular. It marks the general progress of the internationalisation 
of finance, production, and economic transactions to a level that challenges the traditional functioning of 
nation states, and exposes them to a similar set of competitive economic pressure. It renders national 
economies sensitive to international externalities and increasingly dependent upon sympathetic external 
conditions. See Gill, S and David Law, The Global Political Economy, Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 
1988, chs. 7 and 11, Barry Jones, note 9 above, pp. 93-95 and 131. 
13 See Drucker, Peter F., `The Changed World Economy', in Vernon-Wortzel and Wortzel (eds. ), Global 
Strategic Management - The Essential, 2nd ed., NY: John Wiley & Sons, 1990, p. 17. 
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where economic interdependence reins, 14 nation states can no longer be considered as 
distinct economic entities with autonomous decision making power in their pursuit of 
national objectives because of extra-territorial effects of domestic policies. 15 The 
"public goods" of maintaining a free global trading system, such as IPRs and competition 
policy, 16 becomes a global responsibility. 17 Co-ordinated efforts among governments to 
establish multilateral discipline in these areas are therefore necessary. 18 
Following the incorporation of trade-related aspects of IPP into the global trading system, 
there are calls for incorporating competition rules into GATT. 19 One important reason is 
because national : competition policy 20 needs to complement international treaty 
obligations so to protect and promote competition in the global level. 21 But past efforts 
to include competition in GATT had not been successful 22 because the political economy 
'4 Ohmae, Kenichi, The Borderless World - Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy, London: 
Collins, 1990, p. 173. 
is Stopford, note 4 above, p. 66, Jackson, Restructuring the GA7T System, London: Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1990, pp. 91-103, and FT, March 2,1998, p. 21. 
16 According to Barry Jones, globalisation is a direct function of the growth of competition in an 
international free trade system. Barry Jones, note 9 above, p. 12. 
17 Rowthorn and Kozul-Wright, note 4 above, p. 4 and FT, March 2,1998, p. 21. 
18 Stopford, note 4 above, p. 66, According to Scherer, there are three approaches to manage 
interdependence: 1. By upholding the principle of national sovereignty, governments make decisions with 
little or no consultation or co-operation with other nations; 2. Mutual recognition presumes decentralised 
decisions by national governments and relies on market competition to guide the process of international 
convergence. It also entails exchanges of information of national policies with explicit acceptance by each 
member state of the regulatory standards of others; and 3. Agreements of co-ordination promote inter- 
governmental co-operation. They involve jointly designed adjustments of national policies as governments 
agree to behave differently from the way they would have behaved without any agreement. Scherer, F. M., 
Competition Policies for an Integrated World Economy, Washington, D. C.: the Brookings Institution, 
1994, pp. xx-xxi. 
19 Ibid., p. 92 and Petersmann, Ernest-Ullrich, "International Competition Rules for the GATT-MTO World 
Trade and legal System", JWT, 27(6), 1993, pp. 41 and 75. Securing an international agreement on 
competition policy has been identified by the Uruguay Round negotiators as a high-priority items for the 
next round of MTNs. It is reflected in the establishment of a Working Group on the Interaction between 
Trade and Competition Policy during the Singapore Ministerial Conference held in December 1996. 
20 Competition policy and competition law are used synonymously in the discussion. 
21 UNCTAD, TDB/COM. 2/EM/2,28 August 1996, p. 37. 
22 Past efforts to include competition rules into GATT started from the drafting of Chapter V of the Havana 
Charter on restrictive business practices as, for example, Article 46 contained in Chapter V requests each 
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of co-operation on competition policy is different from the more traditional trade 
liberalisation under GATT. 23 Furthermore, the recent trend of increasing unpopularity of 
trade liberalisation and hostility toward MNCs has been fuelled by the opponents of 
globalisation 24 accusing the WTO of intruding on national sovereignty by enforcing 
global trade rules which interfere with domestic political considerations. 25 The US 
member state to take appropriate measures and to co-operate to prevent business practices on the part of 
public or private commercial enterprises from affecting international trade by restricting competition, 
limiting market access, or fostering monopolistic control. In 1955, CPs rejected a proposal to add Chapter 
V to the General Agreement. In 1960, CPs adopted a report by an Expert Group on restrictive business 
practices, but the arrangements for inter-governmental consultation have never been put into practice (see 
GATT, BISD 9th Supp., 1961, the Decision of 18 November 1960). During the Tokyo Round, a 
notification on restrictive business practices of MNCs was included in the Inventory of Non-Tariff 
Measures, but the issue was not examined. During the preparatory work of the Uruguay Round, a proposal 
by least-developed countries to include restrictive business practices as one of the negotiation topic. No 
consensus was reached because of ICs' rejection (GATT, GATT Activities 1986, p. 29). See discussion in 
Malaguti, 1998, pp. 120-122 and Petersmann, 1993, note 19 above, pp. 38-40. 
23 Despite one of the objectives of GATT trade rules being to maintain equal competition opportunities in 
the market place, GATT does not regulate government policies affecting exports. It allows liberalisation to 
occur by inducing export oriented industry and consumer groups to offset the political power of protected 
import competing interest group. See Hoekman, Bernard and Petros C. Mavroidis, `Competition, 
Competition Policy and the GATT', The World Competition, 1994, p. 128 and GATT, BISD 37`h Supp., 86, 
1990, Panel Report on EEC, Payments and Subsidies Paid to Processors and Producers of Oilseeds and 
Related Animal-Feed Proteins, a case relating to the violation of Article III: 4 and XXIII: 1(b). Fox also 
rejects the suggestion of a multilateral agreement in light of recent failed attempts. See Fox, Eleanor M., 
`Trade, Competition, and Intellectual Property - TRIPS and its Antitrust Counterparts', VandJTL, 29(3), 
1996, pp. 495-501. Two examples of recent failure to reach an international antitrust agreement are 1) the 
Munich Group Draft (A Draft International Anti-trust Code as a GATT-Multilateral Trade Organisation 
Plurilateral Trade Agreement), prepared by a private International Antitrust Code Working Group, which 
was submitted to Peter Sutherland, then GATT Director-General in 1993, and 2) the co-ordination of 
competition policies in the framework of the Organisation for economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), mainly due to the objection from the US. Fox further points out that, to have a meaningful 
internationalised IP-anti-trust law, nations have to be able to agree on a set of rules with a meaningful level 
of specificity, the law has to be pre-emptive, and the enforceable mechanism has to be creditable, but these 
conditions are unlikely to achieve. See also See Petersmann, 1993, note 19 above, p. 37. 
24 Many opponents of globalisation are non-governmental organisations (NGOs) with political or social 
objectives, such as preventing environmental deterioration or promoting human rights. The confrontation 
was magnified in the street protests in Seattle during the third WTO Ministerial Conference held between 
30 November and 3 December 1999. The Conference failed to reach an agreement for a new round of 
MTNs. See Vernon, 1998, note 2 above, p. 219 and FT, December 3,1999, p. 19. 
u The Economist observes that if competition is to be incorporated into the WTO, two agreements must be 
reached, one being a transatlantic deal between the EU and the US, the two most influential players in 
global trade who account for nearly two-fifth of world trade, and another one between North and South. 
(See The Economist, November 27,1999, pp. 25-29). The failure of the recent Ministerial Meeting in 
Seattle demonstrates the difficulty for the EU and the US to reach an agreement on this issue (See FT, 
December 3-6,1999, The Economist, November 27,1999, and Vernon, 1998, op. cit., pp. 211-219). They 
both agree that the aim of competition policy is to get other countries to improve access to their markets by 
punishing local RBPs, but both are not keen for WTO DSB to be empowered to overrule their anti-trust 
decisions.. It is an issue which concerns national sovereignty. (See FT, July 27,1998 and October 26, 
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Congress has expressed their refusal to relinquish policy-making power. 26 And the 
reluctance of the EU to comply with rulings of panel reports on its banana regime and 
ban on hormone-treated beef 27 demonstrates the increasing difficulty governments face 
in defending domestically the legitimacy of unpopular dispute rulings by an international 
institution. As such, a multilateral agreement to regulate or harmonise domestic policies 
which will interfere with regulatory autonomy of states looks difficult. 28 
5.2 Global trade in IPP and competition policy 
The major objective of the. global trading system-is to liberalise trade. It is to be achieved 
by two inter-linked mechanisms. One is to secure market access and fair competition 
1999). The EU seeks a WTO agreement on competition policy with agreed common basic principles for 
incorporating into members' domestic competition policies. But the US does not want a global anti-trust 
policy for fear that it could only result in political compromises which could lower standard and weaken 
enforcement, and the scope for its unilateral actions could be constrained (The Economist, November 27, 
1999, p. 26). An agreement between North and South is even more unlikely as DCs have a very different 
perspective in relation to the role the WTO competition policy. For them, competition policy is 
implemented to stop MNCs from dominating their markets and to tackle rich economies' use of anti- 
dumping measures against low cost imports. See FT, December 6,1999, p. 18. 
26 Especially toward the strengthened DSM under the WTO system which might adjudicate unfavourably in 
the area of Section 301 trade policy. Jackson, 1994, op. Cit., pp. 74-81. It should be noted that Article XV: 
I of the Agreement Establishing WTO does provide member states with the right to withdraw from the 
trade organisation with a six months notice. 
27 The two cases do not just involve economic issues, they are also social issues with political elements 
involved. The ban on hormone-treated beef is in response to public fears about food safety, but also is to 
protect inefficient European farmers. See The Economist, May 8,1999, p. 22. See also WTO, 
WT/DS27/RW/ECU, 12 April, 1999, the Panel Report on European Communities' Regime for the 
Importation, sales and Distribution of Bananas - Recourse to Article 21.5 by Ecuador and WTO, 
WT/DS26/ARB, 12 July, 1999, the Decision by the Arbitrators on the European Communities' Measures 
Concerning Meat and Meat Products (hormones). 
28 Mutual recognition of each other's law and regulations might then be a way forward. For example, 
negotiations on mutual recognition agreements between the US and EU to dismantle barriers to 
transatlantic investment and trade in pharmaceuticals and medical devices. See FT, March 2,1998, p. 21. 
Mutual recognition does not require acceptance of another country's standards or technical regulations for 
products. It involves two parties agreeing to recognise, for example, test reports issued by agreed and 
accredited bodies located in each other's territory. It could then waive the need for repetitive testing when 
products are destined for different markets. For discussion on. the approach of mutual recognition on 
transatlantic registration dossier for new chemical entities, see Stephenson, Sherry M., `Mutual Recognition 
and its Role in Trade Facilitation', JWT, 33(2), April 1999, pp. 141-150. 
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opportunity commitments through MTNs under the legal framework of the WTO. And 
the other is to ensure the efficient functioning of domestic markets through domestic 
competition policy to give effect to trade liberalisation commitments. 29 The introduction 
of domestic competition policy in this context is to minimise or eliminate trade restricting 
practices engaged by both government and private enterprises which have anti- 
competitive effects. 30 Its implementation must complement and reinforce international 
treaty obligations so to protect and promote competition in the global market. 31 
The interface between IPP and domestic competition policy comes in two strata: almost 
all competition policies expressly or implicitly. exempt the exclusive rights inherent in 
IPP from their application. 32 But the majority of them do regulate the use of IPRs in the 
areas of contractual licensing agreements and commonly provide compulsory licensing as 
a remedy for abuses or anti-competitive practices in the exercise of the exclusive rights. 33 
With regard to patent protection conferred by the TRIPS Agreement, the Agreement does 
not expressly define to what extent the exclusive rights should be recognised in domestic 
29 OECD, Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Rights, Paris: OECD, 1989, p. 12 and UNCTAD, 
The TRIPS Agreement and Developing Countries, NY; UN, 1996, p. 53. See also Vernon, 1998, note 2 
above, p. 212 and Hoekman and Mavroidis, note 23 above, p. 128. 
30 According to UNCTAD report, the introduction of competition policy is to minimise restrictions on free 
competition caused by restrictive business practices engaged in by private firms, and by governmental 
measures which unjustifiably distort competition. See UNCTAD, TDB/COM. 2/2/Add. 1,26 September 
1996, p. 1. Petersmann and Khemani also acknowledge that private restraints and government policies 
could impede competition, and there is the need for competition policy to relate to government as well as 
private distortion. The comment was made in a symposium on Competition Policy, Economic Development 
and International Trade that took place at the WTO headquarters on 29 November 1997. It was organised 
by the Secretariats of the WTO, UNCTAD, and the World Bank (hereinafter 1997 Symposium). See 
WTO, Focus, February 1998, p. 11. Fox further points out that the implication for IP on market access 
come in two strains. One is the formation of cartel and monopoly by private firms which has an 
international dimension. The other side of the spectrum is strict rules governments apply in interpreting 
TRIPS provisions which might hinder market access as a result. See also Fox, 1996, note 23 above, p. 501. 
31 UNCTAD, TDB/COM. 2/EM/2,28 August 1996, p. 37. 
32 The lack of explicit provisions or guidelines in relation to the competition policy treatment of the 
exclusive rights creates uncertainties. Ibid., p. 20. 
33 OECD, 1989, note 29 above, p. 12. 
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policy. It does acknowledge the interface by providing a framework to deal with private 
anti-competitive practices in contractual licensing agreements, 34 but it does not contain 
checks and balances to ensure that government measures do not unjustifiably distort trade 
and affect the exercise of the exclusive marketing rights conferred by patent. 35 
Under the TRIPS Agreement, governments may; adopt. "appropriate measures" 36 to 
prevent, among others, practices which unreasonably restrain trade. or adversely affect 
international transfer of. technology. 37 As not every: competitive practice has anti- 
competitive effects, UNCTAD 1996 Report interprets... the wording "appropriate 
measures" as meaning that measures taken by-governments have to meet some. sort of 
proportionality test to prevent governments from introducing an overly broad concept of 
restrictive conduct and excessive remedies. The .: 
TRIPS Agreement also authorises 
34 It is important to point out that private entities could not be held as infringing international obligations 
under TRIPS because it is an inter-state agreement. And it is difficult to establish liability of states for the 
independent action of private entities on the basis of WTO laws. Anti-competitive practices pursued by 
private entities without the support from governments cannot be challenged under Article XXIII: 1(a). 
Only if it involves positive actions or specific support from governments that nullify or impair established 
domestic competition conditions can a non-violation complaint be brought. Otherwise, private RBPs that 
are not subject to any government involvement are excluded from the scope of Article XXIII: 1(b). 
Hoekman and Mavroidis, 1994, note 23 above, pp. 121-150, p. 129, and Scherer, note 18 above, p. 105-107 
and Malaguti, note 22 above, pp. 137-138. 
's Fox, 1996, note 23 above, pp. 487,491, and 505. For example, licensors see governments' over-zealous 
application of competition policy as the most important disincentive to technology licensing activities, 
according to the result of an OECD survey, see OECD, International Technology Licensing and Survey 
Results, Paris: OECD, 1987, Table 40 and further discussion on this issue in OECD, 1989, note 29 above, 
12-14. 
36UNCTAD, 1996, note 29 above, p. 54. 
37 In order to achieve the objective of the TRIPS Agreement set out in Article 7, which states that: 
"The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to 
the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of 
technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological 
knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a 
balance of rights and obligations. " 
Article 8(2) reads: 
"appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the provisions of this 
Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right 
holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect 
the international transfer of technology. " 
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national governments to regulate private restrictive business practices (RBPs) which 
affect contractual licences, 38 and calls for a case-by-case approach so as to prevent the 
enactment of licensing rules which might outlaw some forms of licensing without looking 
into the existence of anti-competitive effects. And recognising that many anti- 
competitive practices could have cross-border effects, 39 an inter-governmental 
consultation mechanism is provided for 40 in cases involving private licensing practices 
that restrain competition and adversely affect trade. 41 
38 Article 40.2 reads: 
"Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent Members from specifying in their legislation 
licensing practices or conditions that may in particular cases constitute an abuse of 
intellectual property rights having an adverse effect on competition in the relevant 
market... " 
The Article also gives examples of exclusive grant-back conditions, conditions preventing challenges to 
validity and coercive package licensing. The list of examples should be seen as non-exhaustive. It is up to 
national governments to specify what constitute anti-competitive practices. See discussion in UNCTAD, 
1996, note 29 above, p. 54. There are fourteen practices which have been identified by an international 
draft code of conduct on the transfer of technology as anti-competitive: grant-back provisions, challenges to 
validity, exclusive dealing, restrictions on research, restrictions on use of personnel, price fixing restrictions 
on adaptations, exclusive sales or representation agreements, tying arrangements, export restrictions, patent 
pool or cross-licensing agreements and other arrangements, restrictions on publicity payments and other 
obligations after expiration of industrial property rights, and restrictions after expiration of arrangement. 
See UNCTAD, TD/CODE TOT/56, Further Consultations on a Draft International Code of Conduct on the 
Transfer of Technology - Report by the Secretary General of UNCTAD, 1990a, pp. 8-10. 39 When dealing with business practices occurring in one state which produce restrictive effects in another, 
the international co-operation on the enforcement of competition regulations is in the form of bilateral 
agreement between governments, for example, of the US and the EC (Agreement between the Government 
of the United States of America and the Commission of the European communities regarding the 
application of their competition law, reached on 23 September 1991,30 I. L. M. (1991) 1487) and Canada 
and the US (Canada - United States Agreement regarding the application of their competition and 
deceptive marketing practices laws, reached in August 1995,35 I. L. M. (1996) 309). 
4° Most national competition policies do not apply to RBPs which solely affect foreign markets. It is often 
difficult if not impossible for countries whose markets are affected to gather the necessary evidence from 
where restrictive practices originated. Full cooperation from the authority of the country where the RBPs 
originated is therefore necessary. But Petersmann comments that different degree of market integration 
does affect the extent of co-operation in competition law enforcement. See 1997 Symposium, note 30 
above. 
41 Article 40(3) of the TRIPS Agreement reads: 
"Each Member shall enter, upon request, into consultations with any other Member 
which has cause to believe that an intellectual property right owner that is a national 
or domiciliary of the Member to which the request for consultations has been 
addressed is undertaking practices in violation of the requesting Member's laws and 
regulation... " 
Any anti-competitive practices outside the context of licensing are not subject to this provision. See 
discussion in Fox, 1996, note 23 above, p. 486 and UNCTAD, 1996, note 29 above, pp. 3,7, and 54. 
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The TRIPS Agreement further provides compulsory licensing as a remedy when private 
anti-competitive practices are established. 42 As it is within the domestic jurisdiction to 
define what constitute anti-competitive practices, concerns have been raised that 
governments might rely on the compulsory licensing provisions to implement measures 
which deny the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by patent protection. 43 
Since the protection of public health is a common socio-economic goal among nations, it 
could be taken up as a consideration in formulating or amending domestic licensing - 
legislation.. The availability and affordability : Of modern medicines for: AIDS is a':. 
poignant example in that AIDS is a common disease in both ICs and DCs, but the most 
advanced medicines are in the hand of MPCs, and are protected by patent. 44 With 95% 
of HIV positive sufferers living in DCs, 45 countries such as South Africa try to find a 
way to improve access to these expensive medicines and solve the problem of 
affordability for the poor population as a matter of urgency. 46 In the search for solutions 
that are TRIPS-consistent, Article 8.1 provides the first step forward. It states that 
UNCTAD 1996 Report describes inter-governmental consultation in Article 40: 3 as providing a comity 
approach with respect to possible extra-territorial effects of national anti-trust enforcement. 
42 Article 31(k) of the TRIPS Agreement states that: 
"Members are not obliged to apply the conditions set forth in subparagraphs (b) and 
(f) where such use (without authorisation of the right holder) is permitted to remedy 
a practice determined after judicial or administrative process to be anti-competitive. 
The need to correct anti-competitive practices may be taken into account in 
detrmining the amount of remuneration in such cases... " 
See Chapter 4.4 for the discussion on Articles 31(b) and 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement. 
43 See IFPMA, IFPMA Position Paper - WTO Millennium Round, Geneva: IFPMA, 1999. " MPCs market their advanced medicines in ICs for those affluent patients who can afford to pay. 
45 The Economist, August 14,1999, p. 11. 
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" Members may, in formulating or amending their laws 
and regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect 
public health..., provided that such measures are 
consistent with the provisions of this Agreement. " 
If a product is needed in case of national emergency 47 or if it is for public non- 
commercial use, the requirement of prior negotiations with the right holder for a licensing 
agreement on reasonable commercial terms could be waived.. 48 Compulsory license 
could therefore be granted to allow local manufacturers to produce generic versions of 
the patented product to cope with the epidemic through the public healthcare system. 49 
Limiting the exercise of the exclusive marketing rights conferred by a patent is an 
alternative to secure the availability and affordability of modem medicines in many 
countries. The TRIPS Agreement does allow limited exceptions to the exclusive rights 
conferred by a patent, as states in Article 30: 
46 The government of South Africa acknowledged that they face a national emergency as the HIV epidemic 
and AIDS-related diseases poise to kill millions of people in the country. See FT, December 1,1999, p. 20 
and The Economist, August 14,1999, p. 70. 
47 The government of South Africa has wanted the WTO to declare AIDS a medical emergency, giving it 
the right to disregard patent rules so to manufacture or import cheap copies of HIV drugs, see FT, May 19, 
2000. 
48 Article 31(b) of the TRIPS Agreement states that other use without authorisation of the right holder 
should respect the following provision: 
"such use may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed 
user has made efforts to obtain authorisation from the right holder on 
reasonable commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts 
have not been successful within a reasonable period of time. This 
requirement may be waived by a Member in the case of a national 
emergency... or in case of public non-commercial use... " 
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".. providing that such exceptions do not unreasonably 
conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do 
not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the 
patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of 
third parties. " so 
Under Article 30, limited exception may be provided when three cumulative conditions 
are met, each being a separate and independent requirement that must be satisfied. 51 
Firstly, the exception must be "limited", a condition neither designed nor intended to 
address the issue of economic impact directly. 52 The term "limited exception" expresses 
a requirement that the exception makes only a narrow curtailment of the legal rights 
Article 28.1 of the . TRIPS 
Agreement requires to be granted to patent owners. The 
curtailment of legal rights cannot be measured by the size or extent of the economic 
impact or by counting the number of legal rights impaired by an exception. 53 It is to be 
measured by the extent to which the exclusive rights of the patent owner have been 
curtailed. 54 Secondly, the exception "must not unreasonably conflict with normal 
exploitation of the patent. " And the normal practice of exploitation by patent owners is 
to exclude all forms of competition that could detract significantly from the economic 
49 The assumption is made that medicines are for non-commercial use when they are available through a 
non-profit making national health scheme. 
50 Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement. This Article contains broad language and political. It is left to 
individual governments to define what constitute normal exploitation of the patent and unreasonable 
prejudice? Who are the third parties and how to justify their legitimate interests taking precedent over legal 
rights conferred by patent protection? 
sl WTO, WT/DS 114/R, 17 March 2000, the report of the Panel on Canada - Patent Protection of 
Pharmaceutical Products (hereinafter the EC v Canada Panel Report), p. 138. 
52 Ibid., p. 146. 
53 Ibid., p. 141. 
54 Ibid. 
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returns anticipated from a patent's grant of market exclusivity. 55 Thirdly, the exception 
"must not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking into 
account the legitimate interests of third parties. " 56 The term "the legitimate interests" is 
construed as a concept broader than legal interests. 57 It is defined as a normative claim 
calling for protection of interests that are justifiable in the sense that they are widely 
recognised and supported by relevant public policies or other, social norms. 58 
UNCTAD suggested that one exception relating to the; exclusive right. of using the 
patented product is to allow third parties, such as generic: manufacturers, to use the 
pharmaceutical patented invention to obtain regulatory approval for the 
commercialisation of generic versions prior to the expiry of patent. 59 The legality of 
such a government policy has been challenged by the EC in 1998 under the WTO DSM 60 
against Canada. In this case, the EC challenged Article 55.2(1) of Canada's Patent Act 
(the so called regulatory review exception) which allows all activities relating to the 
development and submission of information required to obtain regulatory approval for 
55 Ibid., p. 147. 
56 Ibid., pp. 147-149. The Panel is of the opinion that the weight of legitimate interests of third party 
interests cannot be appraised after the identification of "the legitimate interests" and the appraisal of 
whether they have been prejudiced. The EC argued that, pursuant to Article 28.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, 
"legitimate interests" is the full enjoyment of one's patent rights during the entire term of the patent, and 
the only relevant third parties for the purpose of Article 30 are the patent owner's competitors, the generic 
drug producers. But Canada defined "legitimate interests" as the norms or policies that are deduced from 
the patent laws that create those rights. And by relying on Articles 7 and 8.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, 
Canada regarded the legitimate interests of third parties as representing general societal interests, 
particularly interests connected with health policy. 
Ibid., pp. 151-154. 
58 Ibid. An example given by the Panel is that both society and the scientists have a legitimate interest in 
using the patent disclosure to support the advance of science and technology. 
59 UNCTAD, 1996, note 29 above, p. 34. 
60 MPCs have also challenged in national courts the legality of the domestic legislation allowing generic 
manufacturers to produce chemical substances within the technical scope of the patent holder's invention 
for the purpose of conducting clinical trials and to gain regulatory approval during the patent life of a 
product. In a recent case between Ono Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. v. Kyoto Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., 
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pharmaceutical products to be carried out by third parties without the consent of the 
patent holder at any time during the patent term, 61 therefore in breach of Articles 30 and 
28(l) of the TRIPS Agreement. Canada argued that, by doing so, it was maintaining the 
balance between the protection of patent and the promotion of public welfare. Canada 
further argued that Articles 55.2(1) sought to protect public health, as recognised in 
Article 8.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, through promoting access to cost-effective generic 
medicines following patent expiry,, taking into . account the legitimate interests of 
individuals, private insurers, and public sector.. entities that financed health care in 
maintaining access to affordable medicines. 62 
The Panel to the case concluded that Article 55.2(1) of Canada's Patent Act does satisfy 
all three conditions of Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement, and does not prejudice "the 
legitimate interests" of affected patent owners within the meaning of Article 30, thus it is 
not inconsistent with Canada's obligations under Article 28.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. 63 
This decision will clear the way for more governments adopting legislations containing 
similar regulatory review exception because the introduction of generic competition is a 
practice governments are keen to emulate as a means to control healthcare costs. 64 
Japanese Supreme Court affirmed that such a conduct by generic manufacturers does not infringe Japanese 
patent law. See National Reports, EIPR, 8,1999, N 140-14 1. 
1 The EC also challenged Articles 55.2(2) and 55.2(3) of Canada's Patent Act that allow manufacturing 
and stockpiling products during the six months immediately prior to the expiration of the twenty-year 
patent term (the so called stockpiling exceptions). See the EC v Canada Panel Report, note 51 above. 
Z Ibid., p. 15 and WTO, Focus, November 1998, pp. 2 and 35, p. 2. 
63 But the stock piling exceptions constitute a substantial curtailment of the exclusive rights and are 
inconsistent with Article 28.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. Ibid., pp. 143-144. 
64 The US, Argentina, Australia, Hungary, Israel, Japan and Portugal all allow research and product testing 
before patents expire, see FT, March 8,2000 and the EC v Canada Panel Report, note 51 above, p. 144. 
Furthermore, the participation of eleven WTO members in the panel proceedings of this case as third 
parties (they are Australia, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, India, Israel, Japan, Poland, Switzerland, Thailand and 
the US) by virtue of Article 10 of the DSU demonstrated the interest governments have in the legal status 
of this practice under WTO rules. 
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5.3 The doctrine of exhaustion and the issue of parallel importation 
The absence of any provisions under the TRIPS Agreement to explicitly define the extent 
the exclusive marketing rights conferred by patent protection 65 should be recognised in 
domestic legislation exposes the contradiction between trade liberalisation and domestic. 
competition policy promoting free trade, and trade restricting effects rising from the 
exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by patent protection. The doctrine of 
- exhaustion 
66 and the related issue of parallel importation for pharmaceuticals are the -. 
prime examples to illustrate this interface. As the scope of exemption of the exclusivity 
of the rights conferred by patent protection from competition rules varies -äriiöng'-T 
countries, 67 and parallel importation is often encouraged to complement an array of other 
domestic economic, health care or social policies, 68 no party in the TRIPS MTNs was 
willing to make any commitment in the areas of exhaustion of rights and parallel 
importation even though they are very important trade-related issues in the field of IPP. 69 
65 This might trace back to the Paris Convention that does not contain explicit provisions about exhaustion 
and parallel importation either. Under the Convention, it is for individual states to legislate whether patent 
holders could rely on domestic patent systems to block parallel imports. 
66 It is referred to as the doctrine of first sale in the US. 
67 See UNCTAD, TDB/COM. 2/EM/2,28 August 1996. 
68 Rothnie, W. A., Parallel Imports, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1993, pp. 501-508. 
69 As Cottier points out, many participants in the TRIPS MTNs thought it necessary to include an explicit 
guarantee of sovereignty in the area of exhaustion of rights and parallel importation if the topics were to be 
negotiated. See Cottier, Thomas, `The Prospects for Intellectual Property in GATT', CMLR, 28,1991, p. 
399. Cornish comments that because they are very political issues. See Cornish, W. R., Intellectual 
Property: Patents, Copyrights, Trade Marks and Allied Rights, 4t' ed., London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1999, p. 
47 and Straus, Joseph, `Implications of the TRIPS Agreement in the Field of Patent Law', in Beier and 
Schricker (eds. ), From GATT to TRIPS - The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
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The word "exhaustion" is used to mean that a patent holder is not entitled to any legal 
control over the subsequent commercialisation 70 of the patented product within the 
territory of the state granting the protection following the first authorised domestic sale of 
the patented product. This concept is underpinned by the assumption that a patent holder 
would have been rewarded for his or her creative efforts through the first exclusive sale 
by charging higher economic - rents to recoup R&D investment; : 71 and that he or she 
should not be allowed to further economic rents from subsequent. commercialisation of 
the product. 72 
Parallel importation of pharmaceuticals -involves the importation of patented : drugs; 
lawfully put on the market in the place of export, by third parties, without patent holders' 
consent, to countries where identical products have been legitimately, put onto ! the 
markets but are selling at a higher price. 73 The application of the doctrine of territorial 
exhaustion is limited to the territory of the state granting the protection, 74 under which 
parallel importation constitutes an infringement of the patent holder's exclusive rights. 
Parallel importation is allowed in countries where a patent system does not exist or the 
Rights, Munich: The Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Patent, Copyright and Competition 
Law, 1996. 
70 The doctrine of exhaustion does not affect the exclusive rights of manufacturing or production of 
patented products. But it applies to the commercialisation stage in relation to sales, marketing, distribution 
and importation of patented products. 
71 When parallel importation is allowed, the assumption that a patent holder could charge a premium price 
and be expected to recoup R&D investment at the initial sale of the patented product in country A can be 
easily rebutted if country A is not the first market the MPC launches this product, and parallel imported 
products are waiting in the wing to compete. 
Yusuf, Abdulgawi and Andres Moncayo von Hase, `Intellectual Property Protection and International 
Trade - Exhaustion of Rights Revisited', World Competition, 16(1), 1992, pp. 116-119 and 129, 73 Rothnie, note 68 above, p. 1 and FT, December 16,1997. The parallel importation on a commercial 
scale is under discussion here. It does not concern private individuals purchasing a small quantity from 
abroad for private use. 
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doctrine of international exhaustion applies. The EU is an exception where community 
exhaustion is applied to uphold the principle of free movement of goods among the EU 
member states. 
75 
In the EU, the disparity of national legislation among its member states did not prevent 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) from applying the exhaustion of IPP on a community 
basis with respect to the distribution of patented products. When parallel importation was 
from outside the common market, it could be stopped by patent holders relying upon 
patent protection of individual -member states. 76 For parallel importation of 
pharmaceuticals from within the community, the ECJ formulated the principle 77 in 
Centrafarm v Sterling Drug that a patent holder cannot not invoke the exclusive rights 
conferred in member states to prevent the importation and the sale of goods that have 
been placed on the market with consent in another member state. 78 Otherwise, it would 
create a barrier to free movement of goods, 79 and amounts to a quantitative restriction or 
74 The territorial nature of the Doctrine of Exhaustion was developed at the end of the nineteenth century. 
It is consistent with the principle of territorality applicable to IPP. Yusuf and von Hase, note 72 above, pp. 
115-131, p. 116. 
7s Ibid. 
76 Bronckers, Marco C. E. J., `The Impact of TRIPS: Intellectual Property Protection in Developing 
Countries', CMLR, 31,1994, p. 1266. 
n Centrafarm BV v Sterling Drug By, (Case 15/74) [1974] ECR 1147 (hereinafter Sterling Drug). And the 
application of community exhaustion is GATT-legal by virtue of Article XXIV of GATT (customs unions 
and free trade areas), see discussion in Yusuf and von Hase, note 72 above, pp. 121 and 122 and Cottier, 
note 69 above, p. 400. 
's Sales in other member states by a licensee or another member of the same corporate group is covered by 
the principle. See Rothnie, note 68 above, p. 384. The same principle was articulated in relation to trade 
marks in Centrafarm BV v Winthrop BV (Case 16/74) [1974] ECR 1183, and Hoffmann-La Roche AG v 
Centrafarm Vertriebsgesellschaft Pharmazeutischer Erzeuugnisse mbH (Case 102/77) [1978] ECR 1139 
(hereinafter Hoffmann-La Roche). In the latter case, Advocate General Capotorti explains that the decision 
was prompted "by the desire to eliminate any risk of the use of trade marks to establish artificial divisions 
within the common market", see Hoffmann-La Roche, p. 1173. The principle applicable to trade marks 
was later enshrined in Article 7 of the Trade Marks Harmonisation Directive (Directive 89/104). 
79 Shea, Nicholas, `Parallel Importers' Use of Trade Marks: The European Court of Justice Confers Rights 
but also Imposes Responsibilities', EIPR, 3, March 1997, p. 103. In cases involving parallel importation, 
the ECJ applied the rules of competition under Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome at the beginning to 
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a measure having equivalent effects within the meaning of Article 30 of the Treaty of 
Rome. 80 But derogation from the principle of free movement of goods allowed under 
Article 36 can be relied on only for the purpose of safeguarding rights which constitute 
"the specific subject matter" of the intellectual property in question. 81 In relation to 
patent, the specific subject matter is the guarantee that the patent holder has the exclusive 
rights to use the invention to manufacture and put them into circulation for the first time 
in order to reward the creative effort of the inventor. 82 
Both the EU and the US have refused to apply international exhaustion. 83- Straus argues 
that the substantive . patent 
law under the TRIPS Agreement amount -to a bar to 
international exhaustion. When Articles 27(1) and 28(1) are read jointly, they oblige 
emphasise the importance of market integration. But increasingly, it relied on the principle of free 
movement of goods as stated in Article 30 of the Treaty of Rome. See discussion in Cornish, note 69 
above, ch. 1. 
80 Article 30 of the Treaty of Rome reads: 
"Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall, 
without prejudice to the following provisions, be prohibited between Member States. " 
Also consider the opinion expressed by Advocate General Jacobs in Upjohn SA v Paranova A/S case 
(Case C-379/97, delivered on 19 November 1998). He opines that if the patent owner is to seek to oppose 
imports from other EU member states, it is necessary to consider whether such an action is justified on 
grounds of the protection of industrial or commercial property by virtue of Article 36 of the Treaty of 
Rome. See http: //europa. eu. intiiurisp. According to Article 36: 
"The provisions of Arts. 30 to 34 shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on 
imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of.. the protection of health 
and life of humans, animals or plants; ... the protection of 
industrial and commercial 
property. Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means of 
arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States. " 
81 Sterling Drug, note 77 above, Judgement pars 8. 
82 Ibid., Judgement para. 9. In a later case, the ECJ elaborates that patent is not a guarantee of a reward, it 
only offers a prospect; and that many factors influence patentees' ultimate return, such as the availability of 
substitute products in the market. See Merck & Co., Inc. v Stephar By, (Case 187/80) [198 1] ECR 263 
(hereinafter Merck). In the same case, the ECJ also specifies that patent protection can be relied on to 
block the free movement of goods when the imported goods are generic, see Merck, Judgement pars 11 and 
Rotknie, note 68 above, pp. 339-352. 
83 See discussion in Broncker, note 76 above, p. 1268, Ullrich, Hanns, `TRIPS: Adequate Protection, 
Inadequate Trade, Adequate Competition Policy', Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal4(l), 1995, p. 192, 
and Yusuf and von Hase, note 72 above, pp. 122 and 123. The community Patent Convention of 1975 as 
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member states to grant the patent holder the exclusive rights to prevent, for example, the 
importation by third parties of patented product regardless of where the products were 
producted. 84 In contrast, Yusuf and von Hase advocate the adoption of international 
exhaustion because parallel importation promotes free trade and encourages 
competition. 85 They regard national exhaustion as constituting a barrier to trade when 
legitimate goods are not allowed from entering into countries; and the discrimination 
against imports contravenes NT obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. 86 Bronckers is 
also in support of international exhaustion regarding it. as more in line with the GATT 
spirit of banning import restrictions and ensuring free movement of goods in the 
promotion of global trade. 87 But any WTO member states applying it must do so on a 
MFN basis 88 without discriminating against imports based on the origin of the product 
89 and to whom the intellectual property belongs. 
Yusuf and von Hase argue that by allowing in parallel imports, it has a price leveling 
effect which could make the lowest price available for the benefit of domestic 
consumers. 90 And by introducing competition into a market, Ullrich believes that MPCs 
revised in 1989 will introduce a specific doctrine of exhaustion affecting community and national patent 
within the EU, see discussion in Cornish, note 69 above, ch. 6. 
84 The situation is not altered by Article 6 because it is not of a substantive legal nature. See Straus, note 69 
above, pp. 160-215, p. 192. 
85 Yusuf and von Hase, note 72 above, p. 128 
86 Ibid. and Ullrich, 1995, note 83 above, p. 193. 
87 Bronckers, note 76 above, pp. 1267 and 1268. Ullrich also makes the point that the principle of 
territorality has to be viewed critically because the application of which could interrupt the free flow of 
goods across borders, Ullrich, 1995, note 83 above, p. 193. 
88 The application of Article 6 is subject to NT (Article 3) and MFN (Article 4). See Article 6 of the TRIPS 
Agreement. 
89 Ullrich, 1995, note 83 above, p. 191. 
40 Yusuf and von Hase, note 72 above, p. 130. This statement could be challenged from two aspects: If the 
criteria of MPCs' pricing strategy hold true, drug prices in DCs would tend to be lower to start with. And if 
governments implement drug reimbursement schemes and healthcare service is delivered by private sector, 
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cannot profit from non-market rewards based on monopoly privileges. 91 But MPCs 
argue that, in recent years, government pressure to reduce health care expenditure has had 
significant impacts on the pricing of pharmaceutical products and the functioning of 
pharmaceutical markets. 92 Even though MPCs base their pricing strategy considerations 
on factors such as demand elasticity, purchasing power and the size of the market, 
conflicting government. policies have also contributed to price differentials among 
countries 93 as some countries adopt a low price approach with stringent pricing control 
scheme in operation, while others allow MPCs greater pricing freedom as an incentive to 
encourage inward R&D investments. 94 .-- 
UNCTAD suggested the adoption of international exhaustion, especially in DCs, by 
relying on the exception provision of Article 30 to facilitate the availability of cheaper 
imports on the domestic market. 95 If this approach is adopted, government measures as 
such cannot be challenged under the TRIPS Agreement because Article 6 of the 
Agreement excludes disputes arising from exhaustion of IPRs from being brought in front 
any saving from drug prices would not pass on to consumers, but to benefit parallel importers or healthcare 
providers who are the purchasers. 
1 Ullrich, 1995, note 83 above, p. 194. 
92 This is acknowledged by the EU Commission in November 98 Communication on the Single Market in 
Pharmaceuticals (EU Commission, COM(98) 588 final). Also see Rothnie, note 68 above, p. 497. 
93 Ibid., pp. 505-508. 
94 Ibid. 
95 UNCTAD, 1996, note 29 above, p. 34. However, UNCTAD also points out that international exhaustion 
could bring the risk of MPCs withdrawing price discrimination in DCs favour. In the interest of consumers 
in poorer countries, some suggest an agreement with wealthier countries where sales by the patentee in the 
poorer countries does not lead to an exhaustion of patent rights in the wealthy countries. In return, it might 
persuade MPCs to price drugs at lower price in the poorer countries. See Adelman, Martin and Sonia 
Baldia, `Prospects and Limits of the Patent Provision in the TRIPS Agreement: The Case of India', Vand 
JTL, 29(3), 1996, p. 532. 
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of the DSB. 96 Some believe tha if it can be substantiated that the introduction of 
international exhaustion has frustr to egitimate expectations created by the TRIPS 
Agreement, in which case it might be actionable under Article XXIII: 1(b) of GATT 
1994.97 But Hoekman and Mavroidis express reservation that the interpretation of 
TRIPS provisions could lead to the establishment of a non-violation complaint under 
GATT 98 as it involves the protection of competitive conditions established by agreed 
imported tariff concessions, but there is no agreed tariff concessions involved in TRIPS. 
When disputes arise which concern the interpretation or application of the legal 
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(Vienna Convention) applies. 99 Recent WTO panel reports 100 affirm that provisions of 
WTO agreements must be interpreted in accordance with customary rules of 
interpretation of public international law, 101 and Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna 
96 See Footnote 6 in the TRIPS Agreement which states that the right in respect of the use, sale, importation 
or other distribution of goods referred to in Article 28.1(a) is subject to the provisions of Article 6. And 
Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement reads: 
"For the purpose of dispute settlement under this Agreement... nothing in this 
Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual 
property rights. " 
97 Cottier, note 69 above, pp. 399 and 400, Broncker, 'note 76 above, p. 1268, and Yusuf and von Hase, note 
72 above, p. 115. They also suggest to rely on Article XX of GATT as a possible defense if international 
exhaustion is challenged, based on the claim that the exclusive rights conferred constitute a means of 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a 
disguised restriction on international trade. 
98 Hoekman and Mavroidis, note 23 above, p. 140-141 and Hoekman, Bernard M. and Michael Kostecki, 
The Political Economy of the World Trading System from GATT to WTO , Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1995, p. 46. 
99 Article 3.2 of the DSU states that the WTO dispute settlement system is 
"to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary 
rules of interpretation of public international law... " 
Furthermore, Article 19.2 of the DSU states that the panel and Appellate Body's rulings or 
recommendations cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements. 
10° WTO, WT/DS79/R, 24 August 1998, the report of the Panel on India - Patent Protection for 
Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products (hereinafter The EC v India Panel Report), p. 57-60. 
101 Article 3.2 of the DSU states that: 
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Convention have attained the status of customary international law. 102 According to 
Article 31, a treaty should be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning of the terms of the treaty, the context, and its object and purpose. 103 And if 
necessary, the negotiating history of TRIPS could be used as a supplementary means of 
interpretation. 104 
The issue of whether adopted, WTO panel reports are ý stare decisis, ' i. e. binding 
precedents, needs to be clarified.. From the legal point of view, international legal system 
does not embrace the common law jurisprudence of strict adherence to precedent. 105 A 
"... The Member of the WTO recognise that it serves to preserve the rights and 
obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing 
provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of 
interpretation of public international law... " 
102 WTO, WT/DS 152/R, 22 December 1999, US - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 (hereinafter 
US Trade Act Panel Report), pp. 304-305. 
103 Article 31 of the Vienna Convention states that: 
" 1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of 
its object and purpose. 
2. The contest for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, 
in addition and annexes: 
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the 
parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty; 
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection 
with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an 
instrument relating to the treaty..... " 
According to the panel report, the elements referred to in this Article, i. e., test, context and object and 
purpose as well as good faith, are to be viewed as one holistic rule of interpretation rather than a sequence 
of separate texts in a hierarchical order. 
1°4 Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 reads: 
"Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the 
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion in order to confirm 
the meaning resulting from the application of article 31... " 
105 See discussion in Jackson, John H., `The World Trade Organisation, Dispute Settlement, and Codes of 
Conduct', in Collins and Bosworth (eds. ), The New GATT - Implications for the United States, 
Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994, p. 70 and Jackson John H., William Davey and Alan 
0. Sykes Jr., Legal Problems of International Economic Relations - Cases, Material and Text on the 
National and International Regulation of Transnational Economic Relations, 3`' ed., St Paul: West 
Publishing Co., 1995 (hereinafter Jackson et al), p. 348 et seq, and Brownlie, Ian, Principles of Public 
International Law, 4`h ed., Oxford: Oxford Univesity Press, pp. 21-23. 
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WTO panel confirmed that panels are not bound by previous decisions of panels or the 
Appellate Body even if the subject matter is the same. 106 However, the need to avoid 
inconsistent rulings so to give security and predictability to a rule-based multilateral 
trading system is very important. 107 
The territorial nature of. the doctrine of exhaustion is consistent with the principle of 
territoriality applicable to IPP under which countries could legitimately take measures 
against import monopoly by introducing international exhaustion in their legislation. 108 1 
In deciding whether to adopt territorial or international exhaustion in their domestic - 
legislation, member states are influenced by different legal traditions of dealing with,,:: - 
patent protection, 109 and varying degrees of emphasis each country places on its 
health, "" industrial 111 and economic policies. 112 They also need to strike a balance 
between short-term benefits of making available pharmaceuticals at lower prices and 
106 The Panel states that: 
"It can thus be concluded that panels are not bound by previous decisions of panels or the 
Appellate Body even if the subject-matter is the same.... Moreover, in our examination, 
we believe that we should give significant weight to both Article 3.2 of the DSU, which 
stress the role of the WTO dispute settlement system in providing security and 
predictability to the multilateral trading system, and to the need to avoid inconsistent 
rulings... " 
See WTO, WT/DS50/AB/R, 19 December 1997, the report of the Appellate Body on India - Patent 
Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products (hereinafter The US v India Appellate 
Body ReportO, p. 57. 
107 Ibid. So to be consistent with the central element of the WTO dispute settlement system. See Article 
3.2 of the DSU. 
los Broncker, note 76 above, p. 1270. 
109 If a country regards IP as public goods that, once created, should be made available at marginal cost, its 
competition policy will treat the question of reward-for-innovation differently from another country with 
the legal tradition of treating IP as private property. 
110 For example, the regulatory mechanism has to be in place to ensure that imported products from all 
sources meet the safety, quality and efficacy standards required of patented products marketed 
domestically. 
111 Such as incentives to attract foreign investment. See UNCTAD, TDB/COM. 2/2/Add. 1,26 September 
1996. 
112 Consumer welfare is an area of concern. It could be protected by, for example, preventing practices that 
artificially raise price to consumers. See WTO, Focus, February 1998, p. 10. At the macro-economic 
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possible long term costs of discouraging MPCs from foreign investment if international 
exhaustion is adopted. 113 If it is perceived to be in the national interest to promote 
parallel importation, reciprocal bargaining in a multilateral setting on the issue will be 
politically difficult. 
In the absence of a multilateral agreement on the exhaustion of the. exclusive marketing 
rights, MPCs will continue to be exposed to diverse domestic legislation in regard to the 
exercise of exclusive marketing rights 114 and give rise to the claim of non-tariff barriers 
that cause trade distortion. If no satisfactory -result is reached by negotiations between -- 
the pharmaceutical industry and the host government, it could result in MPCs' 
representative governments reverting to unilateral sanction as an alternative to resolve the 
issue. 
The legitimacy of Section 301 provisions was confirmed in 1999 by a WTO panel report 
not to be inconsistent with the US's obligations under the WTO. 115 This decision will 
level, revenue from exports and foreign currency reserves could all play a part in shaping government 
ý olicies. 
Rothnie, note 68 above, pp. 585-590. 
114 Vernon, 1998, note 2 above, pp. 213-219. Vernon explains that when an international agreement exists 
that addresses the substance of a problem, it reduces the frequency with which jurisdictional conflicts arise. 
If an agreement does not provide the necessary insulation to enable governments to fend off political 
pressures from, for example, interest groups who perceive the costs and benefits of opening the national 
economy being unfairly distributed, governments will often resist fiercely to the intrusion on their 
sovereignty. 
ils The US Trade Act Panel Report, note 102 above, pp. 6 and 300. In this case, the EC claims that by 
applying sections 301-310 of the 1974 Act after the entry into force of the Uruguay Round Agreement, the 
US breaches the deal struck between the US and the other Uruguay Round participants. The deal consists 
of a trade-off between the practical certainty of adoption by the DSB of panel and Appellate Body Reports 
and of authorisation for members to suspend concession on the one hand, and the complete and definitive 
abandoning by the US of its policy of unilateral actions on the other. One of the important conclusions 
made by the panel is that Section 304(a)(2)(A) of the 1974 Act which requires the USTR to determine 
whether another member state denies rights or benefits of the US under a WTO agreement irrespective of 
whether the DSB adopts a panel or Appellate Body's findings on the matter is not inconsistent with Article 
23.2(a) of the DSU. 
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boost the US government's position in relying on them to deal with trade disputes arising 
within the WTO system or outside its coverage. 116 And these trade provisions will 
continue to play an influential role by providing the US citizens and private enterprises 
with a creditable route to petition the US government to investigate and act against 
potential violations of the TRIPS Agreement. The EC also has enacted a Trade Barrier 
Regulation (TBR) as a part of the Uruguay Round legislation package. 117 It enables 
industries and individual enterprises from the-. Community to' lodge complaints and 
request the Commission to act 118 when they are faced with "obstacle to trade". 119 The 
Regulation could be seen as the counterpart of the US Section 301 provisions, 120 and will 
serve as the basis to impose unilateral sanctions on dispute relating to the exhaustion of 
IPRs in the absence of a multilateral resolution. 
A multilateral solution to define the extent the exclusive marketing rights conferred by 
patent protection under the TRIPS Agreement should be recognised in domestic 
legislation so to settle the issue of exhaustion and parallel importation. MTNs under 
TRIPS is the preferred option because the principles of non-discrimination, namely NT 
and MFN, and reciprocity contained in the agreement would- ensure the compliance of 
treaty commitments, and it offers a centralised enforcement. mechanism that provides 
16 Jackson et al., note 105 above, p. 817. 
117 Council Regulation 3286/94 lays down Community procedures in the field of commercial policy in 
order to ensure that exercise of the community's right under international trade rules, in particular, those 
established under the auspices of the WTO, see O. J. L349/71 of 31 December 1994, amended by the 
Council Regulation 356/95, O. J. L41/3 of 23 February 1995. 
118 Such as bringing actions under the WTO DSM. 
119 It could be either non-violation or outright violation of trade rules. 
120 There are at least two differences between the Regulation and Section 301 provisions: firstly, TBR does 
not intend to force trading nations into new concessions, and secondly, the WTO DSM has to be utilised 
first. See Van Eeckhaute, Jean Charles, `Private Complaints against Foreign Unfair Trade Practices - The 
EC's Trade Barriers Regulation', 36(6), JWTL, 1999, pp. 199-213. 
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administrative simplicity and legal certainty. 121 Without a solution as such, it is difficult 
to see how the TRIPS Agreement could provide adequate or effective patent protection in 
securing patent holders' exercise of their exclusive marketing rights. The exercise of the 
exclusive rights should not be irreconcilable with, but complement trade liberalisation. 122 
If the WTO is to manage increasingly complex trade relations in an interdependent global 
economy and to maintain the basic rational of trade liberalisation, 123 it must address 
policies that, although- remaining within the domestic jurisdiction at present, have a 
bearing on cross-border trade. 124 
121 The WTO might then be faced with the necessity of proving a case of anti-competitive behaviour that is 
harmful to the efficient function of markets. It often requires a highly developed investigative and 
adjudicatory capability which, according to Vernon, is one that exceeds anything that exists in the WTO. If 
the WTO does take up the challenge, the administrative burden placed on the WTO administration could be 
tremendous if the EU experience is a precedent. At the time of writing, the European Commission is 
proposing to leave all but the most serious infringements of European competition law to national authority 
in order to reduce its administrative burden. See Petersmann, 1993, note 19 above, p. 41 and 75, Vernon, 
1998, note 2 aabove, p. 212 and FT, December 14,1999, p. 22. 
122 IPP should be served as the groundwork to facilitate global trade in IP-endowed products and 
technology. In an Aluminum Wheel case, the Tokyo High Court in Japan upheld the doctrine of 
international exhaustion applicable to patent protection for the first time. However, the court also states 
that if the opportunity to take the compensation of the patented product is limited by some national price 
control or execution of compulsory licence, the court will not consider such a patent right as exhausted. 
See Yamamoto, Shusaku, `A Reversal of Fortune for Patentees and Parallel Importers in Japan', EIPR, vol. 
7,1995, pp. 341-343. 
'23 Also see the comment made by Petersmann that benefits of effective competition rules are an element of 
trade liberalisation in 1997 Symposium, note 30 above. 
'24 UNCTAD, The Outcome of the Uruguay Round: An Initial Assessment - Supporting Papers to the 
Trade and Development Report 1994, NY: UN, 1994, p. 240... 
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Conclusion 
IPP has gained its prominence in legal, political and economic debates in recent years 
because of the increasing importance of intellectual property-endowed goods and 
technology in global trade. 1 Technology producers who participated in global trade, 
most of them MNCs, called for a rule-based trading environment in an increasingly 
integrated global economy where disparities in EP system among nations are eliminated, 
and IP products are bestowed due legal protection as in most of ICs. For MPCs, an 
adequate and effective patent regime that ensures the legal recognition of the exclusive 
marketing rights among nations was utmost in their mind. 
The discussion of the legal framework of the Paris Convention in this thesis demonstrates 
that the Convention would have had difficulty in answering above-mentioned demands. 
Its legal framework was agreed upon at a time when economic debates dominated the 
design of the agreement. But IPP as a subject has evolved since then from a domestic 
economic policy issue to one that also affects cross-border trade with global 
ramifications. 
The TRIPS Agreement has reflected, to a large extent, MPCs' concerns over the 
inadequacy and ineffectiveness of patent protection for pharmaceuticals under the 
Convention. With the emphasis on fair trade, it has incorporated unconditional MFN, 
NT, and reciprocity into the Agreement. And it has secured market access and equal 
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competition opportunity commitments by establishing a legal framework of substantive 
norms, enforcement and dispute settlement mechanisms of ICs' standard which binds all 
WTO members. But the Agreement did not address the issue of how to resolve potential 
conflicts between domestic competition policy and the implementation of treaty 
obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. 2 
An example in, point is the different approach, trading nations adopt in dealing with the 
exhaustion of the exclusive marketing rights conferred by patent protection for 
pharmaceuticals under the TRIPS Agreement. It is an issue with economic, political as 
well as legal connotations. Economically; : international- -exhaustion legalises parallel 
importation of pharmaceuticals and has direct impact on MPCs' profitability because 
those targeted drugs tend to be the ones with more improved therapeutic benefits that 
MPCs rely on to sustain their level of profitability. 3 But countries might wish to rely on 
parallel importation as a mechanism to control the perceived monopoly patent holders 
enjoy, and to bring down prices of patented products. It is a legal issue in that, from IP 
holders' point of view, diverse domestic policies will be perceived as non-tariff barriers 
causing trade distortions especially if the exclusive marketing rights are compromised in 
the implementation of other government policies. Politically, it touches upon nations' 
1 See World Bank, World Development Report, 1998/1999, NY: Oxford University Press for the World 
Bank, p. 27. 
2 IPP was introduced into the Uruguay Round MTNs at a time when GATT was confronted with increasing 
demands to bring domestic policy issues which affect cross-border trade into multilateral discipline. It 
inevitably involves interfering with governments' regulatory autonomy. Among different subjects dealt 
with by the global trading system in the Uruguay Round, MTNs on TRIPS, in particular patent protection 
for pharmaceuticals, pose a particular challenge in this respect because of diverse perspectives among ICs 
and DCs of the role patent protection for pharmaceuticals plays in both the spheres of domestic economy 
and global trade. By bringing an issue originally under domestic jurisdiction into multilateral discipline, 
the cohesion between the treaty obligation and other domestic policies cannot be totally ignored. 
3 Rothnie, W. A., Parallel Import, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1993, pp. 506-508. 
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regulatory autonomy if a multilateral solution is to be sought to eliminate the discrepancy 
among domestic laws. 4 
This research has demonstrated that the failure to address the issues of exhaustion and 
parallel importation in the TRIPS Agreement is to put in doubt the adequacy and 
effectiveness of the patent system under the Agreement. The integrity of the patent 
system as a whole could be jeopardised if national governments are-allowed to implement 
international exhaustion and limit the exercise of the exclusive marketing rights, justified 
on the ground of, for example, promoting free trade and competition. 5 The disparity 
among national policies will create distortion in global trade. Furthermore, the exclusion 
of the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property rights for the purpose of dispute 
settlement under the TRIPS Agreement 6 might lead to governments representing MPCs 
reverting to unilateral actions for the resolution of grievances arising from the application 
of international exhaustion that permits parallel imports, an undesirable consequence 
TRIPS MTNs tried to prevent. 
This thesis concludes that a multilateral solution needs to be found under the TRIPS 
Agreement to give legitimacy to the exclusive marketing rights in governments' domestic 
policy consideration. MTNs are the better option when it involves economic, legal, and 
4 Rancher gives the example of the application of community exhaustion for the purpose of creating an 
internal market in pharmaceuticals within the EU, which has proven to be a difficult and slow process: the 
EU member states have to surrender their sovereignty in policy areas such as safety regulations on 
pharmaceuticals and the general economic policy of price control or national reimbursement rules. See 
Hancher, Leigh, Regulating for Competition, London: Clarendon Press, 1990, p. 152. 
S When evaluating the desirability of bringing an issue into the jurisdiction of the WTO, the Economist 
suggests that it is necessary to ask whether the disparity among national policies in this area will distort 
global trade, and whether the existence of an international standard outweighs the benefits of accepting 
domestic rules which reflect local policy priorities. The Economist, January 15,2000, p. 99. 
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political considerations. It may be argued that, in the absence of an agreement to secure 
the recognition in domestic policy of the exclusive marketing rights, it could still be 
possible for the DSB to fine-tune the point of contention while balancing the exercise of 
the exclusive rights with the objective the global trading system to liberalise trade. But to 
solve the issue through litigation would establish a set of rules in a piecemeal and 
protracted manner. 7 It will also put the global trading system in a-reactive mode which 
does not serve the business community well in providing certainty and clarity to deal with 
new government or private business practices continuously emerging in response -to 
market dynamics. 
Inquiries into the impact on MPCs' commercial operations due to the absence of an 
agreement on how to secure the legal recognition of the exclusive marketing rights in the 
domestic policy are few and far between. As the TRIPS Agreement contains IPP of ICs' 
standards, the dislocating effects to the economy of DCs could be predicted with certainty 
in the short term, much of the post-TRIPS research in the area of patent protection for 
pharmaceuticals centre around economic impacts of the TRIPS Agreement on DCs and 
what TRIPS-consistent measures DCs could adopt to complement. their development 
objectives so to alleviate negative impacts to their domestic economies. 8 It might also be 
6 Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
7 Cornish, W. R., Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyrights, Trade Marks and Allied Rights, 4th ed., 
London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1999, ch. 1. 
8 See, for example, the following books, Srinivasan, T. N., Developing Countries and the Multilateral 
Trading System - From the GATT to the Uruguay Round and the Future, Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
Press, 1998, UNCTAD, The TRIPS Agreement and Developing Countries, NY: UN, 1996, and Martin, Will 
and L. Alan Winters (eds. ), The Uruguay Round and the Developing Countries, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996. See also the following articles: Broncker, Marco C. E. J., `The Impact of TRIPS: 
Intellectual Property Protection in Developing Countries', CMLR, 31,1994, pp. 1245-1281, Oddi, Samuel 
A., `TRIPS - Natural Rights and a `Polite Form of Economic Imperalism", VandJTL, 29(3), 1996, pp. 
415-469, and Subramanian, 1990a, note 1 above., pp. 252-265 
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because the assessment of the adequacy and effectiveness of the TRIPS Agreement is 
seen to be premature before it is fully implemented by all WTO members in 2005.9 
The present evaluation of the adequacy and effectiveness of the patent system from the 
perspective of MPCs provides the assessment from the global business community of the 
workability of the international legal regime for the patent protection of pharmaceuticals. 
As in the supply of medicines for AIDS to DCs, MPCs have already encountered the 
issues of compulsory licensing . 10 to facilitate the production of generic version of 
patented drugs which will lead to competition in-the domestic market. They also face the 
demand for lowering the price of medicine 11 affordable to DCs which could lead to more 
products for parallel importation destined for ICs. This case goes to prove the necessity 
of addressing the uncertainty in relation to how governments exercise their discretion in 
implementing the contractual licensing provision contained in the TRIPS Agreement and 
the issues of international exhaustion and parallel importation irrespective of whether the 
TRIPS Agreement is fully implemented by all WTO members. 
This thesis clearly identifies the parameters of the issue of how to establish the link 
between multilateral treaty obligations and domestic government policy portfolio in 
subsequent TRIPS MTNs. For the global trading system as a whole, the challenge 
remains to identify a equilibrium between the pragmatic approach that accommodates 
9 Transitional arrangements are applicable to DCs if they opt to take advantage of them. See Article 65 of 
the TRIPS Agreement and discussion in Chapter 4.3 of the thesis. 
'o An organisation called South Africa's Treatment Action Campaign was about to start a legal action 
seeking a compulsory licence from Pfizer, a MPC, for the production of cheap copies of Pfizer's patented 
product fluconazole for the treatment of certain opportunistic infections that plague AIDS patients. See FT, 
July 12,2000, p. 10. 
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different domestic economic and political agendas, and the judicial approach of 
establishing rule-based multilateral legal principles that provide binding obligations and 
yield the transparency and predictability global business communities look for. It is well 
recognised that the limitation of MTNs involves compromises and trade-offs in the 
negotiation process, and the necessity to respect national regulatory autonomy by 
allowing flexibility in the implementation of the - agreement so to make it politically 
acceptable to domestic constituencies. But the process of globalisation and the 
integration of global economy mean that the shift toward a rule-based global trading 
system is an inevitable consequence, and the global trading system needs to evolve in 
response, if not to take the lead. 
And with regard to future MTNs on TRIPS, ICs' spearheading the initiative remains a 
determined factor if they are to take place. They will involve a protracted series of 
negotiations among an extended set of bodies which includes governments, MPCs, the 
UN, 12 the World Health Organisation, and NGOs 13 with their own political agendas and 
priorities. A different negotiation dynamic has emerged which could impact on the role 
ICs play in future MTNs. It concerns the relationship between MPCs and their respective 
governments, in that, MPCs are faced with the need to call for their own governments to 
give full effect to the exclusive marketing rights conferred by the patent system under the 
11 See reports on the biennial world Aids conference taken place in Durban, South Africa. Ibid., and FT, 
July 8/July 9,2000, p. 12. 
12 The UN has established an umbrella group called UNAIDS to co-ordinate the anti-AIDS effort of various 
UN agencies. During the biannual conference on AIDS which took place In May 2000, five MPCs agreed 
with UNAIDS to slash the price of AIDS medicine for poor countries by 85%. Some commentators 
warned that, by doing so, MPCs run the risk of being asked to extend the price reduction to non-AIDS 
drugs, and that poor citizens in rich countries might also push for similar concessions. See The Economist, 
July 15th-21St 2000, p. 18 and FT, July 31,2000, p. 18. 
13 Ibid. 
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TRIPS Agreement because encouraging competition by means of parallel importation to 
control health care costs is also an"attractive policy option for ICs. 14 The issues of drug 
prices and supply have effect on how the compulsory licensing provision and the doctrine 
of exhaustion are to be implemented domestically. Engaging governments and MPCs in 
constructive dialogue is essential in this respect if there are to be meaningful negotiations, 
and to minimise the deviation of domestic policy remains an important objective in 
MTNs on TRIPS. 
" One recent example is the proposed US Senate amendment on legislation to allow drugs to be imported 
from any foreign factory approved by the Food and Drug Administration. It sends a clear message that 
patents in the US paying more for patented medicines than other western consumers is no longer 
acceptable. See FT, July 31,2000, p. 18. 
214 
Bibliography 
Abbott, Frederick M. 1989. "Protecting First World Assets in the Third World: 
Intellectual Property Negotiations in the GATT Multilateral Framework", Vanderbilt 
Journal of Transnational Law, 22(4), pp. 689-745. 
Abbott, Kenneth W. - 1996. Defensive Unfairness: The Normative Structure of Section 
301, in Bhagwati andHudec (eds. ), Fair Trade and Harmonisation - Prerequisites for 
Free Trade? Vol. 2:, Legal Analysis, Cambridge: The MIT Press. 
Adelman, Martin and Sonia Baldia. 1996. "Prospects and Limits of the Patent Provision 
in the TRIPS Agreement: The Case of India", Vanderbilt Journal of International law, 
29(3), pp. 507-533. 
Adikibi, Owen T.. 1988. "The Multinational Corporation and Monopoly of Patents in 
Nigeria", World Development, 16(4),. 1988, pp. 511-526. - 
Ahari, M. E. 1986. OPEC, The Failing Giant, Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. 
Arnold, M. I. B. and M. C. E. J. Bronckers. 1988. "The EEC New Trade Policy 
Instrument: Some Comments on Its Application", Journal of World Trade, 22(6), pp. 19- 
38. 
Baldwin, R. E. 1984. The Changing Nature of U. S. Trade Policy since World War II, in 
Baldwin and Krueger (eds. ), The Structure and Evolution of Recent U. S. Trade Policy, 
Chicago: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Barclays de Zoete Research. 1991. Pharmaceutical Industry Perspectives - The World's 
50 Best Selling Drugs, London: Barclays de Zoete Wedd Research. 
Barry Jones, R. J. 1995. Globalisation and Interdependence in the International Political 
Economy, London: Pinter Publishers. 
Basic Framework of GATT Provisions on Intellectual Property, Statement of Views of 
the European, Japanese and United States Business Communities. 1988. The Intellectual 
Property Committee (USA), UNICE (Europe), and Keidanren (Japan). 
Beier, Friedrick-Karl and J. Straus. 1977. "The Patent System and Its Information 
Function - Yesterday and Today", 8, IIC. 
, 
Berko, Robert. 1988. Intellectual Property Rights and New Technologies, in Walker 
and Bloomfield (eds. ), Intellectual Property Rights and Capital Formation in the Next 
Decade, Lanham, MD: The University Press of America. 
215 
Bhagwati, Jagdish. 1996. The Demands to Reduce Domestic Diversity Among Trading 
Nations, in Bhagwati and Hudec (eds. ), Fair Trade and Harmonisation, vol. 1, chapter 9, 
Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 
. 1994. Fair Trade, 
Reciprocity and Harmonisation: The New Challenge to 
the Theory and Policy of Free Trade, in Deardorff and Stern (eds. ), Analytical and 
Negotiating Issues - In the Global Trading System, Ann Arbor: The University of 
Michigan Press, pp. 547-598. 
1991. An Overview, in Bhagwati and Patrick (eds. ), Aggressive 
Unilateralism -. America's 301 Trade Policy and the World Trading System, London: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
1988. Protectionism, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 
Bhagwati, Jagdish and Hugh T. Patrick (eds. ). 1991. Aggressive Unilateralism - 
America's 301 Trade Policy and the World -. Trading System, London: = Harvester -: 
Wheatsheaf. 
Bifani, Paolo. 1989. Intellectual Property Rights and International Trade, Uruguay 
Round - Papers on Selected Issues, UNCTAD, NT: UN. 
Blakeney, Michael. 1996. Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A 
Concise Guide to the TRIPS Agreement, London: Sweet & Maxwell. 
Bogsch, Arpad. 1983. The First Hundred Years of the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property, Special Issue for the Commemoration of the Centenary 
of the Paris Convention, Industrial Property, Geneva: WIPO. 
Bodenhausen, G. H. C. 1968. Guide to the Application of the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property, Paris: United International Bureau for the Protection of 
Intellectual Property (BIRPI). 
Brada, Josef C. 1980. Government Policy and the Transfer of Pharmaceutical 
Technology Among Developed Countries, in Helms (ed. ), The International Supply of 
Medicines, Washington, D. C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 
pp. 37-70. 
Bradley, Jane A. 1987. "Intellectual property Rights, Investment and Trade in Services 
in the Uruguay Round: Laying the Foundations", Stanford Journal of International Law, 
23, pp. 57-98. 
Bronckers, Marco C. E. J. 1994. "The Impact of TRIPS: Intellectual Property Protection 
in Developing Countries", Common Market Law Review, 31, pp. 1245-1281. 
. 
216 
Brownlie, Ian. 1990. Principles of Public International Law, 4`h ed., Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Buckley, P. J. 1985. New Forms of International Industrial Co-operations, in Buckley 
and Casson (eds. ), The Economic Theory of the Multinational Enterprise, London: 
Macmillan, pp. 38-59. 
Chen, Edward K. Y. 1996. Transnational Corporations and Technology Transfer to 
Developing Countries, Transnational Corporations and World Development, published 
by Routledge on behalf of the UNXTAD division on Transnational Corporation and 
Investment, London: International Thomson Business Press. 
Clemente, C. L. 1988. 'A Pharmaceutical Industry Perspective;. in Walker and 
Bloomfield (eds. ), Intellectual Property Rights and. Capital Foundation in the Next 
Decade, American Centre for Capital Formation Centre. for PolicyResearch, Lanham, 
MD: University Press of America. 
Cline, William. 1983. Reciprocity: ANew Approach to. World. Trade Policy, '- in Cline 
(ed. ), trade Policy in the 1980s, Washington, D. C.: Institute for International Economics. 
Collin Susan M. and Barry P. Bosworth (eds. ). 1999. The New GATT - Implications for 
the United States, Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution. 
Committee for Economic Development. 1991. Breaking New Ground in U. S. Trade 
Policy, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. 
Cornish, W. R. 1999. Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyrights, Trade Marks and Allied 
Rights, 4t` ed., London: Sweet & Maxwell. 
Correa, Carlos M. 1992. "The Pharmaceutical Industry & Biotechnology Opportunities 
& Constraints for Developing Countries", The world competition, 15(42), pp. 43-63. 
Cottier, Thomas. 1991. "The Prospects for Intellectual. Property in GATT", Common 
Market Law Review, 28, pp. 383-414. 
D'Amato, Anthony and Doris Estelle Long (eds. ). 1997. International Intellectual 
Property Law, The Hague: Kluwer Law International. 
Davidson, W. H. and D. G. McFetridge. 1985. "Key Characteristics in the Choice of 
International Technology Transfer Mode", Journal of International Business Studies, 
XVI, pp. 5-21. 
Davis, L. 1991. Technology Intensity of US, Canada, and Japanese Manufacturers' 
Output and Exports, in Niosi (eds. ), Technology and National Competitiveness, 
Montreal: McGill - Queens. 
217 
David, Paul A. 1993. Intellectual Property Institutions and the Panda's Thumb: Patent, 
Copyrights, and Trade Secrets in Economic Theory and History, in Wallerstein, Mogee, 
and Schoen (eds. ), Global Dimensions of Intellectual Property Rights in Science and 
Technology, Office of International Affairs National Research Council, Washington, 
D. C.: National Academy Press, 1993, pp. 19-61. 
De Lacharriere, Guy Ladreit. 1987. The Legal Framework for International Trade, in 
Trade Policies for a Better Future - The "Leutwiler Report", The GATT and the Uruguay 
Round, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
Deardorff, A. V. and R. M. Stem. 1994. Multilateral Trade Negotiations and 
Preferential Trading Arrangements, in Deardorff and Stem (eds. ), Analytical and 
Negotiating Issues in the Global Trading System, ch. 2, Ann Arbor: The Michigan 
University Press. 
. 1979. 
American Labour's Stake in International Trade, in Institute for 
Contemporary Studies, Tariffs, Quotas and Trade: The Politics of Protectionism, San 
Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, pp. 125-148. 
. 1985. 
Methods of Measurement of Non-Tariff Barriers, Geneva: UNCTAD. 
Dhanjee, Rajan and Laurence Boisson de Chazournes. 1990. "Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS): Objectives, Approaches and Basic Principles of the 
GATT and of Intellectual Property Conventions", Journal of World Trade, 24. 
DiMasi, J. R., Henry H. Grabowski, and L. Lasagna. 1991. "The Cost of Innovation in 
the Pharmaceutical Industry", Journal of Health Economics, 10, pp. 107-142. 
Diwan , Ishac and 
Dani Rodrik. 1989. Patents, Appropriate Technology and North-South 
Trade, International Economic Department, WPS 251, Washington, D. C.: The World 
Bank. 
Drucker, Peter F. 1990. The Changed World Economy, in Vernon-Wortzel and Wortzel 
(eds. ), Global Strategic Management - The Essential, 2 °d ed., NY: John Wiley & Sons. 
Dunning, John H. 1998. "Location and the Multinational Enterprise: A Neglected 
Factor? " Journal of International Business Studies, 29(1), pp. 45-66. 
. 1993. 
Multinational Enterprise and the Global Economy, Reading, Mass: 
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company. 
The Economist, July 15th, 2000. 
, December 11,1999. 
, November 27,1999. 
218 
, August 14,1999. 
, May 8,1999. 
Einhorn, Talia. 1998. "The Impact of the WTO Agreement on TRIPS (Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) on EC Law: A Challenge to Regionalism, 
Common Market Law Review, 35, pp. 1069-1099. 
Emmert, Frank. 1990. "Intellectual Property in the Uruguay Round - Negotiating 
Strategies of the Western Industrialised Countries", Michigan Journal of International 
Law, 11(4), pp. 1317-1399. 
Espiell, Hector Gros. 1971. "The Most-Favoured-Nation Clause - Its Present 
significance in GATT". Journal of World Trade Law, 5(1), pp. 29-44. 
Evans, Gail E. 1996. "The Principle of national Treatment and the International 
Protection of Industrial Property", European Intellectual. Property Review, 3, pp. 149- 
160. 
Evans, Malcolm D. (ed. ). 1996. Blackstone's International Law Documents, 3`d ed., 
London: Blackstone Press Ltd.. 
Evenson, Robert E. 1990a. Survey of Empirical Study, in Siebeck, Evenson, Lesser and 
Primo Braga (eds. ), Strengthening Protection of Intellectual Property in Developing 
Countries -A Survey of the Literature, Part IV, World Bank Discussion Papers #112, 
Washington, D. C.: The World Bank. 
1990b. Intellectual Property Rights, R&D, Inventions, Technology 
Purchase, and Piracy in Economic Development: An International Comparative Study, in 
Evenson and Ranis (eds. ), Science and Technology - Lessons from Development Policy, 
ch. 14, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. 
1984. International Invention: Implication for Technology Market 
Analysis, in Griliches (ed. ), R&D, Patents, and Productivity, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Feinberg R. M. and D. J. Rousslang. 1990. "The Economic Effects of Intellectual 
Property Rights Infringements", Journal of Business, 63, pp. 79-90. 
Feketekuty, Geza. 1991. U. S. Policy on 301 and Super 301, in Bhagwati and Patrick 
(eds. ), Aggressive Unilateralism - America's 301 Trade Policy and the World Trading 
System, Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
219 
Fikentscher, Wolfgang. 1989. GATT Principles and Intellectual Property Protection, in 
Beier and Schricker (eds), GATT or WIPO? New Ways in the International Protection of 
Intellectual Property, Munich: Max Planck Institute. 
Financial Times, July 31,2000. 
, July 
8-10,2000. 
, May 19,2000. 
December 1-14,1999. 
October 26,1999. 
March 15,1999 
November 24 1998. 
November 13,1998. 
, September 24,1998. 
July 27,1998. 
, June 25,1998. 
, March 2,1998 
, December 16,1997. 
Finger, Michael J. and Paula Holmes, Unilateral Liberalisation and the MTNs, in Finger 
and Olechowski (eds. ), The Uruguay Round: A Handbook for the Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, Washington, D. C.: The World Bank, 1987 
Fox, Eleanor M. 1996. "Trade, Competition, and Intellectual Property - TRIPS and its 
Antitrust Counterparts", Vanderbilt Journal of International Trade Law, 29(3), pp. 481- 
505. 
1995. "Competition Law and the Agenda for the WTO: Forging the Links 
of Competition and Trade", Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, 4(1), pp. 1-36. 
Gadbaw, Michael R., and Rosemary E. Gwynn. 1988. Intellectual Property Rights in the 
New GATT Round, in Gadbaw and Richards (eds. ), Intellectual Property Rights - Global 
Consensus, Global Conflict? ch. 2, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. 
220 
Gadbaw, Michael and Timothy J. Richards. 1988a. Introduction, in Gadbaw and 
Richards (eds. ), Intellectual Property Rights - Global Consensus, Global Conflict? 
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. 
Gadbaw, Michael and Timothy J. Richards (eds. ). 1988b. Intellectual Property Rights - 
Global Consensus, Global Conflict? Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. 
Gadbaw, Michael R. 1989. "Intellectual Property and International Trade: Merger or 
Marriage of Convenience? ", Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 22(2), pp. 223- 
242. 
GATT, GATT-WTO News, GW/1 1,21 December 1994. 
, Focus, no. 107; May 1994. 
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, 15 April 1994. 
, BISD, 39th Supp., 1993. 
, MTN. TNC/W/FA, 20 December 1991. 
, BISD 37th Supp., 1990. 
, MTN. GNG/MIN(90)/ST/46,4 December 1990. 
, MTN. GNG/NGI 1/W/76,23 July 1990. 
, MTN. GNG/NGI 1/W/74,15 May 1990. 
, MTN. GNG. NGI 1/W/73,14 May 1990. 
, MTN. GNG/NG11/W/71,14 May 1990. 
, MTN. GNG. NG11/W/70,11 May 1990. 
, MTN. GNG/NG11/W/68,29 March 1990. 
, MTN. GNG/NG7/W/69,23 February 1990. 
, BISD 36 Supp., 1988-1989. 
, MTN. GNG/NG11/14,12 September 1989. 
, MTN. GNG/NG13/W/31,14 July. 1989. 
221 
, Focus - GATT Newsletter, 
May 1989. 
, 
MTN. TNC/11,21 April 1989. 
, BISD 34th Supp., 1988. 
MTN. TNC/7,9 December 1988. 
MTN. GNG/NG11/10,30 November 1988. 
MTN. GNG/NG11//tW/30,31 October 1988. 
MTN. GNG/NG1 IIW/28,19 October 1988. 
MTN. GNG/NG11/W/14 Rev. 1,17 October 1988. 
C/M1224,22 September; 1988. 
MTN. GNG/NG11/W/26; 7 July 1988. 
, MTN. 
GNG/NG11/W/25,29 June 1988. 
, MTN. GNGING11/W124,1988. 
MTN. GNG/NG11/W/22,12 February 1988. 
MTN. GNG/NG11/W/14,20 October 1987. 
MTN. GNG/NG11/W/17,23 November 1987. 
, MTN. GNG/NG11/W/16,6,20 November 1987. 
, MTN/GNG/NG 11 /W/6,22 May 1987. 
1987. Trade Policies for a Better Future -- The "Leutwiler Report", The GATT 
and the Uruguay Round, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
, MIN. DEC, 20 September 1986. 
PREP/COM(86)SR/9,26 August 1986. 
GATT Activities, 1986. 
PREP. COM(86)SR/3,11 April 1986. 
, International Trade 1984/85, Geneva: GATT, 1985. 
222 
, BISD 29 
`h Supp., 1983. 
, GATT Press 
Release no. 1312,5 March 1982. 
, BISD 
28 `h Supp., 1982. 
, L/5424,29 November 1982. 
, BISD 26 
`h Supp., 1980. 
L/4817,31 July 1979. 
1979. The Tokyo Round of -Multilateral Trade Negotiation, Report by the 
Director-General of GATT, Geneva: GATT. 
, BISD 18th Supp., -1972. 
BISD 9 `h Supp., 1961. 
1958. Trend in International Trade (J4aberler Report), Geneva: GATT. 
, BISD 3 
`d Supp., 1955. 
Gerefft, Gary. 1983. The Pharmaceutical Industry and Dependency in the Third World, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Gervais, Daniel J. 1999. "The TRIPS Agreement", European Intellectual Property 
Review, 21(3), 1999, pp. 156-165. 
Getlan, Myles. 1995. "TRIPS and the Future of Section 301: A Comparative Study of 
Trade Dispute Resolution", Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 34(1), pp. 173-218. 
Gibbons, Sam M. 1988. US Trade Legislation and -Intellectual Property Rights, in 
Walker and Bloomfield (eds. ), Intellectual Property Rights and Capital Formation iii- the 
Next Decade, Lanham, MD: University Press of America. 
Gill, S. and David Law. 1988. The Global Political Economy, Hempstead: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf. 
Gorlin, Jacques J. 1993. Updating on International Negotiations on Intellectual Property 
Rights, in Wallerstein, Mogee and Schoen (eds. ), Global Dimensions of Intellectual 
Property Rights in Science and Technology, Washington, D. C.: National Academy Press. 
223 
Grabowski, Henry. 1994a. Price and Profit Control, New Competitive Dynamics and the 
Economics of Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry, in Towse (ed. ), Industrial 
Policy and the Pharmaceutical Industry, London: Office of Health Economics. 
. 1994b. 
Health Reform and Pharmaceutical Innovation, Washington, D. C.: 
American Enterprise Institute of Public Research. 
Grabowski, H. and J Vernon. 1992. "Brand Loyalty, Entry and Price Competition in 
Pharmaceuticals after the 1984 Drug Act", Journal of Law and Economics, 35, pp. 331- 
350. 
Greenaway, David and Robert C. Hine. 1991. Introduction: Trends in World Trade and 
Protection, in Greenaway, Hine, O'Brien, and Thornton (eds. ), Global Protectionism, 
Hampshire: MacMillan Academic and Professional Ltd.. 
Grey, Rodney. 1982. United States Trade Policy Legislation: Canadian View, Montreal: 
The Institute for Research on Public Policy. 
Haggard, Stephan. 1995. Developing Nations and the Politics of Global Integration, 
Washington, D. C.: The Brooking Institution. 
Haley, John L. 1995. "Competition and Trade Policy: Antitrust Enforcement: Do 
Differences Matter? " Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, 4(1), pp. 302-325. 
Ham, Alllard D. 1993. "International Cooperation in the Anti-trust Field and in 
Particular the Agreement between the United States of America and the Commission of 
the European Communities", Common Market Law Review, 30, pp. 531-597. 
Hancher, Leigh. 1990. Regulating for Competition, London: Clarendon Press. 
Hansen, R. 1979. The Pharmaceutical Development Process: Estimates of Current 
Development Costs and Times and the Effects of Regulatory Changes, in Chien (ed. ), 
Issues in Pharmaceutical Economics, Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books. 
Hart, Michael M. 1997. "The WTO and the Political Economy of Globalisation", 
Journal of World Trade, 31(5), pp. 75-93. 
. 1981. 
"The Mercantilist's Lament: National Treatment and Modern Trade 
Negotiations", Journal of World Trade Law, 21(6), pp. 37-61. 
Hartridge, David and Arvind Subramanian. 1989. "Intellectual Property Rights: The 
Issues in GATT", Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 22(4), pp. 894-910. 
Hay, Keith A. and B. Andrei Sulzen ko. 1982. "U. S. Trade Policy and "Reciprocity", 
Journal of World Trade Lmv, 16(6), pp. 471-479. 
224 
Heinemann, Andreas. 1996. Antitrust Law of Intellectual property in the TRIPS 
Agreement of the World Trade Organisation, in Beier and Schricker (eds. ), From GATT 
to TRIPS -- The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Munich: The Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Patent, Copyright and 
Competition Law, pp. 237-247. 
Hine, Robert C. 1991. Protection in the European Community Before and After 1992, in 
Greenaway, Hine, O'Brien, and Thornton (eds. ), Global Protectionism, Hampshire: 
MacMillan Academic and Professional Ltd.. 
Hoekman, Bernard. 1994. Services and Intellectual Property Rights, in Collins and. 
Bosworth (eds. ), The New GATT - Implications for the United States, Washington, D. C:: 
The Brookings Institution, pp. 84-111. 
Hoekman, Bernard M. and Petros C. Mavroidis, Policy Externalities and High-Tech 
Rivalry: Competition and Multilateral Co-operation Beyond the WTO, in OECD, Market 
Access after the Uruguay Round: Investment, Competition and Technology Perspectives, 
Paris: OECD, 1996, pp. 187-235 
Hoekman, Bernard M. and Petros C. Mavroidis. ' 1994. "Competition, Competition 
Policy and the GATT", The World Competition, pp. 121-150. 
Hoekman, Bernard and Michael Kostecki. 1995. The Political Economy of the World.. 
Trading System from GATT to WTO, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Holmes, Jeremy and John Dunning. 1994. Factors Influencing the Location of 
Multinational Investment in the Pharmaceutical Industry, in Towse (ed. ), Industrial 
Policy and the Pharmaceutical Industry, London: Office of Health Economics. 
Hudec, Robert. 1998. The Role of the GATT Secretariat in the Evolution of the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Procedure, in Bhagwati and Hirsch (eds. \0, The Uruguay Round and 
Beyond - Essays in Honour of Arthur Dunkel, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, pp. 101-122. 
. 
1993. Enforcing International Trade Law - The Evolution of the Modern 
GATT Legal System, New Hampshire: Butterworth Legal Publishers. 
. 1991. Thinking About the New Section 301: Beyond Good and Evil, in 
Bhagwati and Patrick (eds. ), Aggressive Unilateralism - America's 301 Trade Policy and 
the World Trading System, Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
. 1990. The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy, 2°d ed., New Hampshire: Butterworth Legal Publishers. 
. 1987. Developing Countries 
in the GATT Legal System, London: Trade 
Policy Research Centre. 
225 
Hufbauer, G. 1989. Background Paper, in The Free Trade Debate: Report on the 
Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on the Future of American Trade Policy, NY: 
Priority Press. 
Hufbauer, Gary Clyde and Jeffrey J. Schott. 1993. NAFTA - An Assessment, 
Washington, D. C.: Institute for International Economics. 
Hurlbut, David. 1994. "Fixing the Biodiversity Convention: Toward a Special Protocol 
for Related Intellectual Property", National Resources Journal, 34. 
IFPMA. 1999. IFPMA Position Paper - WTO Millennium Round, Geneva: IFPMA. 
IMF. 1993. Balance of Payment Manual, 5th ed., Washington, D. C.: IMF. 
Jackson, John. 1998. The Uruguay Round Results and National Sovereignty, in 
Bhagwati and Hirsch (eds. ), The Uruguay Round and Beyond - Essays in Honour of 
Arthur Dunkel, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, pp. 293-304. 
1994. The World Trade Organisation, Dispute Settlement, and Codes of 
Conduct, in Collins and Bosworth (eds. ), The New GATT - Implications for the United 
States, Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, pp. 63-83. 
1992. The Woild `Trading System - Law and Policy of International 
Economic Relations, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 
1990. Restructuring the GATT System, London: Royal Institute of 
International Affairs. 
. 1978. 
"The Crumbling Institutions of the Liberal Trade System", Journal 
of World Trade Law, 12(2), pp. 93-107. 
1969. World Trade and the Law of GATT, NY: The Bobbs-Merrill Co. 
Inc. 
1967. "The GATT in US Domestic Law", Michigan Law Review, 66. 
, 
William Davey and Alan 0. Sykes Jr. 1995. Legal Problems of 
International Economic Relations - Cases, Material and Text on the National and 
International Regulation of Transnational Economic Relations, Yd ed., St Paul: West 
Publishing Co.. 
Kastenmeier Robert W. and David Beier. 1989. "International Trade and Intellectual 
Property: Promise, Risks, and Reality", Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 22(2), 
pp. 285-307. 
226 
Khan, K. R. 1987. International Law of Development and the Law of the GATT, in 
Snyder and Slinn (eds. ), International Law of Development: Comparative Perspectives, 
Abingdon: Professional Books. 
Kinnock, Neil. 1994. "Beyond Free Trade to Fair Trade", California Management 
Review, pp. 124-135. 
Kirim, Arman S. 1985. "Reconsidering patents and Economic Development: A Case 
Study of the Turkish Pharmaceutical Industry", World Development, 13(2), pp. 219-236. 
Kitch, Edmund, W. 1997. "The Nature and Function of the Patent System", Journal of 
Law and Economics, 20. 
Kogut, Bruce. 1990. Designing Global Strategies, Comparative and Competitive Value- 
Added Chains, in Vernon-Wortzel and Wortzel (eds. ), Global Strategic Management - 
The Essential, 2 "d ed.,. NY: John Wiley & Sons. 
Kondo, Edson K. 1995. "The Effect of Patent Protection on Foreign Direct Investment", 
Journal of World Trade, 29, pp. 97-122. 
Krugman, Paul. 1987. Technology-Intensive Goods, in Finger and Olechowski (eds. ) 
The Uruguay Round -A Handbook for the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Washington, 
D. C.: The World Bank. 
Kunz-Hallstein, Hans Peter. 1989. "The United States Proposal for a GATT Agreement 
on Intellectual Property and the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property", Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 22(2), pp. 265-284. 
. 1979. "The 
Revision of the International System of Patent Protection in 
the Interest of Developing Countries", IIC, 10, pp. 649-670. 
Kuroda, Makoto. 1991. Super 301 and Japan, in Bhagwati and Patrick (eds. ), 
Aggressive Unilateralism - America's 301 Trade Policy and the World Trading System, 
Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
Lall, Sanjaya. 1976. "The Patent System and the Transfer of Technology to LDCs", 
Journal of World Trade Law, 10(1), pp. 1-16. 
Lee, Karen and Silke von Lewinski. 1996. The Settlement of International Disputes in 
the Field of Intellectual Property, in Beier and Schricker (eds. ), From GATT to TRIPS, 
IIC Studies in Industrial Property and Copyright Law, Munich: Max Planck Institution 
for Foreign and International Patent, Copyright and Competition Law. 
Levin, Richard C., Alvin K. Klevorick, Richard R. Nelson, and Sidney G. Winter. 1989. 
Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development, Cowles 
227 
Foundation Paper no. 714, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics at Yale 
University. 
Lesser, William. 1990. An Overview of Intellectual Property Systems, in Siebeck, 
Evenson, Lesser and Primo Braga (eds. ), Strengthening Protection of Intellectual 
Property in Developing Countries -A Survey of the Literature, Part II, World Bank 
Discussion Papers #112, Washington, D. C.: The World Bank, pp. 2-15. 
Lipsey, Robert E. 1995. Outward Direct Investment and the US Economy, in Feldstein, 
Hines, and Hubbard (eds. ), The Effects of Taxation on Multinational Corporations, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Long, Olivier. 1987. Law and its Limitations in the GATT Multilateral Trade System, 
Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
Low, Patrick. 1993. Trading Free -- The GAU and US Trade Policy, New York: The 
Twentieth Century Fund Press. 
MacLaughlin, Janet H., Timothy Richards, and Leigh A Kenny. 1988. The Economic 
Significance of Piracy, in Gadbaw and Richards (eds. ), Intellectual Property Rights - 
Global Consensus, Global Conflict? ch. 3, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. 
Malaguti, Maria-Chiara. 1998. "Restrictive Business Practices in International Trade 
and the Role of the World Trade Organisation", Journal of World Trade, 32(3), pp. 117- 
151. 
Mansfield, Edwin. 1995. Intellectual Property Protection, Direct Investment, and 
Technology Transfer - Germany, Japan, and the United States, international Finance 
Corporation, Discussion Paper #27, Washington, D. C., the World Bank. 
. 1994. Intellectual Property Protection, Foreign Direct Investment, and 
Technology Transfer, International Financial Corporation, Discussion Paper #19, 
Washington, D. C.: The World Bank. 
. 1993. Unauthorised Use of Intellectual Property: Effects on Investment, Technology Transfer, and Innovation, in Wallerstein, Mogee, and Schoen (eds. ), Global 
Dimensions of Intellectual Property Rights in Science and Technology, Office of 
International Affairs National Research Council, Washington, D. C., National Academy 
Press, pp. 107-145. 
. 
1986. "Patent and Innovation: An Empirical Study", Management Science, 
32, pp. 173-181. 
. 1985. "How Rapidly does Industrial Technology Leak Out", The Journal 
of Industrial Economics, 34(2), pp. 217-223. 
228 
Martin, Will and L. Alan Winters (eds. ). 1996. The Uruguay Round and the Developing 
Countries, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Maskus, K. E. 1990. "Normative Concerns in the International Protection of Intellectual 
Property Rights", The World Economy, 13, pp. 387-409. 
Maskus, Keith. E. and Denise Eby Konan. 1994. Trade Related Intellectual Property 
Rights: Issues and Exploratory Results, in Deardorff and Stern (eds. ), Analytical and 
Negotiating Issues in the Global Trading System, ch. 10, Ann Arbor: The Michigan 
University Press. 
McGovern, Edmond. 1986. -- International Trade Regulation: GATT, The United States, 
and the European Community, Exeter: Globefield Press. 
Mead, Richard. 1998. International Management - Cross Cultural Dimensions, 2°d ed., 
Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 
Meessen, Karl M. 1987. "Intellectual Property Rights in International Trade", Journal of 
World Trade Law, 21(1), pp. 67-74. 
Milner, Chris. 1991. Graduation and Reciprocity, in Greenaway, Hine, O'Brien, and 
Thornton (eds. ), Global Protectionism, Hampshire: MacMillan Academic and 
Professional Ltd.. 
Milner, Helen. 1991. The Political Economy of U. S. Trade Policy: A Study of the Super 
301 Provision, in Bhagwati and Patrick (eds. ), Aggressive Unilateralism - America's 301 
Trade Policy and the World Trading System, Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
. 1988. Resisting 
Protectionism, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Mody, Ashoka. 1990. New International Environment for Intellectual Property Rights, 
in Rushing and Brown (eds. ), Intellectual Property Rights in Science and Technology and 
Economic Performance, ch. 10, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. 
Moreira, Marcilio Marques. 1991. The Point of View of an Emerging Trading nation: 
Brazil, in Bhagwati and Hirsch (eds. ), Aggressive Unilateralism - America's 301 Trade 
Policy and the World Trading System, London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, pp. 257-260. 
Moy, Carl R. 1993. "The History of the Patent Harmonisation Treaty: Economic Self- 
Interest as an Influence", John Marshall Law Review, 26. 
Nau, Henry R. 1979. Bargaining in the Uruguay Round, in Finger and Olechowski 
(eds. ), the Uruguay Round: A Handbook for the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 
Washington, D. C.: The World Bank. 
New York Times, May 27,1989, Sec. A. 
229 
May 20,1989, Sec. A. 
, May 13,1989. 
Nogues, Julio. 1990. Patents and Pharmaceutical Drugs: Understanding the Pressures on 
Developing Countries, International Economic Department, Washington, D. C.: The 
World Bank. 
Oddi, Samuel A. 1996. "TRIPS - Natural Rights and a `Polite Form of Economic 
Imperialism"', Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 29(3), pp. 415-469. 
1987. "The International Patent System and Third World Development: 
Reality or Myth? " Duke Law Journal, 1987, pp. 831-878. 
OECD, TD/TC/WP99815Final, February 2,1999. 
1994. Sector Case Study of Globalisation in the=Pharmaceutical Industry, Paris- 
OECD. 
. 1992. Detailed Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment, 2°d ed., Paris: OECD. 
1991. Economic Outlook Historical Statistics 1960-1989, Paris: OECD. 
. 1989. Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Rights, Paris: OECD. 
1987. International Technology Licensing: Survey Result, Paris: OECD. 
Ohmae, Kenichi. 1990. The Borderless World - Power and Strategy in the Interlinked 
Economy, London: Collins. 
Olechowski, Andrzej. 1987. Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade, in Finger and Olechowski 
(eds. ), The Uruguay Round: A Handbook for the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 
Washington, D. C.: The World Bank. 
Otten, Adrian and Hannu Wager. 1996. "Compliance with TRIPS: The Emerging World 
View", Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 29(3), pp. 391-413. 
Parker, John E. S. 1980. Pharmaceuticals and Third World Concerns: The Lall Report 
and the Otago Study, in Helms (eds. ), The International Supply of Medicines, 
Washington, D. C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, pp. 135- 
146. 
230 
Patterson, Gardner and Eliza Patterson. 1987. Objectives of the Uruguay Round, in 
Finger and Olechowski (eds. ), The Uruguay Round: A Handbook for the Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations, Washington, D. C.: The World Bank. 
Pecchioli, R. M. 1983. The Internationalisation of Banking: The Policy Issues, Paris: 
OECD. 
Penrose, E. 1973. "International Patenting and the Less-Developed Countries", 
Economic Journal, 83, pp. 768-786. 
Pescatore, Piere. 1993. "The GATT Dispute Settlement Mechanism", Journal of World 
Trade, 27(1). 
Petersmann, Ernest-Ullrich. 1994: "The Dispute Settlement , System of the World Trade 
Organisation and the Evolution of the GATT Dispute Settlement System since 1948", 
Common Market Law Review, 31. - -. 
. 1993. 
"International Competition Rules for the GATT. - MTO World 
Trade and Legal System", Journal of World Trade, 27(6), pp. 35-85. '. 
Porter, Michael E. 1990. The Competitive Advantage of Nations, London: MacMillan. 
Prebisch, R. 1962. "The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal - 
Problems", Economic Bulletin for Latin America, 7, pp. 1-22. 
Primo Braga, Carlos Alberto. 1996. Trade-Related Intellectual Property Issues: The 
Uruguay Round Agreement and its Economic Implications, in Martin and Winters (eds. ), 
The Uruguay Round and the Developing Countries, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
1993. Intellectual Property Rights in NAFTA: Implications for 
International Trade, in Riggs and Velk (eds. ), Beyond NAFTA: An Economic, Political 
and Sociological perspective, Vancouver: The Fraser Institute. 
. 1990a. Guidance from Economic Theory, in Siebeck, Evenson, Lesser and 
Primo Braga (eds. ), Strengthening Protection of Intellectual Property in Developing 
Countries -A Survey of the Literature, Part III, World Bank Discussion Papers #112, 
Washington, D. C.: The World Bank. 
1990b. The Developing Country Case for and Against Intellectual 
Property Protection, in Siebeck, Evenson, Lesser and Primo Braga (eds. ), Strengthening 
Protection of Intellectual Property in Developing Countries -A Survey of the Literature, 
Part VII, World Bank Discussion Papers #112, Washington, D. C.: The World Bank 
. 1989. "The 
Economics of Intellectual Property Rights and the GATT: A 
View From the South", Vanderbilt Journal of Transnatiönal Law, 22(2), pp. 243-264. 
231 
Qureshi, Asif H. 1999. International Economic Law, London: Sweet & Maxwell. 
1V/ 
Raghavan, Chakravarthi. 1990. Recolonisation - GATT, the Uruguay Round & the 
Third World, London: Zed Books Ltd. and Third World Network in Malaysia. 
Ray, Edward J. 1991. Protection of Manufacturers in the US Protectionism, in 
Greenaway, Hine, O'Brien, and Thornton (eds. ), Global Protectionism, Hampshire: 
MacMillan Academic and Professional Ltd., pp. 12-36. 
1981. "The Determinants of Tariff and Non-Tariff Trade Restrictions in 
the United States", Journal of Political Economy, 89(1), pp. 105-121. 
Ray E. J. and H. P. Marvel. 1984. "The Pattern of Protection in the Industrialised 
World", Review of Economics and Statistics. 
Redwood, Heinz. 1994. New Horizons in India, Suffolk: Oldwicks Press. 
1993. Price. Regulation and pharmaceutical Research - The Limits of Co - 
Existence, Suffolk: Oldwicks Press. 
Reichman, J. H. 1996. "Compliance with the TRIPS Agreement: Introduction to a 
Scholarly Debate", Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational, 29(3), pp. 363-390. 
1989. "Intellectual Property in International Trade: Opportunities and 
Risks of a GATT Connection", Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 22(4), pp. 747- 
891. 
Ringo, Frederick. 1994. "The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
Agreement in the GATT and Legal Implications for Sub-Saharan Africa", Journal of 
World Trade, 28(6). 
Roberts, Tim. 1998. "Paper, Scissors, Stone", European Intellectual Property Review, 
20(3), pp. 89-91. 
Roessler, Frieder. 1996. Diverging Domestic Policies and Multilateral Trade 
Integration, in Bhagwati and Hudec (eds. ), Fair Trade and Harmonisation, Vol. 2: Legal 
Analysis, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 
. 1987. 
The Scope, Limits, and Function of the GATT Legal System, in 
GATT, Trade Policies for a Better Future - The "Leutwiler Report", The GATT and the 
Uruguay Round, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
Rothnie, W. A. 1993. Parallel Imports, London: Sweet & Maxwell. 
232 
Rowthorn, Robert and Richard Kozul-Wright. 1988. Globalisation and Economic 
Convergence: An Assessment, Discussion Paper no. 131, Geneva: UNCTAD. 
Rozek, Richard P. 1988. "Protection of Intellectual Property Through Licensing: 
Efficiency Considerations", Journal of World Trade, 22(5), pp. 27-34. 
Scherer, F. M. 1994. Competition Policies for an Integrated World Economy, 
Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution. 
Schumann, Gunda. 1990. Economic Development and Intellectual Property Protection 
in Southeast Asia: Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Thailand, in Rushing and Brown 
(eds. ), Intellectual. Property Rights in Science and Technology and Economic 
Performance, ch. 9, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. 
Scrip, April 12,1994. 
Shea, Nicholas. 1997. "Parallel Importers' Use of Trade Marks: The European Court of 
Justice-Confers Rights but also Imposes Responsibility", European. Intellectual property 
Review, 3, pp. 103-114. 
Sherwood, Robert. 1993. Why a Uniform Intellectual Property System Makes Sense for 
the World, in Wallerstein, Mogee, and Schoen (eds. ), Global Dimensions of Intellectual 
Property Rights in Science and Technology, Office of International Affairs National 
Research Council, Washington, D. C., National Academy Press, pp. 68-88. 
1990. Intellectual Property and Economic Development, Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press. 
Siebeck, Wolfgang E. 1990. Conclusions and Recommendations, in Siebeck, Evenson, 
Lesser and Primo Braga (eds. ), Strengthening Protection of Intellectual Property in 
Developing Countries -A Survey of the Literature, Part VIII, World Bank Discussion 
Papers #112, Washington, D. C.: The World Bank. 
Siebeck, Wolfgang E., Robert E. Evenson, William Lesser, and Carlos A. Primo Braga 
(eds. ). 1990. Strengthening Protection of Intellectual Property in Developing Countries 
-A Survey of the Literature, World Bank Discussion Papers #112, Washington, D. C.: 
The World Bank. 
Srinivasan, T. N. 1998. Developing Countries and the Multilateral Trading System - 
From the GATT to the Uruguay Round and the Future, Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
Press. 
Stamm. Otto A. 1993. Intellectual Property Rights and Competitive Strategy: A 
Multinational pharmaceutical Firm, in Wallerstein, Mogee, and Schoen (eds. ), Global 
Dimensions of Intellectual Property Rights in Science and Technology, Office of 
233 
International Affairs National Research Council, Washington, D. C., National Academy 
Press, pp. 221-228. 
"Statement of Forty Economists on American Trade Policy". 1989. The World 
Economy, 12, pp. 263-265. 
Statman, M. 1981. The Effect of Patent Expiration on the Market Position of Drugs, in 
Helms (ed. ), Drugs and Health: Economic Issues and Policy Objectives, Washington, 
D. C.: American Enterprise for Public Policy Research.. 
Stephenson, Sherry M. 1999. "Mutual Recognition and its Role in Trade Facilitation", 
Journal of World Trade, 33(2), pp. 141-150. 
Stern, Richard H. 1987. Intellectual Property, in Finger and Olechowski (eds. ), A 
Handbook for the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Washington, D. C.: The World Bank. 
Stem, Robert and Bernard Hoekman. 1987. The Code Approach, in Finger and 
Olechowski (eds. ), The Uruguay Round - `A Handbook on the'- Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, Washington, D. C.: The World Bank. 
Stewart, Francis. 1990. Technology Transfer for Development, in Evenson and Ranis 
(eds. ), Science and Technology - Lessons from Development Policy, Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press. 
Stewart, Terence P. (ed. ). 1993. The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History 
(1986-1992), vol. I& II, Deventer: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers. 
Stopford, John M. 1990. The Growing Interdependence between Transnational 
Corporations and Government, in Vernon-Wortzel and Wortzel (eds. ), Strategic 
Management in a Global Economy, NY; John Wiley & Sons. 
Straus, Joseph. 1996. Implications of the TRIPS Agreement in the Field of Patent Law, 
in Beier and Schricker (eds. ), From GATT to TRIPS -- The Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Munich: The Max Planck Institute for Foreign 
and International Patent, Copyright and Competition Law, pp. 160-215. 
Subedi, Surya P. 1996. Land and Maritime Zones of Peace in International Law, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Subramanian, Arvind. 1990a. "Putting Some Numbers on the TRIPS Pharmaceutical 
Debate", International Journal of Technology Management, 10(2/3), pp. 252-265. 
. 1990b. "TRIPs and the Paradigm of the GATT: a Tropical, Temperate View", The World Economy, 13(4), pp. 509-521. 
234 
Takase, T. 1987. "The Role of Concessions in the GATT Trading System and Their 
Implications for Developing Countries", Journal of World Trade Law, pp. 67-89. 
Taylor C. T. and Z. H. Silberston. 1973. The Economic Impact of the Patent System: A 
Study of British Experience, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Tirole, Jean. 1988. The Theory of Industrial Organisation, Cambridge: The MIT Press. 
Ullrich, Hanns. 1995. "TRIPS: Adequate Protection, Inadequate Trade, Adequate 
Competition Policy", Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, 4(1), pp. 153-210. 
1989. GATT: Industrial Property Protection, Fair Trade and Development, 
in Beier and Schricker (eds. ), . 
GATT or WIPO? New Ways in the International 
Protection of Intellectual Property; Munich: Max Planck Institute. 
UN. 1998. World'Investment Report 1998: Trends and Determinants, NY: UN. 
. 1997. World' 
Investment Report : 1997 - Transnational Corporations, Market 
Structure and Competition Policy,: NY: UN. 
1996. The TRIPS Agreement and Developing Countries - Prepared by the 
UNCTAD Secretariat, NY: UN. 
. 1996. World 
Investment Report - Investment, Trade and International Policy 
Arrangements, NY; UN. 
GA Res. 3281 (XXIV), UN Doc. A/RES/3281 (XXU) 1975,14 ILM 251,1975. 
, 
GA Res. 3346,29(1), UN GAOR Supp. (no. 31), UN Doc. A/9361,1974. 
, GA Res. 3201 
(S-VI), UN Doc. A/RES/3201 (S-VI) 1974,13 ILM 715,1974. 
, 
GA Res. 2625 (XXXV), 25 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 28), UN Doc. A/8028,1970. 
, 
GA Res. 2200,21 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 16), UN Doc. A/6316,1966. 
1964. The Role of Patents in the Transfer of Technology to Developing 
Countries, UN Doc. E/3861/Rev. 1. 
UN, UNCTAD, WIPO, The Role of the Patent System in the Transfer of Technology to 
Developing Countries, UN Doc. TDB/AC. 11/19,1974. 
UNCTAD, 1996. The TRIPS Agreement and Developing Countries, NY: UN. 
, TD/B/COM. 2/2/Add. 1,26 
September 1996. 
235 
, TDB/COM. 
2/EM/2,28 August 1996. 
1995. World Investment Report 1995, NY: UN. 
. 
1994. The Outcome of the Uruguay Round: An Initial Assessment - 
Supporting Papers to the Trade and Development Report 1994, NY: UN. 
. 1994. The Least Developed 
Countries: 1993-1994 Report, NY: UN. 
. 1993. World 
Investment Report 1993, NY: UN. 
. 1990a. 
Further Consultations on a Draft International Code of Conduct on 
the Transfer of Technology - Report by the Secretary General of UNCTAD, TD/CODE 
TOT/56. 
1990b. Uruguay Round: Further Papers on Selected Issues, NY: UN. 
1989. Uruguay Round: Papers on Selected Issues, Trade and 
Development, NY: UN. 
. 1987. 
Foreign Direct Investment, the Service Sector, and International 
Banking, NY: UN. 
1983. Code of Conduct for the International Transfer of Technology, UN 
Doc. TD/CODE TOT/41. 
, Major 
Issues Arising From Technology Transfer to Developing Countries, 
UN Doc. TDB/AC. 11/1O/Rev. 2,1975. 
. 1974. The Role of the 
Patent System in the Transfer of Technology to 
Developing Countries, UN Doc. TDB/AC. 11/19. 
. 1968. 
Agreed Conclusion of the Special Committee on Preferences, UN 
Doc. TDB/330, Part I. 
UNCTC. 1987. Foreign Direct Investment, the Service Sector, and International 
Banking, NY: UN. 
US International Trade Commission. 1988. "Economic Effects of Intellectual Property 
Right Infringement (Investigation No. 332-245) ", Journal of World Trade, 22(4), pp. 
101-114. 
US Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission. 1995. Anti-trust Guidelines 
for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, 4, Trade Regulation Report. 
236 
Vaitsos, Constantine V. 1976. "The Revision of the International Patent System: Legal 
Considerations for a Third World Position", World Development, 4(2), pp. 85-102. 
1972. "Patent Revisited: Their Function in Developing Countries", 
Journal of Development Studies, 9(1), pp. 71-97. 
Van Eeckhaute, Jean Charles. 1999. "Private Complaints against Foreign Unfair Trade 
Practices - The EC's Trade Barriers Regulation", Journal of World Trade, 33(6), pp. 
199-213. 
Vernon, Raymond. - 1998. In the Hurricane's Eye - The Troubled Prospects of 
Multinational Enterprises, Massachusetts: Harvard-University Press. 
. 1994. "Research on Transnational Corporation: Shedding Old Paradigms", Transnational Corporation, 3(2), pp. 137-156. 
Whalley, John (cord. ). 1989. The Uruguay Round and-Beyond ' The Final Report from the Ford Foundation : Project on Developing Countries and the. Global Trading System, 
London: The MacMillan Press Ltd.. 
Whalley, John. 1991. Recent Trade Liberalisation in the Developing World: What is 
Behind it and Where is it Headed? In Greenaway, Hine, O'Brien, and Thornton (eds. ), 
Global Protectionism, Hampshire: The MacMillan Academic and Professional Ltd.. 
Wilcox, Clair. 1949. A Charter for World Trade, NY: Arno Press Inc. 
Wineberg, Arthur. 1988. "The Japanese Patent System: A Non-Tariff Barrier to Foreign 
Businesses? " Journal of World Trade, 22(1), pp. 11-21. 
Winters, Alan. 1987. Reciprocity, in Finger and Olechowski (eds. ), The Uruguay 
Round: A Handbook for the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Washington, D. C.: The 
World Bank. 
WIPO. 1998. General Information, Geneva:. WIPO. 
1994. General Information, Geneva: WIPO. 
. 1989. Guide to the Application of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Geneva: WIPO. 
PR/DC/3, June 25,1979. 
PR/PIC/I1/13, July 22,1977, Annex 2. 
World Bank. 1999. World Development Report, 1998/99, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press for the World Bank. 
237 
. 1993. 
The East Asian Miracle - Economic Growth and Public Policy, A 
World Bank Policy Research Report, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
WTO, WT/DS 114/R, 17 March 2000. 
, WT/DS152/R, 22 
December 1999. 
, WT/DS26/ARB, 12 
July, 1999. 
WT/DS27/RW/ECU, 12 April, 1999. 
Focus, no. 37, January - February, 1999 
Focus, no. 36, November 1998. 
WT/DS79/R, 24 August, 1998. 
., Focus, no. 27, February 1998. 
, Focus, no. 
23, October 1997. 
WT/DS50/AB/R, 19 December 1997. 
Yamamoto, Shusaku. 1995. "A Reversal of Fortune for Patentees and Parallel Importers 
in Japan", European Intellectual Property Review, 7, pp. 341-343. 
Yarrow, George. 1994. CEC and EC Member State Industrial Policy and the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, in Towse (ed. ), Industrial Policy and the Pharmaceutical 
Industry, London: Office of Health Economics, pp. 1-12. 
Yusuf, Abdulgawi A. 1989. Developing Countries and Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights, Uruguay Round - Papers on Selected Issues, UNCTAD, NY: 
UN. 
1980. "Differential and More Favourable Treatment - The GATT 
Enabling Clause", Journal of World Trade Law, 14(5), pp. 488-507. 
Yusuf, Abdulgawi and Andres Moncayo von Hase. 1992. "Intellectual Property 
Protection and International Trade - Exhaustion of Rights Revisited", World 
Competition, 16(1), pp. 115-131. 
Zutshi, B. K. 1998. Bringing TRIPS into the Multilateral Trading System, in Bhagwati 
and Hirsch (eds. ), The Uruguay Round and Beyond - Essays in Honour of Arthur 
Dunkel, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, pp. 37-49. 
238/ 
